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Abstract 
This thesis draws on the 'critical case' of Sweden and focuses on the provision of 
pensions to assess the extent to which the post-war social democratic regime and 
adherent meanings and practices in daily life have been transformed in a neoliberal 
direction. The Swedish economy of the late 1990s, still distinctly social democratic, 
although retrenched and increasingly 'financialised', was not stable. The 1999 pension 
reform has further privatised financial risk and hence potentially advanced 
neoliberalism. By subjecting the ability to consume, in working-life as well as m 
retirement, to financial market performance, the rate of growth of inequity 1s 
accelerated. The systemic infrastructure and the knowledge-formation required for this 
pension system to function as intended as well as be accepted as legitimate seem 
however to be lacking. The system engineers, following neoliberal ideas, sought to 
fulfil the objective of institutionalising a mass investment culture in the everyday by 
promoting the notion of risk as potentially profitable if managed well. Yet, as argued 
in the thesis, due to their politico-ideological preferences, they underestimated the 
resilience of existing demographic and geographical cleavages formed by the traumas 
and desires provoked by economic restructuring and financialisation in the post-war 
period. By analysing subject-formation in the everyday, the thesis shows that for a 
finance-led accumulation regime to be stable in Sweden, these cleavages and 
inadequacies have to be regulated. The new pension system in Sweden thus points to 
the tendential microfoundational limits of the projects of neoliberalism and 
fmancialisation. 
Acknowledgements 
Coming from a comfortable, bourgeois background in Stockholm, Sweden, to dedicate 
my research for this Ph.D. thesis to a critical political economy study of the neoliberal 
restructuring of the Swedish economy and the role of pensions therein may not seem 
like the 'natural route'. Indeed, the 'drag' of studying pensions, or, as Robin Blackburn 
calls it, 'grey capital', would seem like an unlikely avenue of research. More 
apparently fascinating topics could have attracted my attention. However, similar to 
Professor Sven Steinmo's realisation of surprise that studying systems of taxation is 
not only interesting but also illuminating of tendencies in the political economy, 
pensions have proven extremely rewarding for me. Yet, the choice of this particular 
topic of study was a matter of moderate desperation and, as it has turned out, fortunate 
circumstance. For this circumstance, I am grateful to Dr. Paul Langley and Dr. Adam 
Harmes for having inspired me. My growing conviction of a particular cultural strand 
of critical political economy is according to this line of thought, I assume, a matter of 
what Rankin has called 'middle class radicalism'. The formation of my intellect is thus 
symptomatic of the contingency of capitalism. 
Still, writing this Ph.D. thesis has not been altogether easy. In fact, it has been very 
difficult at times. Without the support from many special individuals, I would never 
have been able to write these very words. It is funny, I have many times imagined 
writing 'the acknowledgements', although I have been extremely far from finishing the 
work. I have done so with a very deep sense of gratitude. When I now fmally write 
'them', I feel this depth of gratitude even stronger. All these individuals who have 
supported me throughout this time have done so m their own particular ways 
depending on personality and role. 
It is natural to me to start this note of gratitude with my two supervisors, Professor 
Magnus Ryner and Dr. Matthew Watson, both previously at the Department of 
Political Science and International Studies (Polsis), University of Birmingham, where I 
have been based during these years. Boy, have they had a tough time with me! Had 
they known how difficult it would have been when we first set sail, they would maybe 
never have agreed upon supervising me. Hopefully, I can make it up to them in the 
future, at least to an extent. It also feels rather strange to titulate them with their 
academic titles. This is not because they do not deserve them, but because they have 
both not only been my academic fathers, but also my good friends, confidants, 
referees, tennis-, drinking- and travelling-partners in their own wonderful and 
particular ways. I do indeed feel very fortunate to have had them as my supervisors. 
Magnus and Mat, thank you! Dr. Nicola "Nicky" Smith came into the supervisory 
team late, but she has boosted my confidence during the last period of writing up when 
I needed it the most. Thank you. 
Without the financial support from Polsis and the Economic and Social Research 
Council, this piece of work could not have been completed. 
I have also benefited immensely from several field research trips to Sweden. I was 
based at the Institute for Futures Studies. In a very open and generous manner, I was 
welcomed, stimulated and pointed in the right directions by Dr. Urban Lundberg. 
Without Urban's extraordinary insights into the contemporary history of the Swedish 
pension systems, I would have struggled to formulate my ideas in the way I have 
succeeded in doing. Urban has also taken time to assist me in the furthering of my 
young career, for which I am extremely grateful. I know that we will have good reason 
to collaborate also in the future, and I am very much looking forward to this. Start 
tack, Urban! In this context, I would also like to thank Dick Forslund for his 
inspirational thinking and collaboration. 
All former Ph.D. students know how important the Ph.D. community was for their 
intellectual formation and social life. Yet, for those who have not had this opportunity, 
this is worth pointing out. I would, in particular, like to mention the contribution and 
friendship of Lee Jarvis, Tim Legrand, Paul Lewis, Oliver "Oliveira" Hellman and Dr. 
Anca Pusca, although Anca joined late and as a Marie Curie fellow. I also want to 
express a special thanks to Zoe Pflaeger for her great support in times of need. 
However, many others around me in Polsis, Birmingham, have provided me with 
interesting thoughts, friendships, great chats and friendly faces. Thanks to you all. 
I have also had the luck of having benefited from the generous support from the 
departmental secretaries. Suzy, Linda, Karen, you are all amazing! 
Having benefited from going to a rather long series of conferences and workshops 
during these years, I have been inspired and commented upon by many gifted scholars. 
To name them all would an arduous task, but a few, in particular, warrants my 
acknowledgement: Professor Colin Hay, Dr. Marcus Taylor, Professor Daniel Wincott, 
Dr. Andreas Bieler, Dr. Johannes Lindvall, Professor Jane Bayes, Dr. Sheri Berman, 
Dr. Johnna Montgomerie, Dr. Or Raviv, Dr. Paul Langley, Professor Mustapha Pasha 
and Dr. Adam Morton. 
However, I would not have been able to manage the last, soon, two years without the 
companionship, brains and extremely generous support and assistance from Daniela 
Tepe. I am forever in your debt. Daniela's parents certainly also deserve my gratitude 
following their incredibly generous hospitality during the final couple of months of 
intense writing and their patience with my late nights and mornings. I promise that I 
will learn German properly so that we can speak more in-depth in the future. Thanks 
also to Chou-chou for your pleasant company in the study. 
I have so far in my life enjoyed extraordinary friendships outside of academia in 
Sweden, friends who have demonstrated patience with a largely deviating political 
outlook, long distance, student poverty and poor commitment from my side. With the 
conclusion of this thesis, I hope that I will be able to make up for my failures to them. 
Thanks guys! You know who you are. I also, here, want to show my appreciation for 
my 'Birmingham-family'. The Price family has welcomed me as a member of their 
family. As such, they have given me the social stability needed during these years in 
Birmingham. I am looking forward to your comments, Eddie. Thanks also to Johan 
Jensen, James Goldsmith and Chris Pearson, whose special friendships I will never let 
go off. 
Finally, my family, although most of the time far away, has supported me endlessly 
throughout this period and, of course, also before. My parents, Jonas and Monica, have 
always been there for me despite me being 'a difficult son' at times. Their support for 
and interest in my work has provided a great source of meaning and joy to me over 
these years. Despite the age-gap, my sister Charlotta and my brother Carl-Johan have 
always been extremely close to me and it is not with a little pride that I will now soon 
join my brother in the ranks of academics in the family. Finally, but certainly not the 
least, I want to thank my dear dear grandmother Brita "Manne" Hallberg, who has 
always had a special place in my life and heart, and who will now finally after all these 
broken promises see me finishing this thesis. To my family, not the least my dear 
parents, I owe taking this step in my life. I therefore dedicate this piece of work to you. 
Claes Belfrage, 26 August, Massenheim, Germany 
Table of Content 
Introduction 
1. The Neoliberal Discursive Construction 
of Inverted Malthusianism and Pension Reform 
I Introduction 
II Inverted Malthusianism 
III Neoliberalism 
IV The Significance ofNeo-Classical 
Economics to the Design of the Chilean Pension Reform 
V The Chilean Pension Reform 
VI Struggle over Pension Reform 
VII The Swedish "Third Way" Reform 
VIII Conclusion 
2. Finance-led Post-Fordism, Coupon Pool Capitalism 
and Financialisation: the Significance of Pension Reform 
I Introduction 
II Conceptualising Profound Socio-Political Change -
A Rejection of the Varieties of Capitalism Literature 
III Repoliticising Change -
A Regulationist Critique of the Postindustrial Trilemma 
IV A Critique of the SSIP Approach (PRS) 
(a) Societal Paradigms, Discursive Struggles 
and Politics of Representation 
(b) Accumulation Strategies 
(c) The Regulation of Uneven Development 
V The finance-led growth regime, Pensions and 
Financialisation: the importance of cultivating 
mass investment cultures 
12 
12 
21 
27 
31 
36 
45 
59 
63 
69 
69 
72 
78 
90 
90 
95 
100 
102 
VI Conclusion 
3. The Financialisation of Daily Life 
I Introduction 
II Fordist Legacies for Subject-Formation 
under Financialisation 
III Cultural Political Economy and the 
Economic Aesthetic 
IV Beyond the Anglo-American frontier: 
exploring the extension of financialisation to the 
Critical Swedish Case 
V Conclusion 
4. N eo liberal Restructuring, Financialisation 
and the Swedish Pension Reform 
I Introduction 
II The Formation of Swedish Fordism 
(a)The Origins of Swedish Capitalist Modernity 
(b) The Work Principle and Solidaristic Wage-Policy 
(c) The Role of Swedish Capital 
(d) Swedish 'Disarticulated' Fordism 
III The Swedish Welfare State, 
the ATP Pension Reform and Mass Consumption 
(a) The Regulatory Role of the ATP Pension System 
(b) Mass Consumption 
III The First Crisis of Swedish 
Disarticulated F ordism 
(a) The Radicalisation of the Labour Movement 
(b) Democratising the Economy 
116 
118 
118 
122 
131 
142 
148 
151 
151 
154 
154 
158 
163 
168 
171 
180 
185 
190 
191 
197 
(c) The Neoliberal Counter-offensive 
IV The Second Crisis of Swedish 
Disarticulated F ordism 
(a) The Swedish 'Third Way' 
(b) Financial Deregulation the Swedish 'Third Way' 
(c) The 1990s Consolidation of 
Compensatory Neoliberalism 
V Conclusion 
5. An Assessment of the New Pension System 
and Its Capacity to Generate 
A Mass Investment Culture in Sweden 
I Introduction 
II The State of Financialisation at the Millenium 
(a) The Tendential Anglo-Saxification of the Economy 
(b) The Partial Re-Commodification of Labour 
III Method of Assessment 
IV Assessing the Rise of A Mass Investment Culture 
(a) Criterion 1 - Delegitimising Alternatives 
(b) Criterion 2 - The Superiority of 
Financial Investment 
(c) Criterion 3 - Replacing Social Citizenship 
(d) Criterion 4 - Providing the Infrastructure 
(e) Criterion 5 - Financial Literacy 
(f) Criterion 6- High 'Active' Participation Rates 
V Conclusion 
Conclusion 
202 
208 
208 
216 
219 
227 
231 
231 
232 
233 
236 
243 
247 
247 
249 
251 
253 
255 
256 
261 
263 
Bibliography 271 
List of Illustrations 
Figure 1: Percentage of population aged 65 and over in percentage of the working 
population (15-64) ('Elderly Dependency Ratio') in the OECD countries (taken from 
OECD 1997: 102). 
Figure 2: Percentage of population aged 0-14 and 65+ in percentage of the working 
population (15-64) in the OECD countries (taken from OECD 1997: 102). 
Figure 3: Maximum percentages of AFP investment by forms of asset (taken from 
Kritzer 1996: 48). 
Figure 4: the general principles of the capitalist varieties of the SSIP approach (taken 
from Amable 2000: 671). 
Figure 5: the mechanisms of a finance-led growth regime and its institutional forms 
(taken from Boyer 2000: 117). 
Figure 6: Number of employees in foreign-owned firms in Sweden and their share of 
all employees in the Swedish business sector 1980-2001 (taken from Henreksson and 
Jakobsson 2003: 93). 
 Introduction 
 
This thesis addresses the literature on the restructuring of European advanced 
capitalism, through an analysis of the “critical case study” (Eckstein 1976) of the 1999 
Swedish pension reform, here argued to play a key, in the sense of Regulation theory 
(Lipietz 1994), ‘regulatory’ role in the economy. This is predicated upon the view that 
the Swedish case continues to be of paradigmatic importance for the prospects of the 
survival of social democracy under neoliberal pressures to transform.  
 
Ryner (2002) showed that despite that neoliberalisation of Swedish social democratic 
elites could be expected to be unlikely, it did nevertheless happen in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. The consequence of this was a radical transformation of the formal 
institutions of the Swedish economy. The Swedish economy was to a considerable 
extent thus made subject to the disciplinary powers of financial markets (Gill 1991). 
However, significant welfare and labour market institutions remained in place. Since 
the early 1990s, much of what remained ‘traditionally social democratic’ in the 
economy was put under neoliberal pressures to transform in a more market-friendly 
direction. Indeed, the neoliberal restructuring of the Swedish economy was incomplete 
and thus the disciplinary powers of financial markets seemed to have a highly 
mediated impact on Swedish wage-earners and the daily life of the economy more 
broadly. In fact, the Swedish welfare state was still alive and well in the hearts and 
minds of wage-earners (Svallfors 1996). Ryner labelled this condition “compensatory 
neoliberalism”. 
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 European post-war, income-replacing pension systems have played a central role in the 
creation and popular embrace of what the former President of the EU Commission has 
called the “European Social Model”. This has not the least been the case in Sweden, 
where the post-war pension system not only suspended pressures on wage-earners to 
save for their retirement and thus enabled mass consumption, but also served to 
structure the economy in accordance with the “Swedish Model”. Such pension systems 
thus serve to socialise risk. Yet, to reform or even replace such systems has proven 
politically destabilising. However, in the mid-1980s, these pension systems started to 
come under increasing political and fiscal pressures, against the background of ageing 
European populations and supposed economic inefficiency. The ensuing international 
debate on pension reform in the 1990s was dominated by an ideological debate 
between the World Bank with its allies and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) and its sympathisers. The World Bank, on the one hand, advocated a neoliberal 
system of risk-privatising individual equity accounts, with a precedent set in Chile in 
the early 1980s, in order to combine alleviating fiscal pressures with supposed 
financial market-stimulation of the economy. On the other hand, the ILO relativised 
the proclaimed fiscal pressures and hereby rendered pension reform an intrinsically 
political issue. The question the ILO asked was: - how high taxes are European wage-
earners willing to pay for retaining these pension systems? This heated debate was 
concluded by a compromise being struck between the two positions. The model 
promoted in Europe by this consensus was the so-called “Third Way” pension system. 
 
This “Third Way” reform had been designed and was in the process of being 
implemented in Sweden. There, the old, distinctly social democratic pension system 
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 providing substantial pensions was being replaced by a modified neoliberal system 
consisting of insurance-based ‘notional accounts’ and smaller, but potentially 
expanding, individual equity accounts. Pensions would from now on be subjected to 
the performance of the Swedish economy as well as the performance of individual 
equity accounts; that is, risk was being privatised. This shift was obscured by a 
traditional social democratic language of sustained substantial pensions. Thereby, an 
increase of the exposure of daily life to the financial markets was done subversively. In 
accordance with the ideas of the World Bank, the two objectives of easing fiscal 
pressures and financial stimulation of the growth of the economy were met. The 
unfinished neoliberal project was thus resumed, cloaked in social democratic terms. 
The objective of this approach seems to be the socialisation of wage-earners into 
accepting a supposedly superior, yet politically sensitive, economic model in which 
financial markets play a leading role. ‘Investor subjects’ were to be gradually shaped. 
 
The question asked by this thesis is therefore twofold. Firstly, is the neoliberal project 
of financial market exposure capable of subversively shaping subject-formation in 
Swedish daily life through the introduction of a neoliberal pension system? Secondly, 
if so, what are the consequences for the ‘critical case’ of Sweden, and hence social 
democracy? Certainly, if the neoliberal project succeeds in restructuring the Swedish 
economy, not only its formal economic institutions, but also its microfoundational 
daily life, the ‘Swedish Model’ along with a more traditional social democracy may 
very well have effectively been passed into history. However, if its microfoundations 
respond in a manner, which serves to delegitimise this project, social democracy may 
still have a breeding ground for some form of revival. 
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The construction of this argument starts, in chapter 1, with an engagement with the 
dominant discourses on the stated absolute imperative of pension reform for the global 
competitiveness of European economies. It hence commences with an exploration of 
the neoliberal origins of risk-privatising pension reform. The alarming cries over the 
ageing economy, here known as ‘inverted Malthusianism’, are fundamental to the 
construction of legitimacy of these discourses and will therefore have to be considered 
in detail. Neoliberal opinion-makers and the financial sector have sought to undermine 
the welfare state, and particularly post-war, risk-socialising pension systems. By 
wedding ‘inverted Malthusianism’ to the understanding of national economies as 
disciplined by global financial markets, a discourse of ‘no alternative’ to risk-
privatising reform has been formulated. Neoliberal strategies of economic 
competitiveness have on this basis come to demand particular, legal-political 
institutional structures, which discipline economic behaviour into conformity with the 
expectations of markets.  
 
The rise of neoliberalism cannot be understood without either its selective reliance 
upon orthodox Neo-classical economic ideas or the frequent and enthusiastic support 
received from the financial services sector (cf. Dumenil and Levy 2001). Neoliberals 
call upon central ideas within orthodox Neo-classical Economics, despite that the latter 
has been critiqued and modernised by Neo-classical Economists themselves since 
several decades. The materialisation of this worldview necessitates the private 
regulation of financial risk through the evaluation and purchasing of financial services 
(Ericson et al. 2000). It thus often echoes the interests of the financial services sector, 
 4 
 increasingly, yet unevenly, ‘disintermediated’ in the economy (French and Leyshon 
2004). Still, in order to secure democratic legitimisation for its policies, neoliberals 
pay some tribute to changes in mainstream economic thought. In this sense, 
neoliberalism is a laggard in relation to developments within Neo-classical Economics, 
championing selected parts of the latter’s worldview. Accordingly, neoliberal 
discourses on pension reform, drawing upon orthodox neo-classical thought, came to 
an early fruition with the experiment of replacing the Chilean risk-socialising post-war 
system with an extremely risk-privatising pension system under Pinochet’s Junta in 
1981.  
 
The World Bank’s 1994 publication, Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect 
the Old and Promote Growth, was the starting point of a heated international debate 
over pension reform with the Chilean system as its reference point. This publication 
drew upon outdated elements of Neo-classical Economics and only selectively upon 
new developments in the field (Diamond 2007). This struggle, particularly important 
for the European welfare states, seems to have ended with the invention of the Swedish 
‘third way’ reform. However, this ‘solution’ merely taps the ‘old wine in a new bottle’ 
(Cichon 1999). It is argued that the seeming European embrace of the Swedish reform 
is primarily a political strategy to avoid political struggle while allowing for the 
continued restructuring of European economies in the direction of a neoliberal finance-
led economic model.  
 
Chapter 2 seeks to provide a conceptual framework for the particular finance-oriented 
developmental trajectory, which seems to be emerging out of this period of crisis and 
 5 
 restructuring in Europe. In order to do so, it challenges the dominant literature on the 
restructuring of European capitalism. Particularly, it critiques the ‘Varieties of 
Capitalism’ literature in political economy for its internalisation of the ‘post-industrial 
trilemma thesis’ and its resulting implicit preference for the risk-privatising ‘American 
model’, at the expense of social democracy. I here show that the dominant literature 
suffers from a contingent tendency with regard to the establishment of such a politico-
economic trajectory and downplays the regulatory role of risk-socialising pension 
provision. This is solved by turning to Parisian Regulation theory, and particularly its 
more recent version of the Social Structures of Innovation and Production (SSIP) 
approach, sensitive to historical developments in the economy (Amable 2000; Amable 
and Petit 2001; Boyer 2005). Yet, this is argued to be insufficient as such an approach 
does not adequately account for the institutional and socio-cultural specificities of 
national economies and suffers from a relative inability to comprehend contingency. 
By developing the notions of “accumulation strategy” (Jessop 1982), “societal 
paradigm” (Jenson 1989), “the capitalist state” (Alnasseri et al. 2001; Lipietz 1988) 
and “uneven development” (Harvey 1982), I seek to conceptualise the period in the 
aftermath of the crisis of Fordism as politico-economically strategic and contingent.  
 
This leads to an analysis of the literature on the “finance-led growth regime” (Boyer 
2000a). I pay particular attention to the idea of the emergence of a “coupon pool 
capitalism”, as the more realistic, yet politically contingent objective of economic 
restructuring and pension reform in Europe (Froud et al. 2002). Out of such a 
development the financialisation of daily life emerges. Indeed, this is the very 
objective of recent neoliberal and financial sector advocacy: to bring investment 
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 decisions into the meanings and practices of daily life. Yet, this process cannot be 
assumed to occur smoothly, without resistance. The approach developed hence 
inscribes scope for contradictions in the confrontation between financialisation and a 
societal paradigm, which still to some extent answers to notions of risk-sharing and 
solidarity. Along this line of thought, the Swedish case seems exceptionally 
illustrative.  
 
In order to grasp how these meanings and practices jostle together in daily life, the 
third chapter develops a cultural political economy approach, which integrates the 
multi-levelled sociologies underpinning economic activity and subject-formation. 
Following the Regulationist approach developed in chapter 2, these sociologies 
originate from the social contradictions emerging out of the crisis of Fordism and 
neoliberal restructuring. In order to simultaneously account for these, the notion of 
‘economic aesthetics’ is developed. I claim that this notion is capable of grasping the 
complex everyday constitution of subjectivities formed at the busy crossroads between 
accumulation strategies and politics of representation in the unevenly developed 
economy. As such, it is sensitive to discourses of class, gender, sexual desire, age, 
language, rural-urban identities, etc. This is crucial to the critical case study of the 
Swedish economy, as conflict can be expected to arise along these discursive lines 
with the pension-led imposition of financialisation on daily life. This conceptualisation 
of the everyday will also enable us to grasp the emergence of particular forms of 
resistance to, and non-participation in, an economy, which can be expected to harbour 
conflicting logics and practices. The literature on financialisation refuses to study cases 
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 beyond the Anglo-American economies as the former are harbouring just such. It is 
however argued in this thesis that politics does not allow for such refusals.  
 
Where financialisation is imposed, it must be analysed due to its divisive consequences 
and where better than in the Swedish case? This will result in the formulation of a 
number of questions, or criteria, regarding the viability and resonance of 
financialisation in the Swedish economy, and the legitimacy and credibility of the 
finance-led accumulation strategy striving towards its regulation through the 
introduction of a partly financialised pension. Answers to these questions are sought, 
in accordance with the Regulationist approach, through a historical account, assessing 
the impact and role of the new pension system on Swedish daily life.  
 
This historical account presented in chapters 4 and 5 has a rather natural starting point 
in the formation of Swedish Fordism during the interwar period and immediately 
following the 2nd World War. Without the formation of Swedish Fordism, capitalism 
could not intensify and consumption could not become a central regulatory mechanism 
in daily life. Indeed a consumerist and upwardly striving subjectivity was forged 
during this period. Still, without the introduction of substantial and income-replacing 
pensions, such a social democratic subjectivity could not have been formed. In fact, the 
‘Swedish model’ hinged upon the ATP pension system (Allmänna Tjänstepensionen) 
for social regulation, but also for the regulation of the economy, more broadly. Hence, 
the intense struggle over the design of this pension system was a struggle of opposing 
accumulation strategies played out in a hotly contested democratic process.  
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 Following the ‘golden age’ of Swedish Fordism, a multi-phased and multi-dimensional 
crisis ensued. Three interlinked stages are identified. In the first stage, during the 
1960s and 1970s, social democratic Swedish Fordism was challenged from within as 
the labour movement was radicalised. The radicalisation of the labour movement was 
contested by the “New Right” in the 1970s and early 1980s, which resulted in the 
neoliberal restructuring of the Swedish economy. The formulation and legitimisation 
of the idea of wage-earner funds emerged at the core of this struggle, and with that the 
function and meaning of pensions in the economy. During this period, the foundations 
of a finance-led economy were being constructed in Sweden on the back of the 
coupled de-legitimisation of the ATP system and the encouragement of private pension 
savings. Yet, a second stage of the crisis unfolded in the early 1990s as these 
incomplete processes caused a regulatory breakdown. However, a neoliberalised social 
democracy did little else than seeking to stabilise this fragile constellation. Out of the 
resulting “compensatory neoliberalism”, the new pension system emerged, designed 
and introduced in a manner, which echoed the neoliberal scant concern for democracy. 
It will be shown how the combination of processes that led to this moment emerged 
out of the inherent contradictions of Swedish Fordism. This will in turn set the stage 
for chapter 5 and the assessment of the new pension system’s ability to regulate the 
emerging finance-led economy.  
 
The fifth chapter assesses the contribution of the new Swedish pension system to the 
progress of the financialisation of daily life in the Swedish economy. It does so by 
constructing a set of criteria resting on ontological premises discussed and introduced 
already in chapter 4. The regulatory power of this new system is thus evaluated. The 
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 introduction of this new pension system can thus be seen as seeking to deal a final 
blow to the ‘social democratic economic aesthetic’. As such, it constitutes a third and 
potentially decisive stage in the crisis of Swedish social democracy and, thus arguably, 
social democracy more generally.  
 
I point to the difficulties experienced by the State and the financial sector in its efforts 
to form investor subjects and integrate daily life into Swedish coupon pool capitalism 
with resulting losses of legitimacy. The assessment shows that the processes of 
neoliberalisation, financialisation and pension reform seem unlikely, at least in the 
medium-term, to be capable of overcoming resistant logics, meanings and practices in 
Swedish daily life. As it stands, Swedish financialisation promises to be divisive not 
just between income groups, or between included and excluded, but also 
geographically as the uneven development of the Swedish economy continues, creating 
financialised urban cores and a peripheral Hinterland. Nevertheless, despite strong 
processes of individualisation in Sweden since the formation of the post-war pension 
system, a strong sense of solidarity remains in the fragile societal paradigm, which is 
critical of the divisiveness of Swedish financialisation. Thus, the resumed neoliberal 
project of subversively transforming Swedish wage-earners into investor subjects asks 
profound questions to its advocates. As such, the legitimacy of this new system is 
weak, indeed in crisis, yet the impact of the project of neoliberal restructuring of the 
1980s and 1990s is profound, rendering the effective formulation of alternatives very 
difficult. 
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 I will conclude that the case of the Swedish pension reform clearly highlights how 
contingencies in capitalist development, in the processes of reception and 
internalisation of financialisation, can come to seriously jeopardize the project of 
financialisation. The Swedish pension reform is highlighted as a critical project for the 
so far failing attempt to integrate also the microfoundations of the economy in the 
neoliberal push towards a finance-led economy. However, it may also provide 
evidence of a sustained breeding ground for a return to some form of social 
democracy. With caution, social democracy is not dead, but the heavy siege laid upon 
it is having profound effects upon its future popular viability. As such, it contributes, 
albeit humbly, to the literature on the restructuring of the European welfare State and 
opens up a space for future research on financialisation in cases beyond the Anglo-
American economies. 
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 Chapter 1 – The Neoliberal Discursive Construction of Inverted Malthusianism 
and Pension Reform 
 
I Introduction 
This chapter identifies the contingencies of the struggle over pension reform. As such, 
it shows how risk-privatising pension reform is rendered necessary for the purpose of 
securing a developmental trajectory in the European economies, and the Swedish one 
in particular, towards the adoption of a neoliberal finance-led economy. However, by 
way of commencing this discussion, the role, function and meaning of pensions and 
pension systems must be outlined. 
 
Pension systems inevitably redistribute pension capital as the latter cannot be saved 
and consumed at the same time. However, pension systems are historically and 
culturally specific institutional designs accumulating, managing, and redistributing 
wealth differently according to different ‘norms of reward’ and divisions of 
responsibility for provision.  Reasons for warranting a pension vary from the most 
common, wage-earning, to soldier-widowing and studying. As such, they draw 
faultlines between eligible and ineligible, and determine levels and rules of reward.  
 
In different systems, different divisions of responsibility for the provision of pensions 
have been formulated. Here, the State, the financial sector, firms, the individual, or 
other actors in the economy are assigned responsibility for upholding these 
commitments. With this responsibility comes financial risk as neither productivity 
growth nor volumes of pension commitments are stable over time. Economic policies 
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 can of course seek this stability, and accumulated pension capital can play a significant 
part in the function of such policies as in many advanced capitalist economies in the 
post-war period. .  
 
The designs of pension systems are integral to welfare systems, and do generally 
correspond with the role and function of the latter. Pension systems are thus historical 
compromises, or, in the case of private systems, financial service designs which relate 
to the norms and designs of public or occupational systems, between different groups 
and actors in an economy. Yet, no pension system functions this mechanically nor is 
this stable. As it can powerfully support and undermine particular politico-economic 
projects and developments, it is frequently challenged and hence undergoes 
transformative processes. As such, pension systems are institutionalised, social and 
economic relations, which are discursively constructed as particularly benefitting, but 
also imposing costs on, different social groups and individuals. Therefore, reforming 
pension systems frequently involves struggle over norms of reward and distribution of 
wealth in the economy more generally, as well as divisions of responsibility for 
provision.  
  
Since the early 1990s, the reform of pension systems in advanced capitalist economies 
has been brought to the forefront of struggle as a most pressing issue. The pension 
systems primarily called into question are the large-scale public systems that were 
formed in the post-war period, and a number of reforms have already taken place, 
notably in Sweden. Although wide-ranging in their designs and frequently modified 
(Clark 2003: 14-15), a few shared characteristics can be identified among these post-
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 war pension systems. The receipt of a pension was framed in a Marshallian manner as 
an absolute entitlement to income replacement in retirement derived from social 
citizenship and hence a prerequisite for ‘substantive legitimacy’. It contributed to the 
redemption of intergenerational “equality of status as required by political and civic 
citizenship in a capitalist society” (Ryner 2008: 8). Equality of status was thereby 
largely premised upon loyal wage-earning and mass consumption.  
 
Pension provision was hence presented as rightly redistributive. This norm, although 
differently expressed in different settings, came more or less to apply to the welfare 
system as a whole. The reliance upon private savings, vulnerable to market-
performance, during retirement was intended to be reduced, if not altogether removed. 
Facilitated by the high growth sustained in the post-war recovery years and the 
expectation of continued high fertility rates, States and firms, expressing the urges of 
distributive coalitions, took on the responsibility for the upholding of these pension 
systems. In a Keynesian manner, pension capital was commonly amassed in large 
public pension funds used to finance politico-strategically industrial production or 
infrastructural projects, in order to maintain “adequate levels of investment”, in the 
event of declining growth, and hence full employment (Esping-Andersen 1985: 35-6). 
Alternatively, pensions were organised in Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) systems 
immediately transferred from one generation to another. Consumption and investment 
could be kept high over the whole ‘life-cycle’ (Merton 1983). Real pensions would 
adjust themselves to demographic changes through the latter’s impact on prices,1 and 
1 In the theoretically legitimating paper par excellence of the US social security system, Samuelson 
(1958: 482) argues that: [w]ith population growing like (1 +m)', output will come to grow at that rate. 
Fixed M will come to mean prices falling like 1/(1 +m)'. Each dollar saved today will thus yield a real 
rate of interest of exactly m per period-just what the biological social-optimality configuration calls for. 
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 in the case of extreme inflation “social security programs can re-create themselves 
anew astride the community's indestructible real tax base” (Samuelson 1958: 482fn). 
The financial risks of pension provision were socialised, which was considered to be 
normatively and economically superior to risk-privatising alternatives (Hacker 2004: 
249; Samuelson 1958). As such, pension systems were central to shaping the 
hegemonic conditions, which enabled the post-war growth period (Blackburn 2002: 
45-68) of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982). 
 
Asking why pension reform is so urgent calls for the justification of why present 
arrangements of wealth-redistribution, responsibilities for pension provision, norms of 
reward and particular faultlines of inclusion/exclusion should be reconsidered. 
Consequently, pension reform calls the legitimacy of existing distributive coalitions 
into question. It thus politicises the economy where it is at its arguably most political. 
Unsurprisingly, then, reforming pension systems is understood as a dangerous practice 
among politicians. More recently, world leaders like Ronald Reagan (in 1983), Alain 
Juppé (in 1995), Berlusconi (in 1995), Kohl (in 1996-7), Clinton (in 1998) and Tony 
Blair (in 2000) have been made more than aware of this. Pension reform is an issue of 
highest political sensitivity and of greatest strategic import.  
 
Those who today call for the reform of pension systems claim that reform is an 
absolute imperative for economic survival and global competitiveness. Following the 
neoliberal turn in the 1970s and early 1980s, the idea of pensions as entitlements 
derived from social citizenship and importantly redistributive is being framed as a 
Similarly, when m < 0 and population falls, rising prices will create the desired negative real rate of 
interest equal to m. 
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 luxury of the post-war period of high growth. Pensions, along with other welfare 
provisions, are presented as a cost to the economy. A “welfare pessimism” has arisen 
(Taylor-Gooby 1997: 173). Today, it is argued, under conditions of global 
competition, lower growth rates, high unemployment and post-modern social 
fragmentation, radically different arrangements for pension provision have to be made 
serving different purposes and constituting less of a burden to the economy (ibid.). 
Accordingly, pension reform is understood as part of “necessary welfare retrenchment” 
(Hay 1998). The resulting reforms can be categorised according to their form and 
process. Clark (2003: 14-19) distinguishes between “parametric” and “structural” 
reforms, in which the former primarily refer to cumulative, or gradual reforms, 
processes retaining the overall institutional design of the system, whilst the latter refer 
to more large-scale institutional overhauls, which radically transform norms of reward 
and divisions of responsibility for the provision of pensions.  
 
Structural reforms have been made in the neoliberal direction of the privatisation of 
risk, towards ‘actuarialism’2 and financial market funding. Here, the financial sector 
provides forms of pension savings, whose performance depends upon financial market 
performance. Thus, pensions should no longer be defined by social citizenship, but 
rather financial markets. This is in turn intended to spur an efficient, market-allocation 
of investment capital. The State and firms are hence relieved of their responsibility to 
guarantee set pension entitlements. Yet, the needs of and risks for the individual are 
said to be best catered for on a privatised, risk-induced basis. Alternatively, the 
privatisation of risk can be understood as leaving “individuals and families responsible 
2 This term implies linking pensions more closely to contributions. 
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 for coping with social risks largely on their own” (Hacker 2004: 249). However, given 
the high degree of politicisation of public pension systems, radical reforms of extreme 
risk-privatisation have been rare, particularly in the welfare states of Western Europe. 
Therefore, the famous 1981 Chilean reform under the Pinochet government remains 
almost unique. (Extreme risk-privatisation has been more common for occupational 
pensions.) Although having many neoliberal and financial sector supporters and being 
advocated by the World Bank in the mid-1990s as the ideal model to follow (World 
Bank 1994), extremely risk-privatising pension reforms have come to be understood as 
politically (and economically, Cichon 1999) unrealisable, particularly in European and 
North American economies in which pension provision had been at the core of the 
formation of a social citizenship. 
 
Instead, historical compromises are now sought around hybrid, multipillar pension 
systems, in which elements of risk-socialisation, in the form of means-tested minimum 
pensions, are retained but which predominantly can be characterised by market-
friendly institutionalised forms of risk-privatisation (Palmer 2000). The dominant 
feature in such systems is a PAYGO notional defined contribution (NDC) system, in 
which pension provision is only minimally redistributive and regulated by changes in 
the demographic composition of age cohorts and economic growth (Williamson and 
Williams 2005). Another pillar is a funded element of individualised investment choice 
between fund managers. Thus also in this hybrid alternative are pensions no longer a 
defined benefit, or entitlement. In fact, it is questionable whether this ‘alternative’ is 
really much else than a new pension policy instrument, packaging neoliberal risk-
privatising pensions more politically palatable, or an ‘old wine in new bottles’ (Cichon 
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 1999). The new pension system introduced in Sweden in 1999 is commonly 
understood as providing the design and the rationale behind such types of reform.  
 
Hence, in either alternative, pensions have become risky and partly financialised, 
deemed essential to an economy, which is increasingly understood as suffering from 
demographic imbalances and economic inefficiency due to a lack of exposure to the 
discipline of financial markets. By increasing the efficiency of the economy through 
financialisation, wealth is generated that supposedly offsets the dangers of financial 
risk. Accordingly, where such structural reforms have taken place, such as in the 
Swedish case, the sponsors of the new systems promise that it will be able to provide 
more or less the same pensions, and similarly the same welfare provision, as that of its 
supposedly inadequate predecessors (Lundberg 2003). If we accept these promises, “it 
becomes difficult to sustain the proposition that major welfare retrenchment has 
occurred” (Pierson 1996: 173). Previous guarantees of entitlements are replaced with 
promises of a ‘status quo’. Whilst these reforms are still in their youth, the 
legitimisations are politically difficult to question. However, what is certain is that 
with the privatisation of risk come greater opportunities as well as rising inequalities. 
Against the background of the post-war hegemonic norms of social citizenship in 
relation to the welfare state, particularly in Sweden, it is difficult to imagine that these 
rising inequalities would be acceptable. Still, norms and subjectivities change, 
particularly when exposed to new meanings and practices. Without evidence of future 
performance, the impact of risk-privatisation on the formation of meanings and 
practices in daily life therefore becomes critical for the assessment of the future 
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 legitimacy of a neoliberal risk-privatising pension system, and hence potentially its 
viability. 
 
As claimed in the introductory chapter, the neoliberal economic restructuring of the 
Swedish economy, seemingly leading towards financialisation, provides a critical case 
for the political and socio-economic viability of a neoliberal, finance-led economy 
(Boyer 2000). If it can happen in Sweden, it seems possible that it can happen 
everywhere else. The role, function and impact of neoliberal, risk-privatising pension 
reform is central to this development. The fact that the Swedish pension reform is the 
dominant reference point in international pension debates today makes the 
developments in Swedish daily life arguably even more critical to the viable 
introduction of a neoliberal finance-led economic model in economies where pensions 
and the welfare state carry a strong meaning. The critical case of the Swedish pension 
reform will be analysed in chapters 4 and 5. In this chapter, the construction of the 
imperative of neoliberal risk-privatising pension reform, and particularly the turn to 
hybrid multipillar reform such as the Swedish one, is analysed. 
 
This chapter proceeds in a number of steps. Firstly, it explores the neoliberal origins of 
risk-privatising pension reform. For this purpose, the alarming cries over the ageing 
economy, central to calls for pension reform and here known as ‘inverted 
Malthusianism’, will be considered in detail. The undermining of the welfare state, and 
particularly post-war pension systems, calling upon inverted Malthusianism has been a 
key strategy for neoliberal opinion-makers and the financial sector. The understanding 
of national economies as disciplined by global financial markets has become 
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 discursively wedded to inverted Malthusianism. Hence, neoliberal strategies of 
economic competitiveness have come to demand particular, legal-political institutional 
structures, which discipline economic behaviour into conformity with the expectations 
of markets, made understandable to us by Stephen Gill’s notion of “new 
constitutionalism” (1991, 2000). Thus, secondly, the chapter deals with the rise of 
neoliberalism and its selective reliance upon orthodox neo-classical economic ideas, 
but also the value of neoliberalism to Neo-classical Economics. This interrelationship 
came to fruition with the experiment of replacing the Chilean post-war DB PAYGO 
system with an extremely risk-privatising pension system in 1981. Sections three and 
four deal with this reform as a crucial experiment for orthodox Neo-classical economic 
ideas on pension reform and neoliberal pension policy advocacy. Section five explores 
the heated struggle over pension reform, which emerged with the World Bank’s 
publication Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote 
Growth in 1994. This struggle, particularly important for the European welfare states, 
seems to have ended with the invention of the Swedish ‘third way’ reform. This will be 
analysed in section six. However, as it will be shown, this is merely the same wine in a 
new bottle. It is argued that the seeming European embrace of the Swedish reform is 
primarily a political strategy to avoid political struggle while allowing for the 
continued restructuring of European economies in the direction of a neoliberal finance-
led economic model. As such, to study the popular reception of the Swedish reform in 
Sweden and beyond it is crucial to grasp the political viability of a finance-led 
economy in the European context. 
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 II Inverted Malthusianism 
The strains put on risk-socialising pension systems by a more permanent ‘greying’ of 
the advanced capitalist economies, than those foreseen by e.g. Samuelson (1958), 
provide risk-privatising pension reform with much of its rationale. Risk-socialising 
welfare provision was once claimed by Malthus to be dangerous to the territorially 
delimited economy. Such provisions would blunt the ‘goad of necessity’, derived from 
inequality and spurring the productive industry of the thrifty labourer. Instead of 
saving to support himself in sickness and old age, the labourer could spend the fruits of 
the land on the well-being of his family. The dangerous consequences would be the 
removal of the check on the rising generation, “the ‘killing frost’ of misery”, and hence 
a declining economy as more people had to share the scarce fruits of the land (1998: 
46-8). Today’s alarming cries over population ageing can be understood as a form of 
inversion of Malthus’ thesis: with fertility and mortality greatly reduced by the socio-
economic impact of post-war welfare states, economic growth is prevented by the 
increasing scarcity of productive labour.  
 
The United Nations (UN) World Population Ageing: 1950-2050 report describes a 
sombre scenario. Population ageing is historically unprecedented in scope, pervasive 
and profound in impact, and enduring. These developments vary from region to region 
and country to country (see Lutz and Qiang 2002; UN 2002). Still,  
population ageing [is expected to] have an impact on economic growth, savings, investment 
and consumption, labour markets, pensions, taxation and intergenerational transfers…, health 
and health care, family composition and living arrangements… [with] a direct bearing on the 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity and solidarity that are the foundations of society 
(UN 2002: xxviii). 
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 In the OECD economies, as figure 1 shows, without exception, populations have aged 
significantly since 1960, yet the rate of population ageing is to accelerate  considerably 
accelerate between 2000 and 2030. 
 
         Country 
                                                   Elderly Dependency Ratio 
 1960 2000 2030 
France 18.8 23.6 39.1 
Germany 16.0 23.8 49.2 
Italy 13.3 26.5 48.3 
Netherlands 14.7 20.8 45.1 
Spain 12.7 23.5 41.0 
Sweden 17.8 26.9 39.4 
Switzerland 15.5 23.6 48.6 
United Kingdom 17.9 24.4 38.7 
OECD Europe 15.3 22.1 39.2 
United States of America 15.4 19.0 36.8 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of population aged 65 and over as a percentage of the working 
population (15-64, ‘Elderly Dependency Ratio’) in OECD countries (taken from OECD 
1997: 102). 
 
Hidden behind these numbers are of course also trends in birth rates, life expectancy, 
(im)migration, education and (early) retirement. These in turn are strongly affected by 
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 developments in social and economic policies. The mainstream of demographic studies 
is based on the conventional theory of ‘demographic transition’. Coming to dominance 
in the 1950s and 1960s, this theory assumed that as modernisation enables enhanced 
food security and improvements in public health, life expectancy increases. Birth rates 
were expected to follow, with some time lag (due to cultural or perceptual dynamics), 
because societies seek a population equilibrium (Lutz and Qiang 2002: 1199). In its 
application to the post-demographic transition conditions in post-war Europe, 
however, these predictions of re-equilibration turned out to the extremely naïve (Lutz 
2005: 20). Demographers foresaw no significant increases in either life expectancy or 
migration. In fact, life expectancy was assumed to have an upper limit in the low 70s 
for men and the high 70s for women, whilst migration was written off as an 
insignificant ‘constant’. Instead, the main focus was on fertility, for which both the 
1950s ‘baby boom’ and the 1970s ‘baby bust’ came completely unexpected (Booth 
2006: 2). Yet, the estimations on birth rates remained greatly exaggerated: “at the end 
of the demographic transition, fertility [was predicted to] stabilize at replacement 
level…of roughly 2.1 children per woman” (italics in original, Lutz 2005: 21). As life 
expectancy continued to increase, much thanks to the achievements of the welfare 
state, “[i]ronically, in terms of total population size, these two errors tend[ed] to cancel 
each other out” (Lutz 2005: 20). The ‘total dependency ratio’ even decreased and 
continued to do so until 2000, as a comparison of columns 2 and 3 of figure 2 shows. 
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          Country 
                                                   Total Dependency Ratio 
 1960 2000 2030 
France 61.3 52.8 67.9 
Germany 47.4 46.7 75.1 
Italy 47.9 47.8 72.7 
Netherlands 63.9 47.7 73.2 
Spain 55.1 45.3 64.8 
Sweden 51.8 57.9 70.4 
Switzerland 51.5 49.6 77.0 
United Kingdom 53.7 54.0 68.0 
OECD Europe 57.9 50.4 67.4 
United States of America 67.4 52.0 68.0 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of population aged 0-14 and 65+ as a percentage of the working 
population (15-64) in the OECD countries (taken from OECD 1997: 102). 
 
While all demographers now consider migration to be of great importance, the 
continued increase of life expectancy is surprisingly much more controversial. Despite 
an undeniable continuation of increases in life expectancy, “the UN and many other 
statistical offices [still does not consider this as] problematic” (Lutz 2005: 21). Many 
academic demographers, in contrast, inject much more uncertainty and hence openness 
into their models, following the failures of the conventional theory of demographic 
transition (Lutz and Goldstein (eds) 2004). The peculiar stance of the UN is of course 
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 of political significance as governments do not have to engage with the prospect of 
adapting their economies to extreme population ageing (ibid.). Although birth rates can 
potentially be raised through various forms of family planning encouragements, and 
are hence rather unpredictable, to lower life expectancy is hardly a morally justifiable 
policy goal. Yet, why does increased life expectancy have to imply a threat to 
everything from economic growth to savings, consumption and pensions? And hence, 
does increased life expectancy necessarily put intergenerational and intragenerational 
equity and solidarity in danger? These questions are complex to answer.  
 
Such threats are premised upon a number of loosely interconnected assumptions. 
Firstly, the working population will shrink, or, rather, the dependency ratio will 
increase, to such an extent that existing, risk-socialising pension and other welfare 
arrangements become economically unsustainable. Secondly, it assumes that people 
cannot extend their working careers beyond today’s standard retirement age. That is, 
the capacity of those aged 65 and over to work is very low and the impact of medical 
advances on this capacity is insignificant (cf. OECD 2007b). Thirdly and related, it is 
largely inconceivable that today’s intergenerational and intragenerational equity and 
solidarity can muster new forms of, or additional, redistribution (cf. see chapter 2-5 of 
this thesis). Fourthly, the productivity of today’s working population has reached its 
maximum. Hence, there is no unemployment (cf. Cichon 1997). Moreover, 
technological advances will have no considerable impact on labour productivity (cf. 
OECD 2007c; ILO 2005). Female labour participation rates and birth rates are 
maximised through “Swedish-style free childcare facilities” (see Blackburn 2002: 18), 
educational and family policies, as well as a woman-friendly political culture and 
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 labour-market policies (see Hoem 2005; Jenson and Mahon 1993). If so, the capacity 
of migration between societies with different population regimes (e.g. from societies 
with high population growth to those with low such) to provide additional labour is 
negligible (cf. International Organization for Migration 2005).  
 
These assumptions only incidentally match the conditions in any of the OECD 
economies. Indeed, when actually looking into the calculations underpinning these 
arguments they certainly do not always remain sound. As Forslund (2008) 
convincingly shows, Inverted Malthusianism is a problem because it has been 
constructed as one. His calculations show that, given continued increases in labour 
productivity rates, the problem of no longer having the same proportional wealth to 
distribute to the growing numbers of elderly has no mathematical grounding. Indeed, 
continued high labour productivity ensures that the per capita share of wealth will 
actually increase, rather than decrease, despite the pressures of an ageing population. 
Inverted Malthusianism is thus not only a highly contingent account of these 
economies, it is also a fragile political construction, which could be countered with 
policy solutions if deconstructed.  
 
Therefore, and particularly considering the political sensitivity of reforming the post-
war pension systems, fragile inverted Malthusianism must be wedded to a more 
authoritative rendition of its economic circumstances and solution to be capable of 
gathering support. More fundamentally, post-war norms of pension entitlements, as 
income replacement and derived from social citizenship, have to be effectively buried 
and be replaced with the notion of pensions as the result of individualised, risk-
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 management. Risk-privatising pension systems have to become accepted as the 
‘objectively’ correct alternative to be urgently introduced. Neoliberalism and its 
selective use of frequently discarded neo-classical economic ideas is central to such a 
shift. 
 
III Neoliberalism  
With the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state in the 1970s, “doctrines of the free 
market, both as ideology and as political economy,” were revived (Gamble 2001: 127). 
With the suspension of the fixed dollar standard in 1971 and the onset of stagflation, 
the combination of the neoclassical doctrine of monetarism (e.g. Friedman) and the 
Austrian school’s more explicitly political critique of the involvement of the state (e.g. 
von Hayek) in the economy started to be successfully made by think tanks and 
politicians of the New Right. Targeting in the first instance inflation, neoliberal policy-
makers give “priority to capital as money rather than capital as production” (ibid.: 130-
1; Duménil and Lévy 2001). The financial risks emerging out of the shift to a floating 
currency regime, the transnationalisation of production and an increasing indebtedness 
started to give voice to neoliberalism and to the calls of the financial services sector to 
be able to more freely manage and creatively exploit these financial risks. These calls, 
for what has come to be known as ‘disintermediation’,3  were successful and resulted, 
3 As French and Leyshon show, the notion of ‘disintermediation’ has been used vaguely and widely to 
describe a number of different processes. In the first place, they identify two types of disintermediation. 
The first type refers to “when investors, or the purchasers of financial instruments, deal directly with the 
producers of those products, sidestepping the need to go via established intermediaries such as insurance 
brokers or agents” (2004: 268). This is usually accompanied by an increase in the provision of financial 
information as a means to attract investors and as demanded by the latter. Since recourse to 
intermediaries is less of an option, consumers are required to attain higher levels of ‘financial literacy’ 
in order to make sense out of this information. Otherwise, they may fall prey to the information 
packages and advertisement strategies of financial services firms. The second type of disintermediation 
involves the “direct investment or market borrowing by companies without going through a bank or 
other financial intermediary” (Hamilton 1986: 244). The emergence of this type has two immediate 
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 in turn, in the explosive growth of traded financial papers and the extension of the 
‘disciplinary powers’ of financial markets (Gill 1991).  The relative failures of an 
initial extreme phase of deregulatory free-marketeering under Reagan in the USA and 
Thatcher in the UK produced strong popular dissent. These failures, moreover, 
generated what is best understood as a ‘critique’ from within the Economics profession 
in the form of the ‘Rational Choice’ approach, which in turn led to the emergence of 
the “New Institutionalist Economics” (e.g. North 1990; see Fine 2001). Neoliberalism 
has subsequently been partly reformulated. Instead of merely aiming at the ‘liberation 
of the market’, it now seeks to provide the institutional and normative conditions, 
which can optimise the flows of capital.  
 
Strategies of economic competitiveness have come to demand particular legal-political 
institutional structures, or a “new constitutionalism”, which discipline economic 
behaviour into conformity with the expectations of markets (Gill 2000). In this sense, 
the neoliberal emphasis on ‘de-regulation’ shifted to emphasising a particular form of 
reasons. Firstly, as a response to the ‘costs’ of financial regulation on lending or credit creation, 
financial services firms have sought to circumvent controls over the flows of assets and liabilities 
registered on balance sheets. Secondly, as “the volume of information available to assess the relative 
creditworthiness of borrowers” has increased considerably with technological developments, costly 
face-to-face assessments have been replaced with at-a-distance methods for rating credit worthiness 
(269). These new methods have increased the transparency of debtors rendering discretionary and 
confidence-based credit practices increasingly obsolete, particularly for the less financially resourceful. 
Moreover, this has in turn enabled the bundling and selling of credit risks in a complex process known 
as ‘securitisation’ (Montgomerie 2006). “More uneven and more intensely polarized landscapes of 
investment and borrowing” have been produced as a consequence (French and Leyshon 2004: 270; see 
also Ericson et al. 2000). Also, increased transparency has made cross-financing, particularly known 
from the Japanese, French and German economies, difficult. French and Leyshon identify three spatially 
related outcomes of this type disintermediation. Firstly, leading financial centres, like the City of 
London and Wall Street, have become more powerful nodal points of financial flows, as “centres of 
interpretation, calculation and power” (2004: 270). Secondly, at different spatial scales, 
disintermediation, especially in relation to the advent of ‘e-finance’ and ‘e-commerce’ has served to 
deepen processes of inclusion and exclusion in relation to the provision of credit and financial services. 
Finally, due to national and supranational forms of regulation as well as deep-seated routines and 
practices (Langley 2006a), disintermediation has advanced unevenly across space. Among the western 
capitalist economies, considerable variation remains with the Anglo-American economies as the 
supposed ideal. 
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 ”reregulation” (Majone 1990), from the “nightwatchman” type of government to 
“governance” (Jessop 2002). Neoliberals now sought to institutionalise individualism 
through the offer of choice and agency (Garland 1997), but neither freedom nor liberty 
(Rose 1999). The discourses and practices produced by international institutions, 
particularly the World Bank (Williams and Young 1994), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), tendentially shaped, but also gave legitimacy to neoliberal policy,.  
 
In neoliberal, increasingly hegemonic, accounts, these developments were evidence of 
‘globalisation’, a homogenous and inexorable process exogenously driving national 
economies to converge around the economic model seen as the benchmark of liberal 
capitalism, that of the world capitalist economy’s leader – the US economy (see 
Rassekh et al. 2001; Ohmae 1990, 1996; Thurow 1994). These “convergence forces” 
are identified by their original neo-classical proponents (e.g. Baumol 1986; 
Ambramovitz 1986) as the importation of technology, the opportunities to higher 
returns to capital and the absence of demanding “distributional coalitions”, which slow 
down growth (Olson 1980). These factors of convergence are seen as causing national 
economies to compete with one another (Cerny 1995). Governments consequently take 
on a remote, juridical role in relation to the economy and thereby providing a 
transparent and more predictable economic environment for market forces (Gill 2000). 
This is supposed to attract and retain the productive economic agents and capital flows 
which will enable national economies to catch up with the leading US economy, and 
do hence join the process of emulating the benchmark neoliberal capitalist economic 
model. In turn, this puts pressure on governments, especially those with large public 
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 sectors, high tax levels and significant regulations on economic activity and capital 
flows, to deregulate their economies and to minimise tax levels. Expensive and 
regulatory economic institutions that provide welfare and the capacity to 
macroeconomically steer economic activity, such as Keynesian risk-socialising 
pension systems, are therefore considered to have a negative impact on 
competitiveness and economic growth, as they interfere with the mechanisms of the 
market.  
 
Yet, this disciplinary neoliberalism has been differently interpreted, formulated and 
resisted in distinct socio-economic and institutional contexts. In fact, it is questionable 
whether this argument has any real correlation in empirical developments (Hirst and 
Thompson 1996; Hay 2000). Neoliberalism can, thus, not be understood as a uniform 
ideology or political economy. To treat neoliberalism as “a phenomenon which 
manifests itself everywhere and in everything” would be “politically paralysing” and 
analytically unhelpful (Gamble 2001: 134). Avoiding such tendential reification 
demands the careful deconstruction of neoliberalism “into the different doctrines and 
ideas which compose it, and relate them to particular practices and political projects” 
(ibid.).  
 
In accordance with the neoliberal ‘convergence thesis’, the most central neoliberal 
political projects of today are those undermining risk-socialising welfare systems, and 
particularly post-war pension systems. The role played by Neo-classical Economics to 
these projects cannot be understated. Debates within Neo-classical Economics have 
been crucial to the reform debate. Here, the wedding of the fragile inverted 
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 Malthusianism to particular sets of neo-classical economic ideas has been a crucial 
neoliberal discursive strategy. Consequently, this section will discuss the development 
of neo-classical debates on pension reform through the lessons learnt from the 1981 
Chilean ‘reform experiment’ and onto the Swedish pension reform. However, first, the 
central ideas of Neo-classical Economics to pension reform must be outlined. 
 
 
 
IV The Significance of Neo-classical Economics to the Design of the Chilean 
Pension Reform 
Orthodox Neo-classical Economics rose to prominence and dominance in policy-
making in the 1960s and 1970s, at the expense of Keynesian Economics. This was 
largely the orthodox doctrine established during the decades around the turn of the 
previous Century. Its canonical foundations, greed, rationality and equilibrium, are not 
only highly pessimistic of humankind (greed), but also unrealistic (rationality and 
equilibrium). However, since then it has been noticeably revised, starting with the 
Arrow-Debreu specification (1954). Still, this revision has not been convincing to all 
Neo-classical Economists, nor has it been adopted wholesale within the Economics 
profession (Schiffman 2004). Neoliberal policy-makers, whose knowledge of the 
economy is generally a product of the formers’ narrow teachings (Keen 2001), seem 
uninterested in integrating these revisions and, instead, keep on referring to and 
drawing much of their legitimacy from an outdated ‘Neo-classical Economics’ and its 
foundational canon. As Fine (2001: 149) argues with regard to the World Bank’s 
research on ‘privatisation’: 
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 Whilst consistently and aggressively pursued as a policy measure, the World Bank’s research 
has remained impoverished at best and apologetic at its worst. Analytically, it has fallen far 
short of the content of the approach that dominates the orthodoxy – with its conclusion that 
ownership as such does not matter relative to the conditions of competition and regulation. Its 
empirical work has simply and primarily been self-serving. If the lessons from existing 
literature had been learnt and followed in advance, policies would have been very different, 
particularly in terms of the desirability as well as the sequencing and integration of 
privatisation, or public sector reform, with other policies. 
 
As we will see later in this chapter, this also goes for World Bank pension policy.  
 
Broadly speaking, the world, according to orthodox Neo-classical Economics is 
defined by ‘general equilibrium theory’ and inhabited by rational utility-maximisers, 
so-called homines oeconomici. Individual human action is here “characterized by 
perfect[, and hence symmetrical,] information, an absence of strategic behaviour, 
public goods or externalities, and perfect forecasts (or, in the absence thereof, by a 
complete set of future markets) [because an existing] market economy guarantees that 
equilibriums are pareto-optimal” (Boyer 2005: 535). Thereby “economic agents can be 
modelled as if they form their expectations of future events according to the best 
available economic theory or econometric analysis” (Mackenzie 2004: 304). The most 
obvious instance of this general equilibrium theory is the ‘efficient market hypothesis’ 
(Fama 1970), to which we will return shortly.  
 
Many Neo-classical economists, at the time of the Chilean pension reform, believed 
that extreme risk-privatising pension systems had the potential to contribute to the 
emergence of efficient markets. The role of active pension savers was central to this 
belief. The claim was that through the buying and selling of assets, investors exchange 
information about the expected future value of these assets. Investment decisions are 
based on the individual, rational evaluation of the economic fundamentals 
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 underpinning such a value. ‘Market opportunities’, in the form of opportunities to 
optimise the rate of return on investments, function as powerful incentives providing 
the impulse to act. The belief in the social power of these incentives derives from the 
assumption of rational expectations of utility-maximisation, as determined by the 
optimisation of investment returns. It is assumed that information is fully and equally 
available to both buyers and sellers, yet, due to time-differentials in the evaluation of 
prices, opinions vary on the correct value of assets. The law of averages ensures that 
deviating opinions on the price for these assets even out to produce the true price at 
any given time. Accordingly, the greater number of active and ‘financially literate’ 
participants, the greater the efficiency of the market. Nonetheless, should this price-
setting mechanism in the market fail to generate the true price, arbitrageurs, such as 
institutional investors, will invest to eventually profit from this market failure, once 
fully corrected. Hence, the market is self-equilibrating, and if left to its own devices 
will produce the correct values of assets. Consequently, a fully functional market is 
assumed to be an efficient mechanism for the allocation of resources in any economy 
(ibid.). The specification of Arrow and Debreu (1954), and the critiques of North 
(1990) and Stiglitz (2001), among others, have weakened this extremely rationalistic, 
‘market-friendly’ and self-equilibrating understanding of markets. However, to 
neoliberals, at the time of the Chilean pension reform, as will be shown below, this 
was an extremely attractive theorisation of the market economy. 
 
A crucial second neo-classical idea, relevant to the Chilean pension reform, was 
economist Martin Feldstein’s thesis on the negative impact of U.S. social security4 on 
4 U.S. social security is a PAYGO defined benefit system funded through income tax. 
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 national aggregate savings and hence aggregate accumulation (1974, 1975, 1976). 
Based on the comparison between the post-war performance of the stock exchange and 
wage growth, he argued that private accumulation generated vastly higher aggregate 
accumulation than ‘social security wealth’. Echoing Friedman’s argument (1957: 123), 
he stated, that in the hypothetical absence of social security, workers would save for 
their retirement over the life-cycle. They would save less in their youth and 
progressively more when approaching retirement (the so-called ‘humped life-cycle 
thesis’). However, social security “induces” the worker to retire earlier than in its 
absence (Feldstein 1974). As social security pensions imply a loss of income relative 
to pre-retirement wages, the worker saves privately to ‘smooth’ life-cycle income 
(Arno and Modigliani 1963). However, without social security, retirement would not 
generally occur before or at the age of 65, but rather later as consumption levels would 
have declined significantly. Thus, social security does potentially generate savings. 
The “net effect [on national aggregate savings] of the social security program will 
therefore depend on the balance between the extra savings due to induced retirement 
and the reduced savings due to the replacement of private accumulation by social 
security ‘wealth’” (Feldstein 1975: 85). On the basis of his subsequent calculations, he 
came to the conclusion that national income was significantly reduced (by as much as 
60%) (Feldstein 1974) and thus the social security system was suboptimal. Yet, the 
combination of anticipated population ageing (Feldstein 1975: 79-81) and the 
politically induced expansion of the social security system (ibid.: 75-76), had reduced 
the rational inclination to work and save (1974: 906). In this Malthusian manner, he 
came to the conclusion that US social security was becoming increasingly untenable 
(1975).  
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Interestingly, a central element of his formula for adjusting the social security system 
to the modern economy (1977: 97) was the development of a large “social-security 
capital fund”, to reduce the burden on coming generations for financing the pensions 
of retirees. This would be done, in a manner politically compatible with the spirit of 
social security, by buying “outstanding government debt” (ibid.). In turn, this “would 
add to the nation’s rate of saving and real capital accumulation…[and be] an efficient 
way to finance future benefits (ibid.). Not to mention, this would reduce heavy US 
state indebtedness and hence extract the US economy from the claws of credit rating 
agencies (Sinclair 1994) and financial markets. This solution to the problem was not 
attractive to neoliberals, as it would return power to the State at the expense of the 
financial markets (Blackburn 2002). However, his problematisation of US social 
security and risk-socialising PAYGO defined benefit systems more generally was 
embraced by neoliberals. To neoliberals, risks in the saving for pensions should be 
shifted to the individual, so as to ensure market-conforming behaviour and maximise 
aggregate savings. Moreover, for pension savings to be allocated efficiently, without 
state interference, private financial institutions would have to be in charge of their 
management. This would in turn greatly enhance aggregate accumulation and thus 
ensure pareto-optimality. In addition, this would result in the distancing of the State 
from the economy. A neoliberal interpretation of the efficient market hypothesis and 
Feldstein’s theories were largely incorporated in the design of the new pension system 
in Chile. 
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 V The Chilean Pension Reform 
As argued in the introduction to this chapter, the replacement of one pension system by 
another implies the uprooting of particular social relations, or distributive coalitions, 
backing this historical compromise. Yet, these social relations can only be uprooted if 
the ideas, norms and practices upon which these social relations are forged are 
rendered obsolete and inferior to alternative ones. Against the background of the 
discourse of globalisation, the deployment of the discourse of inverted Malthusianism 
has aimed to construct risk-socialising pension systems as ‘sub-optimal’ and risk-
privatising pension systems as optimal, or rather ‘pareto-optimal’. The search for ‘this 
optimal alternative’ arguably started with the 1981 reform experiment in Chile, the 
country that Raffer refers to as “the lab of privatisations” (2003: 3; Orenstein 2005: 
190). However, demographic considerations were of minor concern to the reformers 
(Madrid 2002). Unsurprisingly, to neoliberals, and to some extent neo-classical 
economists, the particular political, economic and social conditions of the Chilean 
reform were allowed to play little role in their deliberations. The pension reform was 
part of a strategically uneven neoliberal overhaul of the economy hit by the 1970s 
stagflation and emerging debt crisis. The technocrats of the recently acceded Pinochet 
military junta designed a ‘shock therapy’ for large parts of the economy, yet 
purposefully sparing some actors (like the military and the higher echelons of the civil 
service) while undermining the power and the social conditions of others (Blackburn 
2002: 73, 227; Ippolito 1998: 140). This should also be understood as part of the early 
period of the international financial institutions’ (IMF and World Bank) programme of 
extreme structural adjustment in Latin America (Laurell 2000). Accordingly, as 
Madrid (2002: 159) argues, the pension privatisation scheme was “a response to severe 
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 capital shortages,… as well as the influence wielded by international financial 
institutions, especially the World Bank,…rather than to the financial problems facing 
some of the pension systems”. Pinochet’s University of Chicago-trained finance 
minister, who was in charge of the introduction of this system, perceived the old 
system as founded on the basis of a flawed “collectivistic concept of man and society” 
(Acuna and Iglesias 2001: 23). Hence, ‘parametric’ reform was not an option (Raffer 
2003: 4). The reform had to be ‘structural’ and aiming to reduce the weight of the State 
in the economy (Blackburn 2002: 227). 
 
The Chilean pension reform can be seen as the materialisation of late 1970s and early 
1980s neoliberal ideas on pension reform (Raffer 2003). As the first pension reform to 
replace a PAYGO system5 with a risk-privatising pension system, it incorporated a set 
of neo-classical economic ideas, which had started to make inroads into the emerging 
debates on pension reform. Thus, neoliberals and neo-classical economists understood 
this reform as an extremely significant experiment in pension risk-privatisation, from 
which crucial lessons could be drawn for subsequent reforms in more sizeable 
economies (World Bank 1994, chapters 4 and 6; Edwards 1998; Feldstein 2001: 8; 
Normann and Mitchell 2000: 9; OECD 2006). Whilst it was crucial to neoliberals 
because a success of this reform would empower them in their advocacy of risk-
privatising pension reform, neo-classical economists were eager to study the turnout of 
their neo-classical theories. Introduced was a ‘funded defined contribution’ scheme 
(FDC) constituted by a privately and competitively managed mandatory saving 
programme (World Bank 1994: 204) consisting “of individual capitalization accounts 
5 The old pension system in fact consisted of several PAYGO pension systems (see Kritzer 1996). 
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 financed solely by the employee” (Kritzer 1996: 45).6 This was complemented by the 
provision of minimum pensions to those who qualified for it. Launching this new 
system aimed at switching “the burden of retirement to the individual, lessen the 
government’s financial responsibilities, stimulate the economy [by increasing the 
equity savings base], and encourage employment” (ibid. 46). The transitions in 
structural, risk-privatising pension reforms are commonly known to draw 
problematically high fiscal costs (e.g. World Bank 2005: 44), the so-called ‘double 
payment problem’7. In the Chilean case, this was covered by the revenue from the 
privatisation of state-owned firms (Diamond and Valdes-Prieto 1994).  
 
Needless to say in the context of pension systems, the Chilean pension system is 
complex in more or less all of its elements and I will therefore just briefly outline those 
characteristics of particular significance to this thesis.8 Firstly, the system was 
supposedly designed to encourage the seeking of sustained and formal employment by 
awarding such with increased pension coverage. A complex system of mandatory and 
voluntary pension contributions9, however, applied differently to different categories 
of wage-earners, also to encourage formal employment. In a ‘tight’ formal labour 
market, the very high percentage of ‘self-employed’ (37% in 1996) could choose 
whether to contribute or not. Monthly pension contributions were set at a rather high 
level and did thus seem to discourage (10%), rather than incentivise, this group of 
workers from ensuring coverage. Other differentially marginalised groups faced a 
6 The Chilean FDC scheme was not the first of its kind. As Gillion et al. (2000) show, FDC schemes had 
existed since decolonisation in several former British colonies in Africa and Asia. However, these 
schemes were not harbouring privately managed funds. As such, they differ markedly from the Chilean 
scheme which relies upon the management of pensions by private funds. 
7 This refers specifically to the issue of one generation having to fund both its own pensions and the 
retirement of another. 
8 For a detailed study of the Chilean pension system, see Valdes-Prieto 2001. 
9 Mandatory pension contributions stand at 10% of monthly wages. 
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 complex set of rules for participation. Still, those workers who did regularly contribute 
still had to work for a certain number of years and reach a certain level of pension 
savings in order to receive a ‘full’ pension. Those who did not qualify for full 
entitlements to these savings faced a difficult struggle to secure a minimum pension 
(Kritzer 1996). 
 
Secondly, pension savings are invested by 10-20 pension funds10 (AFPs11), between 
which pension savers choose. In accordance with the efficient market hypotheses, 
consumer choice was of course central to engendering competition between the AFPs.  
The AFPs could be formed by shareholders, but not banks. Since the introduction of 
the system, the regulations on the investment practices of AFPs have gone from 
extremely strict and low-risk (effectively limiting investments to the Chilean economy 
and hence to its performance) to moderate. In 1981, AFP investments were limited to 
“low-risk domestic instruments, such as government bonds, time deposits and 
securities of financial institutions, bonds guaranteed by financial institutions, letters of 
credit sent by financial institutions, debentures of public and private companies, and 
shares in other pension funds” (Kritzer 1996: 48).  By 1995, the restrictions on AFP 
investment had been relaxed, as illustrated by figure 3.  
10 Between 1981 and 1996, the number of AFPs fluctuated between 12 and 21 (Kritzer 1996: 51). 
11 Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones.  
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Figure 3: Maximum percentages of AFP investment by forms of asset (taken from 
Kritzer 1996: 48). 
 
The Chilean pension reform is understood as an integral part of “the Chilean miracle” 
(e.g. Collins and Lear 1995; Edwards et al. 2000) making the Chilean economy into a 
potential “puma” (relating it to the East Asian ‘miracle’ and the East Asian ‘tigers’) 
(Sznajder 1996). The supposed success (e.g. World Bank 1994: 276) of the reform has 
made it “fashionable” to refer to (Cichon 2005: 1). However, this ‘success’ cannot 
merely be taken for granted. Thus, in order to assess the success of this pension system 
and hence the ability of neoliberals and neo-classical economists to draw upon the 
Chilean case, the outcome of the reform up to at least the mid-1990s must be analysed 
in order to be able to understand its relevance for the pension reform debates of the 
1990s. This ought to still be an insufficient time period as neoliberals and neo-classical 
economists claim, and in the case of a risk-privatising pension reform requiring 
‘behavioural adjustment’, there to be a time lag between the reform and its coming to 
 40 
 fruition (see Lindbeck and Persson 2002: 28-40). Yet, them singing its praise must 
allow others to engage with its success story.  
 
Four main objectives with the introduction of the new risk-privatising system can be 
identified: 
• to privatise risk and hence call upon the thrifty and rational individual to take 
responsibility for his pensions;  
• to relieve the financial burdens of the government and thus distance it from the 
economy;  
• to encourage employment; and  
• to stimulate the economy by increasing aggregate national savings and the 
efficient allocation of capital in the economy.  
 
Firstly, the reform certainly privatised risk, yet few individuals seem ‘rational’ and 
‘thrifty’ enough to manage their pensions as intended. The risk-privatising system was 
intended to ‘incentivise’ pension savers to acquire ‘financial literacy’, here understood 
as being able to understand present market values and to vaguely be able to predict 
future such, without educational support. However, whilst making choices between 
AFPs was complex at the outset, the required financial literacy became higher with the 
relaxation of the investment rules of the AFPs. In addition, at the time of retirement, 
pension savers had to make difficult and expensive choices when converting their 
savings into steady pension income (Diamond 1996: 83). As Rix (1995: 5) claims,  
[w]orkers’ ability to make the wisest investment decisions, to say nothing of their interest in 
keeping abreast of all that they need in order to make wise decisions, is questioned in 
Chile....Workers under the new Chilean system, aside from the minimum benefit, are not 
ensured against poor decisions; nor can the system guarantee a particular rate of return. 
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 Rarely having the skills or the knowledge to obtain such financial literacy, Chilean 
pension savers became highly exposed to AFP and financial sector marketing and led 
to the seeking of expensive investment advice (Kritzer 1996: 47). Indeed, the system, 
along with the rest of the technocratically designed economy, has created a bifurcation 
between, on the one hand, “a new commercial farming class in the countryside and a 
new financial and industrial entrepreneurial class in the cities” and, on the other hand, 
the urban working classes and the rural poor (Portes 1997: 241).12 Thus, towards the 
late 1990s, only 32.1 percent of the population of working age were in some sense 
active in and were hence potentially more comprehensively covered by the pension 
system (Valdes-Prieto 2001: 7). The complex and strict rules of participation seem 
likely to have contributed to that large numbers of workers, for instance female family-
rearing workers, aimed for just qualifying for the minimum pension and/or securing 
retirement income outside the pension system. All in all, according to the calculations 
of Valdes-Prieto, “[t]his means that, in an average month, 67.9 percent of the 
population above the age of 15 was inactive (out of the labor market), was active and 
exempt from contributing, or was evading contributions” (2001: 7). This can hardly 
have been aided by the unreliability of employers, who are legally responsible for 
transferring the pension contributions to the pension system. Kritzer notes that in early 
1996, 150.000 law suits against employers remained unresolved (Economist 
Intelligence Unit in Kritzer 1996: 49). 
 
Secondly, the State budget was indeed relieved of much of its pension liabilities. Two 
general pension systems were assumed responsibility for: the Minimum Pension and 
12 However, in the early 1990s, the minimum income was raised, partly intended to increase pensions. 
Still, as Valdes-Prieto (2001) argues, this had no real impact upon pension levels. 
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 the Assistance Pension. Whilst the former requires 20 years of working pension 
contributions, the latter remains extremely difficult to obtain (Valdes-Prieto 2001: 14).  
 
Thirdly, some neo-classical economists claim that the pension system has resulted in 
an increase of labour market efficiency, and hence employment rates by between 1.0 
and 1.5% (Edwards et al. 2000). Other research has shown that the impact has been 
insignificant (Gruber 1997). Overall in the economy, the 1960s were characterised by 
unemployment of around 6%, but this increased in the 1970s with stabilisation policies 
and structural adjustment programmes to about 15%. During the debt crisis in 1982-
1983 unemployment rose to 30% before stabilising again in the early 1990s at close to 
6% (Larranaga and Paredes 1999: 930). The authoritarian imposition of neoliberal 
policies in Chile (Portes 1997) may, to some extent, account for this restabilisation, yet 
without “large unemployment insurance programs nor publicly provided work 
subsidies in Chile,…the family support network [has been] critical (Valdes-Prieto 
2001: 10).  
 
Finally, with regards to aggregate national savings, much of the literature is actually 
showing that the effect has been negative during the time-period 1981-1995, and this 
was before the difficult years of 1996-1997 (Beattie and McGillivray 1995; Holzmann 
1997; Arenas de Mesa 1999; Acuna and Iglesias 2001). In late 1995, the total wealth 
of AFPs was 40% of GDP. Yet, the growth-contribution during this period of the AFPs 
has been deemed difficult to assess, as the introduction of the new system 
corresponded in time with a large number of other changes in the economy (Mesa-
Lago 1994; Vittas 1995). In addition, although the average annual rate of return for the 
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 investments of the AFPs during the 1981-1995 period were high (12.9%) (Kritzer 
1996: 49), this was still more than 10% below the Selective Share Price Index of the 
Santiago stock exchange and just 4% higher than the average rate of bank deposits 
(Acunas and Iglesias 2001). Still, this hides a high level of fluctuation from AFP to 
AFP and from year to year, which, of course, affects pension levels substantially.  
 
The effect of the Chilean reform on workers is thus the subject of great debate, yet  
[i]t is clear nonetheless that workers will face more risk in the private systems because most 
pension guarantees have been eliminated. It is also likely that some groups, such as women, 
will fare poorly in the new system because they live longer or because they often have 
prolonged absences from the labor market while raising children (Arenas de Mesa and 
Montecinos 2002: 160).  
 
Thus, the neoliberal claim that a pension reform like the Chilean one is pareto-optimal 
seems odd, unless politically or financially motivated. 
 
To neo-classical economists, the experiment remained of great significance as the shift 
from a risk-socialising system to a risk-privatising system now had been empirically 
tested. This was of course enhanced by the authoritarian means by which the reform 
took place. The social relations upon which the old PAYGO system rested were 
brutally uprooted and the new ideas, norms and practices were coercively imposed 
(Portes 1997). The expected high degree of conflict promised by structural reform 
constitutes a problem to neo-classical economists as ideas, norms and practices were 
even more unstable than otherwise. Assuming rational expectations and the provision 
of the right incentives, it is not the system itself which is problematic, but the reform 
process. As Rodrik argues, “a lot of economists [covertly find that] the search for 
consensus and compromise” may just hinder the introduction of a new and supposedly 
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 functioning system (1996: p.33). Of course, under the junta such a reform could be 
made without seeking popular consensus or having to make compromises with too 
many social partners. Thus, the introduction of the risk-privatising pension system in 
Chile provided the ideal ‘apolitical’ test for their ideas. Through the coercive 
neoliberal restructuring of the Chilean economy, with the new pension system in the 
forefront, market-conforming behaviour was to be ensured.  
 
VI Struggle over Pension Reform  
In 1994, the World Bank’s publication Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect 
the Old and Promote Growth implied the shift of considerable attention to pension 
reform worldwide. It was also the starting point of the World Bank’s (the Bank) highly 
active advocacy and direct engagement with pension reform worldwide (Orenstein 
2005: 191). As suggested by its title, Averting invoked inverted Malthusianism in full 
force and combined it with a recipe for growth: risk-privatisation and financial market 
stimulation. The fundamental starting point was Feldstein’s claim, as outlined above, 
that DB PAYGO pension systems, or rather US social security, significantly reduce 
national aggregate savings and hence economic growth. The Bank admitted that this 
had turned out to be wrong empirically in many cases (Canada, France, Germany, 
Japan, Sweden and UK. Sweden had even shown positive trends.), but gave a number 
of reasons for this: 
 
• The financial sector had not been able to provide adequate financial instruments for 
savings to make sense, especially when wage contributions to DB PAYGO systems 
‘crowd out’ consumption. 
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 • DB PAYGO systems induce workers to retire early, which forces them to save 
more and sooner for retirement. 
• Inverted Malthusianism had undermined the credibility of pension systems to such 
a degree that it had made pension savers hedge against the possibility of its 
collapse (World Bank 1994: 307-8). 
 
Hence, this empirical misfit did not provide strong enough reasons for the Bank to 
advocate parametric reforms. Feldstein’s claim, as outlined above, that DB PAYGO 
pension savings generated significantly lower rates of return than equity savings 
strongly suggested to the Bank that, for the sake of promoting growth, pension reform 
should involve the shift to equity savings (WB 1994: 307-9). 
 
The rational consumption smoothing life-cycle thesis, crucial to the post-war DB 
PAYGO systems (Samuelson 1958; Merton 1983) and the Feldsteinian ‘humped life-
cycle thesis’ of skewed life-cycle consumption (1976) crucial to the Chilean reform, 
were addressed in Averting. The Bank’s acknowledgement of the overly simplified and 
stylised assumptions made by these previously dominant understandings of life-cycle 
savings and consumption patterns was on the surface politically open, but implicitly 
neoliberal. By pointing to the great variety of needs and preferences in relation to 
consumption and saving, it implicitly advocated lower levels of pension contributions 
(yet obligatorily funded) than in e.g. the European welfare systems. Compensatory 
private voluntary savings should not be allowed to be ‘crowded out’ by high rates of 
inefficient DB PAYGO pension transfers (1994: 2, 49, 66-7, 80, 293-5). With the 
preference for equity savings for the purpose of growth, the obvious solution was the 
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 Chilean model of funded defined contribution pension schemes. Yet, these schemes 
could not be allowed to be too small (below 5%) because this would also crowd out 
voluntary private savings through increased consumption (ibid.: 93). The advocated 
funded defined contribution schemes thus had to be substantial, at least 10% of wages 
(ibid.: 251). Thus the discourse of inverted Malthusianism had gained a considerable 
boost.  
 
Despite its seeming failure, the model proposed was the Chilean one: 
• A mandatory tax-financed public pillar designed to alleviate poverty 
• A mandatory funded, privately managed pillar (based on personal accounts or occupational plans) 
to handle people's savings 
• A supplementary voluntary pillar (again based on personal saving, or occupational, plans) for 
people who want more protection. (World Bank 1994: 292) 
 
The neoliberals’ and the financial sector’s advocacy of cutting back on the public 
provision of pensions, in order to make people save for their own retirement, packaged 
in threats of inverted Malthusianism, had been given considerable legitimacy and 
respectability (Blackburn 2002: 16). No, better: following the Chilean example, the 
Bank proposed that such savings should be mandatory, substantial and managed by the 
financial sector. Maybe this was not coincidental. As former World Bank chief 
economist Stiglitz argues, in the Bank’s formulation of policy it tends to be heavily 
influenced by the IMF, who in turn has close ties to the transnational financial services 
industry as a consequence of sharing the same pool of high-ranking staff. Hence, Bank 
policy often reflects the interests of finance (Stiglitz 2002). 
 
Through the wave of financial deregulation sweeping over most of the world since the 
time of the Chilean reform, pension funds and other institutional investors saw the 
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 prospects for spreading the ‘equity culture’, which had come to characterise the, by 
neoliberals so cherished, Anglo-American model. Prior to the publication of Averting, 
the market for the private management of pension savings was a small business in 
most economies other than the Anglo-American ones. The spread of inverted 
Malthusianism had frightened some into saving on the side at the event of public 
system implosion, however pension funds were restricted to struggling against the 
“sales resistance” of “voluntary savers” in domestic markets (ibid.: 433). With the 
World Bank’s embrace, the conditions now seemed ripe for the construction of a 
transnational market for pension savings. 
 
However, the World Bank approach attracted criticism from two directions. Firstly, it 
received a strong critique from the International Labour Organization (ILO) on the 
grounds of its assumptions that post-war PAYGO defined benefit pension systems 
were demographically doomed. The Bank, through Averting, had problematically 
contributed to this perception. ILO’s Cichon responded that these pension systems do 
not suffer from a financing problem, but a problem of employment. With more people 
working, these systems are not in danger. It is only if the additional labour supply 
cannot be absorbed that the problem of employment becomes a problem of financing. 
Yet, even in such a case, these pension systems were not necessarily doomed, but 
could be adjusted to accommodate this financing problem (1995: 83-84).  
 
Cichon’s argument was further developed in another paper. Here, he argued that the 
Bank’s claim of the financial non-sustainability of these systems was a political one. It 
primarily targeted the type of costs of the redistributive system of the “European model 
of social protection” and advocated a shift to another type - the supposedly less costly 
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 redistributive system of the US economic model (1997: 1). The financial non-
sustainability of the European model resulted from its preference for redistribution 
through “social protection transfers financed through taxation and social security 
contributions”, while the perception of the US model of redistribution as less costly 
was based on the disregard for the implicit taxes paid through the redistribution of jobs 
and poverty (ibid.: 11). European workers, Cichon showed, were significantly more 
productive than US workers, which in turn offset some of the costs for unemployment, 
and this was a consequence of, among other things, labour market regulation (ibid.: 
10). In fact, Cichon showed that the two models of redistribution are equally costly. 
The World Bank’s claim was biased towards the US model. Thus, the World Bank 
made the biased assumption that sharing work was better than sharing income, when, 
according to Cichon, dealing with an ageing population required both. In addition, 
Cichon could have argued that the World Bank’s data on France’s and Germany’s 
national aggregate savings rates (as equal to those of the US) were not unquestioned. 
According to Blackburn, the historical aggregate savings rates for France and Germany 
have been higher than those of the US, despite having more generous pension systems. 
Hence, not only Sweden showed higher savings rates than the US, but also the two 
main economies of the European model (Blackburn 2002: 219). Thus, the World 
Bank’s celebration of the US equity culture would seem spurious. 
 
Nevertheless, the retaining of the “European model of social protection” was a political 
decision that had to be made (Cichon 1997: 21-22). Cichon argued that “[e]uropean 
social policy is at a critical crossroad”: 
As long as it maintains its low poverty priority and as long as growth rates in Europe do not 
show substantial improvements, Europe has a clear-cut choice: either it accepts unemployment 
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 and maintains high wages and high social transfers or it substitutes some of its disposable 
income and its social transfers by the financing of additional (social) employment. (1997: 32) 
 
According to Cichon, promoting and facing inverted Malthusianism, the Bank hence 
cared more for risk-privatisation and finance-led growth than for income redistribution 
and risk-sharing. In fact, the latter were costly, sub-optimal for growth and not pareto-
optimal. The Bank’s response to this criticism was to re-emphasise the financial non-
sustainability of parametric reforms, yet to acknowledge the need for dialogue with the 
ILO (Holzmann 2000: 28). The end of the heated struggle over pension reform seemed 
to have reached its conclusion with the Bank’s embrace of the “third way” Swedish 
Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system (World Bank 2001: 2). 
 
This shift in Bank policy, to which I will turn shortly, was primarily founded on 
considerable theoretical criticisms of its strong policy preference for the Chilean 
model. Particularly notable criticisms, or rather ‘critiques’ came from four economists, 
claimed by the Bank to have directly contributed to Averting (World Bank 1994: xvii): 
Ippolito, Barr, Diamond and Bodie. This internal ‘critique’ constitutes the second 
strand of criticism. According to Diamond, World Bank pension policy advocacy can 
be characterised as being of a highly uneven quality and of “overselling” (2007). He 
raises two concerns with reference to the latter: “one is that there has been too much 
advocacy at the cost of more balanced, and so more educational, presentations...[There 
has been] a near-religious war about the virtue of funded versus unfunded provisions, 
and the merits of defined-benefit versus defined-contribution plans.” He adds: “it 
should be recognized that the Bank’s economists set (and sustained) the tone for these 
interactions” (Diamond 2007: last page).   
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 Thus, also the ILO critique seemed to have been acknowledged, albeit in a still 
politicised manner, as the Bank came to accept that it had to meet “some of the 
objections of labor and pensioners’ organizations” (Williamson and Williams 2005: 
502). Addressing a number of myths that have arisen as a consequence of the 
discursive construction of inverted Malthusianism, Barr points to the flawed 
understanding of funded schemes as capable of resolving the ‘old age crisis’. The 
costly effect of increasing dependency ratios on funded schemes is “equally 
inescapable”, just more subtle (2001: 2). Instead of taking its expression in that greater 
tax contributions have to be made by the working population as in DB PAYGO 
systems, the retirement of a large generation of workers in a funded scheme, turning its 
financial asset savings into annuities or the like, “will exceed purchases of assets by 
the smaller younger generation, leading to falling equity prices and, hence, to lower 
pensions” (ibid.).  
 
The Bank’s promotion of funded schemes as generating superior rates of return to 
pensioners and growth in the economy was also strongly criticised. Feldstein, who in 
his critique of the DB PAYGO pension system of US social security in the 1970s and 
early 1980s had not gone so far as to embrace a funded defined contribution scheme 
with individual accounts like the Chilean one, had since the early 1990s changed his 
opinion. Now, Feldstein “became a leading advocate” of the Chilean model (Blackburn 
2002: 392). Based on new data, on stock market performances in several economies 
since 1960 which included the upswing of the late 1980s and early 1990s, “Feldstein 
claimed that the real return that individual accounts could reap on the stock market was 
higher than had previously been thought” (ibid.). Feldstein advocated the adoption of a 
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 standardised portfolio consisting of 60% shares, rather risky by nature, and 40% 
government bonds, usually of low risk. He argued that since the introduction of 
individual capitalised accounts would add additional return on capital, and because 
voluntary pension savings enjoyed tax exemption (not only in the US but also 
elsewhere, including Sweden), “[g]overnments should be willing to forgo those 
corporate taxes” and use them to pay for the costly transition (ibid.). Even in the 
universal and generous pension systems of Europe, this was a solution to the ‘double 
payment problem’. Still, as Barr points out, this is only a solution if the investments 
made under such a scheme generate increased productivity: “it cannot be assumed that 
pension fund managers make more efficient choices than other agents in channeling 
resources into their most productive uses” (2001: 2). As suggested by Blackburn 
above, the private pensions-induced equity culture of the US has not necessarily 
generated higher growth than in the income redistributive European economies, where, 
bar the UK, there is no strong private savings culture. The rise of “pension fund 
capitalism” in the US since the mid-1970s (Clark 2000) has, thus, not made growing 
equity markets the sources of increasing real investment capital. Financial markets 
merely have a “refinancing function”, which enables owners of capital to turn illiquid 
assets into liquid assets; they do not add new “productive capital” to the total capital 
stock. US capitalism has as a result of the growth of the private pensions market 
become characterisable by the notion of “rentier capitalism” (Toporowski 2000: 22-3).  
 
Of course, the supposed mobility of finance capital on largely deregulated financial 
markets enabled private pension providers to freely switch markets and exploit price 
differentials on assets. However, since the 1970s, the risks on financial markets have 
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 not become smaller, but significantly greater. Financial innovation (Mackenzie 2004), 
increasing market performance pressures on institutional investors (Harmes 1998: 
406), and the international financial institutions imposition of a uniform technical 
model on financial markets (Best 2005: 124-5, 147) have served to increase, rather 
than reduce, this volatility. The politically approved application of financial economics 
in financial market practice “performed” to generate this unexpected outcome 
(Mackenzie 2004). Understandably, in this context, Ippolito accused Feldstein of 
ignoring the risk it imposes upon pension savers:  
a risky return on capital cannot be compared to a riskless return on a government-enforced 
pay-as-you-go system…On a risk-adjusted basis, it is not clear that the return on the pay-as-
you-go system is lower than [in] a funded system. (Ippolito 1989: 140) 
 
Barr added to this by arguing that under a funded system the fluctuations of stock 
markets will render markedly different outcomes: “[t]wo individuals with identical 
lifetime contribution profiles could end up with very different pensions” (2001: 3). 
Thus, as Diamond states, pensions are directly affected by the risk reflected in realised 
rates of return rather than, as in DB PAYGO systems, spread across generations (1996: 
81). Moreover, as Bodie argues, building on the argument of Merton and Samuelson 
(1974), pensions in funded systems are determined by volatility, not by average rates 
of return in the long run (1995). Hence, the pensioner’s timing of the cashing of her 
pension savings becomes critical to her retirement income, although the choice of 
when to retire is often limited by need. There is thus often an in-built risk in retirement 
in funded schemes. 
 
However, choice itself could surely not be negative? In the end, consumer choice is 
central to the efficient markets hypothesis. This is, in turn, key to orthodox Neo-
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 classical Economics and neoliberal thought, and the claim that by increasing choice, 
welfare is enhanced. Barr makes the caveat that increasing the choice of pension plans, 
or fund managers, is only “desirable if consumers know enough to choose well. 
However, pensions are complex even for financially sophisticated consumers.” (Barr 
2001: 3) ‘Choice’ itself was acknowledged to be problematic, despite that this was 
theoretically understood to be the very engine of the market – the fundamental driver 
of a Pareto-optimising economy. 
 
Problematic on a deep theoretical level, the neo-classical economists’ assumption that 
the economy’s inhabitants were so-called hominess oeconomici, having perfect and 
symmetrically available information, had to be questioned. Still, in 2001, Holzmann, in 
charge of strategic and conceptual issues in the area of pensions for the Bank, stated 
that one of the main items on the policy research agenda for the World Bank was: to 
seek to understand “the (non-) participation decisions of individuals in the workforce 
in order to design second-generation reforms with a view to increasing coverage“ 
(Holzmann 2001: 27). Thus, Holzmann cautiously acknowledged that the decisions of 
individuals within funded schemes were hard to grasp for the World Bank economists. 
Had these rational utility-maximisers been acting as if they had internalised ‘the best 
available economic theory or econometric analysis’, they would have responded to the 
market-designs of funded schemes by participating and by making the appropriate 
choices. Human agency was found to be more complex than anticipated. However, the 
quest for the perfect pension system continued, largely on the grounds of rationalist 
assumptions. 
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 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, economists had, however, increasingly started to 
acknowledge the flaws in the ‘rational expectations’ approach. North had pointed to 
the importance of ‘institutions’, other than the market, and behavioural norms in order 
to reduce transaction costs in the market economy (North and Weingast 1989, North 
1990). In contrast to orthodox Neo-classical Economics and neoliberal ideas, the State 
was acknowledged to play a significant role in the economy: “[f]or economic growth 
to occur the sovereign or government must not merely establish the relevant set of 
rights, but must make a credible commitment to them” (North and Weingast 1989: 
803). Capitalist behavioural norms had to be fostered and secured rather than expected 
to naturally arise as a response to market incentives. Norms stipulating a duty to 
respect capitalist property rights had to be in place. For this to occur, behaviour had to 
be “constrained to obey a set of rules that do not permit leeway for violating 
commitments” (ibid.: 804). Whilst the State had “a comparative advantage in 
coercion”, and thus could violate property rights to secure the surplus at will, the State 
may have an interest in upholding the latter. By “striking a bargain with constituents 
that provides them some security, the state can often increase its revenue” (ibid.: 806). 
 
Echoing Gill’s idea of ‘new constitutionalism’, these ‘New Institutionalist Economists’ 
claimed that the role of the constitution was central to the capitalist economy because 
the State’s general interest did not suffice for an economy to grow. Whilst the 
bargaining “parties may have strong incentives to strike a bargain”, compliance with 
this bargain ex ante “is always a potential problem” (ibid.). Therefore a constitution 
was required, but a constitution which would reflect the incentive problems anticipated 
in the historical context between the bargaining parties, as well as “the potential 
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 enforcement problems among the relevant parties” (ibid.). Thus, “[s]uccessful 
economic performance…must be accompanied by institutions that limit economic 
intervention and allow private rights and markets to prevail in large segments of the 
economy” (ibid.: 808). Williamson, North and Weingast pointed to that such 
institutional structures should organise incentives so that they can: “be realigned 
and/or superior governance structures within which to organize transactions may be 
devised“ (ibid.:   806). 
 
The integration of these ideas into mainstream economic thought under the umbrella of 
heterodox, ‘Rational Choice’ economics seemed to have shaken the efficient market 
hypothesis to its very foundations. Firstly, the State had an important role to play in the 
capitalist economy (Stiglitz 1998: 25. Secondly, information was neither perfect nor 
symmetrically available (Orszag and Stiglitz 2001). Thirdly, capitalist behaviour was 
also political and thus had to be shaped through constitutions and ‘good governance’, 
beyond the provision of incentives (Stiglitz 2002). It was not that the World Bank did 
not allow for public regulation; it just did not trust public agencies with the 
management of pension savings, or rather, it had a bias towards private pension 
management for the purpose of stimulating finance-led growth. Orszag and Stiglitz 
showed in a paper, highly critical of the Bank’s approach, that leaving pension 
management in the hands of the financial services industry was problematically costly 
because “suppliers chasing pension contracts that were to last a lifetime had a motive 
to engage in exorbitant marketing expenditure” (Blackburn 2006: 166). Information 
was, in addition, ‘asymmetrical’ in the relationship between pension savers and 
pension funds, which led to that marketing distorted the choices of pension savers. In 
their stead,  
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 well-staffed public bodies have the capacity to remedy [these] information asymmetries. 
Indeed there is a bias toward collective provision in pensions because of the expense of 
marketing and administering millions of individualized schemes and because of the logic of 
risk pooling and information sharing. (in Blackburn 2006: 166)  
 
Given its subscription to the assumptions of neo-classical orthodoxy, the Bank’s 
confusion over “(non-) participation” in funded schemes, even if perfectly designed 
according to the assumption of ‘rational expectations’, may be understandable. As 
Thaler argues, 
The economic theory of the consumer is a combination of positive and normative theories. 
Since it is based on a rational maximizing model it describes how consumers should choose, 
but it is alleged to also describe how they do choose…[I]n certain well-defined situations 
many consumers act in a manner that is inconsistent with economic theory. In these situations 
economic theory will make systematic errors in predicting behavior. (1980: 39) 
 
Through the receipt of heavy criticism from some of its supposedly closest allies, the 
Bank’s embrace of the Chilean funded model had taken a severe toll. The criticism had 
undermined the dominant position in the pensions debate, which the World Bank had 
acquired through Averting (Orenstein 2005). Yet they continued their active advocacy 
of funded schemes worldwide, whilst, at the same time, starting to look for an 
alternative, particularly with regard to the Western European pension systems.  
 
Still, in the Western European OECD economies, the projection of inverted 
Malthusianism by the OECD (1995, 1998), national governments and the financial 
sector had generated a popular sense of crisis with regard to DB PAYGO pension 
systems (Eurobarometer 2004). This was hardly alleviated by the monetarist policies 
inscribed into the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, including the launch of the EMU and the 
so-called ‘convergence criteria’ forcing a minimisation of budgetary deficits onto the 
European economies (Scharpf 2000; Martin and Ross 2004; Blackburn 2005; Cafruny 
and Ryner 2007; Mathers 2007). Meanwhile, the World Bank’s argument about how a 
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 funded system would stimulate finance-led growth had become explicitly attractive to 
the OECD (1998)13 and implicitly attractive to the European Commission’s Lisbon 
Strategy (1999, Bolkestein in van Apeldoorn 2006: 19; Clark 2002; Bieling 2006). 
Structural reform towards a Chilean model involved very high transition costs (the 
‘double payment problem’) for the European welfare economies. Also, structural 
reform à la Chile seemed politically unfeasible as these pension systems, along with 
Delors’ “European Social Model” (Ross 1992), enjoyed considerable popular backing 
(Eurobarometer 2004). Yet, with the perception of a looming threat of rapidly rising 
social expenditure and with projected enormous outlays for the transitional costs of 
structural reform, the undermining of the main structural reform alternative was still a 
problem. The objectives of boosting the financial services industry and reducing the 
financial responsibility of States and firms still had to be met and, as such, parametric 
reform was insufficient. With most Western European governments, much of the 
industrial sector (European Round Table of Industrialists (ERTI) 2002), the financial 
sector (European Financial Services Roundtable (EFSR) 2002) and the EU 
Commission (EU Commission 2000/2001; Jenson and Pochet 2005; cf. EU Pension 
directive 2003) in pursuit of such an alternative, the Swedish “third way” alternative 
was a blessing, and the reason for policy convergence, even with regard to the World 
Bank (Quiesser 2000: 40). 
 
 
 
13 One of the “seven principles to guide reform” that the OECD outlines is that “The development of 
advance-funded pension systems should go hand-inhand with that of the financial market infrastructure, 
including the establishment of a modern and effective regulatory framework.” (OECD 1998: 2) 
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 VII The Swedish “Third Way” Reform 
The Swedish invention of the Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system was 
according to some a “paradigm shift” in the provision of public pensions (Palmer 
2000: 2).14 However, as Cichon argues, this is not “a new type of pension formula”, 
but rather “a novel pension policy instrument”, designed to obscure the shift in 
underpinning values and norms from tendentially oppositional elements in the electoral 
base, particularly labour and pensioners’ organisations (1999: 1; Myles and Pierson 
2000; Lundberg 2003). Indeed, the Swedish pension reform was a distinct elite project 
under the auspices of a coalition of the main political parties (including the Social 
Democrats), which excluded such organisations from the design process and kept the 
opportunities for public debate small (Lundberg 2003). This will be discussed in 
greater depth in chapters 4 and 5. Yet, the “reform fundamentally changed the 
provision of public pension benefits and redefined the benefit promise” (Sundén 2004: 
1). Its adoption in European economies will imply the introduction of “a new 
‘zeitgeist’” (Cichon 2005: 1). Solidarity and risk-sharing are abandoned to the benefit 
of risk-privatisation and “actuarial fairness” (World Bank 2001: 2; Lundberg 2003).  
 
A central motivation behind the NDC system is to strengthen the link between 
individual pensions and individual lifetime contributions. It does so by creating 
‘notional’ individual accounts in a DC PAYGO system. These accounts are fictional, 
simply recording contributions whilst used for pension payments. A notional interest is 
credited to these contributions each year and is used to calculate pension benefits at 
retirement. Supposedly, this provides pensions with more transparency and incentives 
14 Although the NDS was invented for the purpose of the Swedish reform, it was introduced in other 
countries before, as the process of reaching the phase of implementation took longer in Sweden. 
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 for extending the working career, which in turn would lower the need for raised 
contributions. Also, the dependency of one generation upon another is reduced in this 
system. In fact, it is so constructed that there is an in-built “automatic benefit 
adjustment process that responds to changes in longevity” (Sundén 2004: 9). Such a 
process is also attached to economic growth. In case economic growth dips underneath 
a certain level, pension levels are reduced (Settergren 2001). This latter fact also 
relates to the transitional costs involved in this structural reform:  
[b]y maintaining pay-as-you-go finance, notional accounts avoid the transition costs incurred 
by a shift to funding. Yet, by mimicking the structure of defined contribution plans, they avoid 
some of the problems of schemes with a defined benefit formula, associated with ageing 
populations. (World Bank 2001: 2) 
 
The Swedish reformers, however, did not settle with the introduction of a pension 
system based on the invention of the NDC system, but added a smaller mandatory 
savings system, the Premium Reserve System (PRS), as well as a means-tested 
element. Whilst the means-tested element was introduced to guarantee a basic pension, 
the PRS was introduced, in accordance with the Chilean model, to boost individual 
responsibility for pension savings, provide incentives to attain financial literacy and 
enhance the efficiency of the allocation of pension capital in the economy.15 Indeed, it 
was intended that the pension derived from the NDC system would not guarantee a 
‘normal’ standard of living in old age (Forslund, 2004), in order to function as an 
incentive for an active involvement in the PRS as well as to increase voluntary private 
savings. Yet, the small size of the funded element did not necessarily reflect the future 
plans of the Swedish reformers (interview with Margit Gennser 2005). As Orenstein 
(2005: 188) argues, the introduction of smaller funded elements is often seen “as a first 
15 Feldstein himself had been consulted by the Swedish pension reformers, and it seems likely that he 
exercised some form of policy influence here (interview with Margit Gennser 2005; Feldstein 2002). 
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 step towards the introduction of [more substantial] private savings accounts, in part by 
changing the mentality of contributors and beneficiaries” (Orenstein 2005: 188; also 
James in Williamson and Williams 2005: 493). However, to introduce individual 
accounts is also, as I have shown above, a costly exercise. In the Swedish case, a large 
part of previously accumulated capital in large public pension funds (the AP funds) 
was used to smooth the transition. However, the politics of this move will be discussed 
at length in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
More precisely, the Swedish funded PRS system is constructed and managed by the 
Premium Pension Authority (Premiepensionsmyndigheten) (PPM). It is built up on the 
basis of savings from 2.5 percent of individual annual earnings. Pension savers are 
given the opportunity to choose a portfolio of up to five among 750-800 ‘unit trust’ 
funds with different levels of risk, managed by accredited institutional investors 
allowed to advertise to attract pension savings. If a choice is not made, although 
discouraged by the PPM (Cronqvist and Thaler 2007: 425), an index-tracking public 
pension fund makes investment decisions for ‘passive’, ‘non-participatory’ pension 
savers. The PRS is organised according to supposedly superior neo-classical portfolio 
management and arbitrage principles. The PPM authority is, in recognition of 
heterodox, new institutionalist economics, assigned to cultivate norms of equity 
investment in pension savers by regularly providing them with information about 
financial markets and to educate them about financial risk and risk-management. As 
such, it is a state apparatus with explicit socialisation functions (Sweden. SOU, 1998: 
87; Sweden. Ministry of Finance, 2005a; PPM, 2006).  
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 The role of the PPM can be described by Thaler and Sunstein’s term “libertarian 
paternalism”, by which “the program designer [creates] an environment in which 
unsophisticated participants are gently guided in a manner that is intended to make 
them better off without restricting the freedom of the more sophisticated participants” 
(in Cronqvist and Thaler 2007: 424-425). As such, it is by design allowing for 
expected inequality in outcome. Yet, as Froud et al. have shown with reference to 
several Anglo-American economies, even the more sophisticated participants in an 
environment of wide-ranging choice make highly illogical investment decisions 
(2007). Apart from the specific role of the PPM, the PRS is an extremely ‘pro choice’ 
design, in accordance with neo-classical theory. Although we will wait to analyse this 
until chapter 5, based on our discussion of ‘choice’ above, offering this very high 
number of choices seems, even for the best trained professional investor, to generate an 
overly complex and risk-induced investment landscape. Moreover, it also seems, 
according to Orszag and Stiglitz above, prone to high administrative costs as a result of 
the advertisement costs of competing fund managers. Their competition, in turn, may 
very well generate further distortions of ‘sensible’ investment decisions on behalf of 
the average pension saver (Cronqvist and Thaler 2007: 428).  
 
Allowing such a high number of funds seems thus, at this first glance, to either be a 
reflection of Neo-classical Economics enjoying a condition of Kuhnian paradigmatic 
normality (Kuhn 1962) among policy-makers in Sweden, or the power of the financial 
lobby to impose the inclusion of a large number of its constituents in the system. 
Considering the small percentage of wages allocated to these investment choices, it 
presents itself more as a system of governance. As such, it seems to aim at a mental 
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 transformation of pension savers rather than generating increased aggregate rates of 
savings or growth rates. Indeed, the PRS is expected to accumulate the same volumes 
of capital as the previous AP funds (Palme 2005: 87). And without greater 
governmental regulation, any savings, whether privately or publicly managed, promise 
to fail to generate such. Hence, neoliberal policy is here aiming at generating consumer 
choice and agency, but will not necessarily create greater freedom and liberty (Rose 
1999). Chapter 5 will deal with these issues in greater detail. 
 
VIII Conclusion 
The emergence of the reform alternative of this hybrid, multipillar system containing 
both a NDC system and the funded PRS system, speaks to the belief-system of 
neoliberal policy-makers and to the interests of the financial sector. Both pillars, as 
supported by means-tested pensions, are “consistent with the neoliberal ethic of 
individualizing costs and limiting the redistribution of resources” (Williamson and 
Williams 2005: 493).16 Consequently, it is not difficult to see that the introduction of 
these systems may come “at a high cost to pensioners” (Cichon 2005: 1), whilst a 
much reduced such to the State and employers. In the Western European context, if 
receiving a greater subscription, this hybrid promises to be the optimal type of pension 
system in the eyes of neoliberal policy-makers. It is thus not surprising that it received 
the blessing of the Heritage Foundation (2000), a neoliberal think thank very 
influential during the neoliberal revolution in the US throughout the 1970s and early 
1980s (Cockett, 1995). How the introduction of such a system could be possible in any 
Western European economy, with their tradition of high levels of redistribution, is 
16 However, the Swedish pension reformers allowed e.g. higher education, military service and parenting 
to generate pension contributions. Thus, a degree of redistribution, apart from the means-tested element, 
exists in the system. 
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 critical to understanding the degree of neoliberal restructuring of daily life and elite 
level appreciation for finance-led growth. How it was possible in the case of Sweden is 
in itself critical to understanding the power of the neoliberal, finance-oriented project. 
Furthermore, given the anticipated strong social democratic legacies in Sweden, the 
viability of a neoliberal, finance-led economy is best explored in the Swedish 
economy, and particularly through the study of subject-formation. To reassert the focus 
of this thesis: the impact of risk-privatising pension reform on the formation of the 
necessary microfoundations for a neoliberal, finance-led economy in Swedish daily life 
is critical to an improved understanding of the feasibility of the emergence of a 
neoliberal, finance-led economy. Yet, such a study cannot rely upon a rationalist 
ontology. 
 
As I have discussed above, orthodox Neo-classical economics, from which neo-liberals 
pick up much of their thinking, but also derive their legitimacy, relies heavily upon 
such rationalist assumptions about human nature. This is also the reason why it is 
likely to continue to cause the World Bank difficulties in the defence of its pension 
policy advocacy. Despite its adherence to a strict positivist scienticity à la Popper, the 
orthodox Neo-classical Economics’ postulate of the logic of utility-maximisation 
provides its theorists, and now also neoliberal policy-makers, with an empiricist 
approach, which in itself cannot be empirically disproven (Hodgson 2001: 232-44).  
 
The combination of this epistemological arrogance with a rationalist ontological 
superficiality allows for the discarding of approaches, which take ‘externalities’ 
seriously and attribute unobservable structures an independent causal role in its 
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 systems of explanation. For, in orthodox Neo-classical Economics, general market 
equilibria can be constructed without taking the latter into serious account. The 
approach needed to tackle the issues dealt with in this thesis must therefore be based 
on different assumptions. Indeed, ‘externalities’, strategic behaviour and public goods 
are commonplace in the human world, and collective action problems can be overcome 
by wilful and strategic actors (cf. Olson 1980). As Mackenzie argues, the very markets 
in which the homo oeconomicus appears to thrive cannot be created (if they require the 
solution of collective action problems)… by homines oeconomici (2003: 116). As 
such, orthodox Neo-classical Economics, on which neoliberal policy-makers depend, 
is unable “to analyse the economic process in terms of the time lived by its 
subjects…[and cannot] express the social content of economic relations, and 
consequently to interpret the forces and conflicts at work in the economic process”, 
which is primarily due to the logic by which the concepts of these approaches are 
developed (Aglietta 1979: 9; see also Hodgson 2001). 
 
While the Rational Choice approach, partly elaborated upon by the ‘new 
institutionalist economists’, claims to have tackled these inadequacies,  and have been 
internationally recognised for this (Noble Prize laureates), their critiques are largely 
cosmetic. This Rational Choice approach only takes “the social half-seriously” (Fine 
2001: 145). Five overarching reasons can be given for this.  
1. It does not violate the Neo-classical assumption of utility-maximising 
behaviour, it merely provides a “deeper understanding of the latter in the 
context of market, non-market and informational imperfections” (ibid.: 143). 
Individuals and collectivities are thus still merely ‘pleasure-seeking’. 
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 2. Despite considering so-called ‘endogenous’ factors (e.g. ‘random shocks’, 
‘multiple equilibria’ or ‘path-dependency’) more seriously than Neo-classical 
Economics, ‘exogenous’ factors stipulated by “underlying axiomatic model-
building implies that outcomes are heavily predetermined” (ibid.: 144). The 
supposed inevitability of ‘Globalisation’ is a case in point (Hay et al. 1999; 
Watson and Hay 2003). 
3. Although adding market and informational imperfections, Rational Choice 
remains insensitive to socially and historically specific conditions of particular 
spaces. Hence, economies allocate “scarce resources between competing ends 
with these, in turn, determined by given production functions, preferences, and 
factor endowments” (Fine 2001: 144). The discursive construction of Inverted 
Malthusianism is a perfect example of economies being exogenously shocked 
with given (fiscal) constraints to adaptation. 
4. Rational Choice continues to strip issues of their complexity as well as their 
social and historical content. Society, albeit imperfectly informed, is merely the 
aggregate behaviour of individuals. 
5. Without adding any new analytical insight, Rational Choice justifies addressing 
‘old’ issues with reference to ‘parsimony’ (ibid.). Thus, when large parts of the 
social sciences are taking notions of space and time, issues and structures of 
power and identity, as well as processes of conflict and transformation more 
seriously, Rational Choice ‘dumbs’ social inquiry down. 
 
 Although, this ‘challenge from within’ has had an impact, it seems to have been 
unevenly affecting Neo-classical Economics and Neoliberal policy-makers. Thus, not 
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 only neoliberals lag selectively behind mainstream developments within the discipline 
of Economics, Neo-classical Economists do too. Indeed, the normativity and hauteur 
of those economists who still derive their voice from association with orthodox Neo-
classical Economics are thus beyond question, and in the context of highly complex 
pension reform these are outspoken: “[w]hen the politicians are ready to act, I hope 
that we in the economics profession are ready to help them” (Feldstein in Blackburn 
2002: 349). In this particular historical context, we can thereby talk about Neo-
classical Economics as being ‘performative’ (Callon 1998) as well as paradigmatic, in 
a Kuhnian sense. Unsurprisingly, this is having an impact on society. 
 
Since the rise of neoliberalism, increasingly the assumptions of orthodox Neo-classical 
economics seem to have become internalised by human agents as normal (Hay 2004). 
Wedded to inverted Malthusianism, they have shown to have a propensity towards 
becoming self-fulfilling (Offe 1987). In accordance with this idea and fundamental to 
my thesis, the neoliberal construction of a discourse of inverted Malthusianism is 
potentially capable of rendering risk-privatising pension reform the only ‘objectively’ 
correct alternative. By selectively drawing upon neo-classical economic ideas, 
reconstructing them and subsequently deepening their paradigmatic status, 
neoliberalism seeks to render the contingent necessary (Watson and Hay 2003). It thus 
seeks to benefit some, at the expense of others. As Cox famously puts it: “[t]heory is 
always for someone and for some purpose” (italics in original, Cox 1981 [1996]: 87). 
As such, neoliberalism is morally hazardous (Ericson et al. 2000) 
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 To carry the discussion of this chapter over to the next’s of how to understand 
economic restructuring as political and contingent, it seems meaningful to end with a 
quote from a disillusioned renegade member of the European financial community: 
The systematic search for the highest value possible for the shareholder is nothing other than 
the disguised expression of rentier interests, with a strong preference for the future over the 
present, a translation of the power of Anglo-Saxon pensioners (who are the only ones to save 
so strongly) over the whole of world society, in short of old, or ageing, Americans and Britons 
to the detriment of young people of all other countries. Have we already succumbed to this 
new form of serfdom? Let us forget for a moment frontiers and nationalities: within each of 
us, to put it another way, old age is in charge of what we do. The high rates of interest we have 
known for nearly twenty years, are they not the expression of this new domination, of 
governance without debate?...Indeed we find that today’s workers have no say over how their 
savings are invested and the activities of the most powerful financial interests are legitimated. 
(Jean Peyrelevade, President of Credit Lyonnais, in Blackburn 2002: 224) 
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 Chapter 2: Finance-led Post-Fordism, Coupon Pool Capitalism and 
Financialisation: the Significance of Pension Reform  
 
I Introduction  
Chapter 1 pointed out the contingencies and contradictions in the dominant 
transnational discourse on pension reform. The “old-age crisis”, caused by growing 
volumes of pension liabilities, is still considered the most pressing issue for advanced 
capitalist economies. Discourses of inverted Malthusianism point to the necessity of 
pension system retrenchment. I showed that this retrenchment is presented as 
necessarily requiring the transfer of risk from the national economy and firms to 
individuals in order to enable the liberation of capital from the liabilities of pension 
obligations. Yet, extreme market-oriented pension reforms are acknowledged as 
politically sensitive because the post-war defined benefit pensions are deeply 
embedded in society. The proposed solution has therefore been the shift to hybrid 
forms of pension provision, in which defined-benefit elements are transformed into a 
residual element and combined with defined-contribution and funded elements, and 
away from risk-socialising, defined-benefit systems. This nevertheless implies a 
significantly greater risk exposure for wage-earners and households. At the same time, 
this is understood as providing greater incentives to manage risk efficiently. 
Considering that pension capital has become the greatest source of investment capital 
in advanced capitalist economies, the economy is to benefit substantially from more 
efficiently allocated pension capital. Risk-induced pension reform is as such a 
powerful instrument in channelling pension capital to financial markets at the same 
time as it supposedly relieves the economy of the ‘burdens’ resulting from risk-
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 sharing. This neoliberal conception of the role and function of pensions in the 
economy stands in stark contrast to post-war organisational forms of pension 
provision. Neoliberal pension reform must therefore be understood in the context of 
the post-war development of such economies.  
 
The post-war, social democratic Swedish economy is, quite arguably, the context in 
which neoliberal pension reform protrudes the most, and can thus be expected to have 
the greatest socio-economic and political consequences. The literature on neoliberal 
restructuring of the Swedish economy since the early 1980s helps to explain, to some 
extent, how the introduction of a neoliberal pension system, in 1999, was politically 
possible. Although the new pension system was not introduced for nearly another two 
decades, the role and function of pensions underwent considerable transformation, 
partly paralleling this economic restructuring. Both economic restructuring and gradual 
pension reform must therefore be understood not only as closely linked, but also as 
originating in the crisis of the post-war economy.  
 
The literature on this crisis and restructuring is both considerable and thorough (e.g. 
Lipietz 1987; for a comparative study of the Nordic cases, see Mjöset 1987). Also, the 
coverage of the economic restructuring that ensued in Sweden is exhaustive (Svensson 
2001, 2002; Ryner 2002; Blyth 2002), yet this is only suggestive of what has followed. 
Through a comprehensive literature review, this chapter provides a conceptual 
framework for the particularly finance-oriented developmental trajectory, which seems 
to be emerging out of this period of crisis and restructuring. In particular, the chapter 
conceptually explores the particular points of departure for this trajectory, or 
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 contingent tendency, identified in this literature and relates these to the changing role 
and function of pension provision in such a politico-economic future development.  
 
The chapter pursues this in a number of steps. Firstly, I briefly review the dominant 
approach to the restructuring of Fordism in the political economy literature: the 
Varieties of Capitalism approach (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001; Garrett 1998; Kitschelt 
et al. 1999). I identify the theory of the post-industrial trilemma (Iversen and Wren 
1998) as highly influential in this literature. I proceed by critiquing Baumol’s 
underpinning cost-disease theorem (Baumol 1967). My argument is that these 
approaches and theories neither consider institutions, nor the political nor contingency 
sufficiently. Consequently, I turn to Parisian Regulation theory, and particularly its 
more recent versions such as the SSIP approach (Amable 2000; Amable and Petit 
2001; Boyer 2005). Whilst Parisian Regulation theory, in an open-ended manner, 
addresses the institutional and political inadequacies emerging out of the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature, it is insufficiently sensitive to the institutional specificities of 
national economies and thus suffers from a relative inability to comprehend 
contingency. Moreover, the Parisian Regulation School primarily consists of 
economists, albeit highly politically aware economists. Therefore, it is not so 
surprising that they neglect politico-strategic agency. By developing the notions of 
“accumulation strategy” (Jessop 1982), “societal paradigm” (Jenson 1989), “the 
capitalist state” (Alnasseri et al. 2001; Lipietz 1988) and “uneven development” 
(Harvey 1982), I seek to conceptualise the period in the aftermath of the crisis of 
Fordism as politico-economically strategic and contingent. Considering the financial 
direction of this development and the role of pension reform therein, I pay particular 
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 attention to the idea of the emergence of a “finance-led growth regime” (Boyer 2000a) 
or a “coupon pool capitalism” (Froud et al. 2002). I also consider the significance of 
other actors, e.g. the ‘financial lobby’, in these developments (Posen 1993; Svensson 
2001), the notion of “financialisation”, and the contradictions emerging out of the 
imposition of processes of financialisation on a variegated societal paradigm, which 
still answers to notions of risk-sharing and solidarity. I will summarise by pointing to 
the critical importance of the Swedish case for this direction of development. The 
literature on the “financialisation of the Swedish economy”, to which pension reform 
potentially contributes significantly, suggests a surprising resilience of neoliberal 
restructuring in such a seemingly inhospitable environment (Henreksson and 
Jakobsson 2003; Reiter 2003). However, the “institutional incompatibility” (Amable 
2000) of the resulting matrix of institutions nevertheless promises systemic fragility 
(see chapter 4). This review will set the stage for chapter 3, in which a distinct ‘cultural 
political economy’ approach will demonstrate the need to approach the financialisation 
of the Swedish economy in a manner which is sensitive to contingent subject-
formation, i.e. the complex tendencies in the microfoundations of this particular 
process. 
 
II Conceptualising Profound Socio-Political Change – A Rejection of the Varieties 
of Capitalism Literature 
As I showed in the previous chapter with reference to the work of Feldstein, theories 
based predominantly on the ‘axiom’ of rational expectations, still dominate 
mainstream economics. They are not helpful in our endeavour to comprehend 
economic behaviour, if, as here, understood as inseparable from its complex context in 
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 ‘daily life’.17 The rationality axiom, the basis for neoliberal understandings of the 
equilibrating, pareto-optimalising market economy made up of autonomous, perfectly 
informed, utility-maximising individuals, paradoxically becomes the grounding for a 
dangerous structuralism (Hay 2004b). In a more upfront manner, structuralist 
approaches also reduce our ability to identify prospects for radical change as 
contingency is removed from processes of subject-formation. Here, the individual 
subject is reduced to the “mere personification of a given structure” (Morley 1986: 43). 
This is where this chapter contributes to the intervention of this thesis: to develop an 
approach which is capable of understanding the seeming profound, yet contingent, 
change implied with the ‘financialisation’ of the Swedish economy since the 1970s, 
but still attributing crucial importance to processes of subject-formation, understood as 
intrinsic to the contingencies in this development. Hence, such an approach would be 
required to operate on many levels of analysis and only momentarily discriminate 
between them. 
 
As stated above, the dominant literature on economic restructuring in the context of the 
profound changes witnessed in the advanced capitalist economies since the late 1960s, 
and particularly from the early 1980s, has become the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
literature (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001; Garrett 1998; Kitschelt et al. 1999). Its 
prominence requires me to pay it attention here. However, as we shall see, the coming 
to the fore of this literature within (comparative) political economy suggests a 
continuing failure to adequately account for complex, socio-political change. 
Consisting of a number of different approaches, this literature has reached a relative 
17 See footnote 30. 
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 “theoretical synthesis” around the understanding of the impact of pressures derived 
from capital mobility and the shift to postindustrial employment on:  
particular configurations of interlocking and interdependent political-economic institutions 
which produce different forms of behavior on the part of economic actors, different economic 
and social outcomes, and different patterns of economic development (Howell 2003: 103). 
 
The outcome is a ‘dual convergence’ around two models of economic development, 
the Liberal Market Economy (LME) and Coordinated Market Economy (CME) (ibid.: 
109; Blyth 2003: 215). Out of these approaches, Hall and Soskice (2001) have 
received the most attention, for seemingly good reasons:  
[o]ne can clearly see the strengths of this approach when taken as a whole. Micro, meso and 
macro are all there. The interactions of agents and institutions in their wider structural context 
is apparent, and how that context shapes those interactions is central to the approach. It has 
microfoundations, meso institutions and macro regimes. It offers a coherent account of what 
we see empirically; that globalization did not change everything, that agency and institutions 
still matter. (Blyth 2003: 216) 
 
The central analytical point for Hall and Soskice’s approach is the capacity of firms to 
resolve five coordination problems (collective action problems) in these institutional 
configurations, partly shaped by the emerging, abovementioned pressures. In cases 
where firms are incapable of this, the given variety of capitalism proves untenable. 
Firms respond rationally, modelled in game-theoretic terms, to these coordination 
problems, which generates equilibria, which only seem to be disturbed by exogenous 
factors (Hay 2005). Hence, the ‘structuralism’ of the rationality axiom haunts also this 
approach (Boyer 2005). The interests and behaviours of economic actors are derived 
from their institutional contexts, yet, as Amable points out, game theory is more 
capable of explaining conventions than institutions proper (2000: 653). Consequently, 
the VoC is not, contrary to its expressed allegiances, sufficiently institutionalist to 
account for the variation, on which it focuses (Hay 2005: 21). If these contexts, 
however, are destabilised, institutional adaptation occurs in rather functional-
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 mechanistic terms (Watson 2003; Hay 2005). Hence, the strength of their approach lies 
in explaining stability, not the contradictory features of institutional configuration or 
the contingency of political agency, both potentially central to the notion of radical 
change. Nevertheless, as other varieties seem untenable, the outcome is convergence 
around two ideal-type models: the LME and the CME. The outcome is thus divergence 
in convergence.  
 
These, in turn, are modelled, largely, on the US and the German economies 
respectively. However, as Hay points out, no deductive reasoning is provided for this 
outcome, nor for the exclusion of, say, a social democratic alternative (2005: 11-12) 
other than the decline of “peak-bargaining” (Howell 2003: 109). Social democratic 
alternatives are considered as plausible and temporary sub-varieties of the coordinated 
model (Hall and Soskice 2001: 33-26; Esping-Andersen 1996), but not alternatives in 
their own right. Here, Hall and Soskice rely upon, arguably ‘contingent’, statistical 
evidence to parsimoniously make their case (Hay 2005: 11-12). A number of OECD 
economies are simply plotted on a diagram constituted by two axes, according to 
which their ‘degree of coordination’ can be read (Boyer 2005: 528-9). The data, 
seemingly inductively applied (Hay 2005: 12, with reference to Hall and Gingerich 
2001), suggest that the US and the German economies are the two strong survivors 
under these pressures, by being able to provide institutional configurations in which 
firms can continue to successfully resolve their coordination problems. As Blyth points 
out, the basis for this reasoning seems questionable. Firstly, the German model, as 
described by Hall and Soskice, no longer meaningfully corresponds to the German 
economy. The difficult fate of the German economy during the 1990s (Streeck 1997) 
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 and the early 2000s hardly supports their case. Secondly, the data pointing to the US 
economy’s capacity to maintain low unemployment rates, one of Hall and Soskice’s 
indicators of success, ignores the extraordinary incarceration rates, along with its often 
‘privatised’ costs, which reduce official unemployment levels and serve to highlight 
the expenditures of the European welfare states for unemployment and retraining 
(Blyth 2003). Hence the costliness of European welfare states is emphasised, but they 
may survive due to the ‘institutional comparative advantage’ they enjoy: the high 
levels of strategic (non-market) coordination displayed.  
 
Thus, according to Hall and Soskice, particular institutional configurations provide 
national economies with the conditions for firms to specialise and engage in trade 
relations, which render those economies successful. Yet, as Watson argues, this 
Ricardian approach largely neglects the political and the contingent in the formation 
and reproduction of institutional configurations (2003: 231-2). Instead they come 
across as pre-givens of, or functional to, economic systems (Hall and Soskice 2003: 
248). In a Ricardian manner, it is almost as if institutional comparative advantage is 
naturally endowed. Thus,  
 
[t]he political choice to construct social institutions in one way, thus foregoing all possible 
alternatives, appears to be an epiphenomenon of a more essential economic logic. In this 
respect, decisions relating to the socio-institutional organization of the economy remain 
overwhelmingly technical in nature. Politics is reduced to the struggle for the authority to 
impose efficient institutions for economic policy-making (Watson 2003: 232). 
 
However, as Hall and Soskice concede, the varieties of capitalism approach was not 
intended to fully explain the origins and changes of institutional configurations (Hall 
and Soskice 2003: 249), although this is clearly discussed in the original volume 
(2001). As Boyer argues, the paradoxical neglect of the political and more generally of 
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 change is more a result of their “strong interest in economics, specifically in 
microeconomic theory”, despite coming from political science (2005: 523) 
 
Models of stasis are of limited value in times of change, not the least in the times of 
radical, profound change, which the Swedish economy, along with other ones, have 
experienced during the time period from which the varieties of capitalism literature 
draws its data. The main claim with regards to change, Ricardian-style, is that facing 
pressures of liberal convergence, both the liberal market and the coordinated market 
models are not only likely to survive, but to be reinforced “by encouraging each 
country to specialize in what it does best”, institutionally (Hall and Soskice 2003: 
247). Hence, the more an economy resembles one of the two models, the more 
economically efficient it is likely to be and the more likely it is to survive these 
pressures (ibid.: 244-5). Hall and Soskice, however, provide arguments and supporting 
data, which contradict these claims, and to the benefit of the liberal market model. 
Firstly, given the liberal nature of these pressures, coordinated market economies are 
required to be particularly flexible, despite resulting conflict, in its approach to its 
institutional design (ibid.: 246). Secondly, liberal market economies are expected to 
provide superior conditions for the provision of terms conducive to radical and rapid 
innovation. Considering that the significance of such innovation is reinforced during 
this period of increased competition, it seems that Hall and Soskice are claiming that 
liberal market economies will strengthen their comparative institutional advantage and 
attract mobile firms. As coordinated market economies ‘merely’ enable incremental 
innovation, they will lose out (Hall and Soskice 2001: 42-3; 2003: 248). Hence, at this 
historical juncture, at least, liberal convergence, nevertheless, seems likely, according 
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 to their account. Yet, as Hay shows (2004), the data is pointing towards a different 
scenario. Coordinated market economies, and particularly the, by Hall and Soskice 
neglected, socially democratic economies in Northern Europe have shown to be the 
most attractive to research & development-intense firms world-wide. Hence, the ‘dual 
convergence’ thesis seems problematic and not useful to this study (cf. Henreksson 
and Jakobsson 200318). 
 
III Repoliticising Change – A Regulationist Critique of the Postindustrial 
Trilemma 
In Blyth’s critique of the VoC, he argues that the German economy is underperforming 
due to the slow rate of adjustment demonstrated. Here, adjustment is hindered by 
defensive trade unions, a political system with multiple veto points and decreasing 
popular legitimacy of tax increases (Blyth 2003: 219-220; Hall and Soskice 2003: 242-
3). Iversen and Wren argue (1998) that this is symptomatic of Baumol’s cost-disease 
theorem relating to the rise of the service economy (see also Esping-Andersen 1996), 
around which a consensus has been formed among economists (Iversen and Wren 
1998: 511). The basis for this idea is that manufacturing has the potential to increase 
productivity because it can be technologically progressive and thereby capable of 
reducing labour costs, whereas services cannot; innovation, capital accumulation and 
economies of scale can benefit the former whilst the latter cannot significantly reduce 
labour costs per unit produced and at the same time retain or improve the quality of the 
produced service (Baumol 1967). Iversen and Wren state this in clear terms: 
“[t]eachers can serve more students, nurses more patients, and waiters more customers, 
18 Henreksson and Jakobsson claim that the Swedish economy is a CME, but developing corporate 
governance and ownership structures similar to those of LMEs (2003: 98). 
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 but this is not easily achieved without a decline in the quality of the service” (1998: 
511-512). In post-industrial economies, manufacturing reduces its labour costs through 
technological progression and labour is hence inevitably shed to the extent that this has 
to be compensated by increases of employment in the service sector.  
 
According to this literature, the “virtuous circle between falling prices and rising real 
demand” during the post-war period was broken in the late 1960s and 1970s, as the 
expansion of manufacturing slowed down (ibid.: 512). Given the size and political role 
played by the public sectors in the post-war CMEs, the public sector became the 
obvious space of employment expansion (ibid: 511; Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Problematically, solidaristic wage increases in post-industrial economies, with shifting 
emphasis of employment towards the tertiary sector, become decreasingly viable, 
particularly if linked to wage-setting in manufacturing. Whilst centrally bargained, 
solidaristic wage policies served to reduce inflationary pressures and sustain full 
employment during the post-war period, not least in their country of origin Sweden 
(see e.g. Erixon 2001, 2003; Ryner 2002), post-industrial CMEs now instead 
supposedly face the reversed effect of solidaristic wage-setting as it compresses wages 
in manufacturing and sustains high wages in the less dynamic service sector. 
Consequently, this process requires economies to either accept increasing wage 
inequality or increased public spending and taxation to finance service sector 
expansion. They further argue that public sector expansion can cause “incentive 
problems”, so-called “moral hazards” (Lindbeck 1995a, 1995b), capable of 
undermining economic efficiency (Iversen and Wren 1998: 512-513). Yet, increasing 
unemployment can only exacerbate the problem, in particular when dependency ratios 
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 increase, the ‘inverted Malthusianism’ described in the previous chapter. The “post-
industrial trilemma” supposedly arises, particularly problematic for the CMEs of 
Europe. 
 
However, this is, as I have shown, premised upon the acceptance of Baumol’s cost-
disease theorem. Although the formal integration of this theorem into Swedish 
economic policy-making is recent (2003) (Mahon 2007), its general line of reasoning 
started to become increasingly characteristic of the latter in the late 1980s, as I will 
show in chapters 4 and 5. Therefore, to show the arbitrariness of this argument is 
central to accounting for radical, largely strategic change in the Swedish economy 
since then. In brief, the Baumol thesis claims that the service sector is “asymptotically 
stagnant”, i.e. the value of its produced services remains constant although the costs of 
the required labour increases together with those of the manufacturing sector. Firstly, 
economists, or in the case of the VoC literature rational choice-inspired political 
scientists, have tended to make such claims on the grounds of drawn trajectories of per 
unit costs over time for service sectors which have “performed” poorly. Nevertheless, 
empirically, such criteria fail to measure productivity accurately as they do not account 
for either increases in product quality or diversity. Services can potentially benefit 
from innovation just as much as manufacturing (Cowen 1996: 210-211). Hence, the 
cost-disease thesis underestimates the scope for innovation in service production, and 
hence overestimates the relative rise in costs of such. There is thus neither any a priori 
nor a posteriori reason “to expect lower rates of productivity growth from the arts, 
from health care, or from education” (ibid.: 211). Secondly, a clear interpretative 
dimension, of popular norms and values influenced by marketing and politics, is 
 80 
 neglected by Baumol’s neoclassical and technology-centred understanding of labour 
costs and price-setting. More ‘primitive’ technologies and production processes may 
be more highly valued than more ‘sophisticated’ ones, whether it is in the service or 
manufacturing sectors. The same interpretative dimension, informing norms and 
values, can make people willing to pay considerably for public services, via taxes. 
Such attitudes have been dominant in the Swedish economy (Svallfors 1999; Rothstein 
2001). However, primarily, “it ignores the contribution of the service sector to 
productivity and lower costs in the goods-producing sector” (Mahon 2007: 81). And, 
secondly, “it falsely assumes a determinist logic of socio-economic development” 
(Ryner 2002: 40). Contingency and variety in capitalist development are thus 
downplayed. This is not the case in Parisian Regulation theory. 
 
In contrast to the VoC literature, Parisian Regulation theory evaluates the ability of 
economic systems to survive, not on the grounds of economic growth, but by their 
ability to regulate conflicts emerging out of capitalism, which, of course, in turn can 
generate extended periods of growth, such as that of the post-war ‘golden age’ 
(Aglietta 1979). Hence, the economic contribution of the service sector, and even more 
so the public sector, is considered important, despite difficulties in quantitatively 
determining its contribution to economic growth (Mahon 2007: 81). This more open-
ended approach also implies a greater willingness to identify a greater number of 
‘varieties of capitalism’ than the VoC literature, including a Social Democratic one 
(Amable 2000; Boyer 2005) and a finance-led model of growth (Boyer 2000). The 
Parisian Regulation School19 (PRS) arose from the identification of the inadequacies of 
19 Jessop (1990) famously identifies seven different strands of Regulation theory. Here we focus on its 
Parisian strand. 
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 the methodological individualism of neoclassical economics and the structural 
determinism of Althusserian Marxism. The critique of the former resulted in a neo-
marxist form of institutionalism emphasising changing norms and modes of economic 
calculation, whilst the objection to the latter led to a commitment to openness of 
historical processes (Jessop 1997).20 Given my metatheoretical concerns, laid out in 
chapter 1, and the weaknesses of the dominant literature on the political economy of 
the post-1980 economic restructuring, the PRS presents considerable promise in my 
search for a conceptual approach to comprehend the financial restructuring, which 
seems to characterise the Swedish economy of the 1990s and the 2000s, and the role of 
pension reform therein. Yet, it is both complex and in some regards limited. It thus 
requires the ensuing rather extensive discussion. 
 
Fundamentally, as Jessop points out, the PRS is committed to accounts of ‘ontological 
depth’ (1990b). This has its foundation in that research, like social life more generally, 
is discursively constituted and can therefore never be void of theory. Instead, concepts 
have to be developed and persistently refined in order to be able to tendentially capture 
complex ‘reality’ with its multiple determinations. The identification of the ‘real 
mechanisms’ determining this ‘reality’ is thus a difficult, albeit necessarily so, process 
moving from the ‘real-concrete’, or as Marx labels them, ‘chaotic conceptions’ (1857 
[1973]: 100-1), to ‘concrete in thought’. This movement can be characterised as “a 
dialectical interplay of abstract and concrete which moves in spiral fashion as the 
introduction   of lower order concepts entails modifications in higher order concepts” 
(Jessop 1990b: 163). Indeed, the formulation of a concept is a ‘thought-experiment’, 
20 The PRS has frequently been accused of functionalism, similarly to Polanyiesque institutionalism, but 
their commitment to openness moderates this accusation (Elam 1994: 60). Yet, as we shall see, this 
accusation is founded on some substance. 
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 which is “not empirically ‘testable’ in a positivist sense”, but is evaluated on the basis 
of its ontological depth and logical coherence (Ryner 2002: 198). It is thus not, and 
cannot be, striving towards the verification of a finished theory (Aglietta 1979: 66). 
 
Ontologically then, following Marx and Keynes, the PRS understands the basic social 
link under capitalism to be money rather than commodities, as money is required for 
commodity exchange to take place (Aglietta 1979; 1998). Hence, the relations between 
individual and society are predicated upon the settling of debts rather than commodity 
exchange. In fact, “individual actions are validated by the obligation to settle debts” 
(Aglietta 1998: 46). Income generated by wage-labour enables the repayment of debt, 
which in turn validates the division of labour from which this wage-labour originated. 
Yet, the repayment of debt is predicated upon income security, but this is related to 
historically concrete forms of socio-political organisation of the contradictory wage 
relation (ibid: 47). The contradictory nature of the wage relation, nevertheless, 
threatens to surface in the form of crisis, but despite this, capitalism is not expected to 
inevitably implode (Aglietta 1979). Instead, capitalism can be ‘in regulation’, i.e. the 
social contradictions of capitalism can be, at least temporarily, overcome. Hence, 
regulation is the ultimate focus of the PRS, and can be understood if a constellation of 
related ideas - social relation, reproduction, contradiction and crisis – is explored 
(Lipietz 1988: 14). 
 
According to the PRS then, and in contrast to Marx (in Harvey 1975 [2001]: 238), the 
extended period of balanced growth experienced in the twenty years after the Second 
World War was not purely accidental. A “growth regime” was forged on the basis of 
the regulation of a mass productionist-consumptionist “regime of accumulation” by a 
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 “mode of regulation” made up by mechanisms coercing and mediating behaviour to 
stabilise accumulation through the formation of subjects (Aglietta 1998; Lipietz 1987). 
Similar to Polanyi, the process of production here requires (continuous) processes of 
primitive accumulation, in which extra-economic, fictitious commodities are explored 
and brought into the process of valorisation (incl. gender, the body, language, etc.) 
(Elam 1994: 60; Jenson 1987, 1989). Following Schumpeter, innovation is here also 
understood as critical, not the least to minimise wage costs. The PRS claims that 
particular technological paradigms structure innovation, guiding the development of 
principles of labour organisation and production techniques (Lipietz 1994: 339). 
Specific norms of production are hence established, which in turn provide the 
structural conditions together with particular norms of consumption (the regime of 
accumulation) seeking to overcome the contradictions of capitalism (Grahl and Teague 
2000: 161; Ryner 2002: 41).  
 
The golden age following the Second World War was until recently referred to as 
‘Atlantic Fordism’ by the PRS, during which the economic model advocated briefly by 
Ford in the 1920s’ USA was spread to Western Europe. The cultural, financial and, 
finally, institutional imposition of American Fordism on Europe and Japan21, 
generated economies of mass demand for American products (Lipietz 1987: 31; 
Aglietta 1979), seeking to sweep away the “Old Regime” in the form of a Gramscian 
‘passive revolution’ (Elam 1994: 63). A Fordist intensive “regime of accumulation”, 
deriving its dynamism from Taylorist-Fordist ‘scientific’ norms of mass production22 
21 But also elsewhere, although only partly, in the form of “peripheral fordism” (Lipietz 1987: 44-5). 
22 Taylorism refers to Frederick W. Taylor’s ideas of scientifically managing the division of labour. As 
such, it involves the extreme specialisation of labour into the carrying out of tasks as moments of the 
production process. Henry Ford is known for having mechanised this process through the introduction 
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 and values of social mobility underpinning consumption, came to be sustained by a 
Keynesian-welfarist “mode of regulation”, alleviating the exploitative wage relation. 
As Esping-Andersen has famously claimed, such welfare-institutional forms were de-
commodifying (1985).23 These welfare-institutional forms were ‘armistices’, 
institutionali[s]ed compromises” of struggles (Lipietz 1994: 339), contested from 
within and from the outside and potentially resulting in “societal paradigms” (Jenson 
1989), or in other words “a mode of structuration of the identities and legitimately 
defensible interests within the ‘universe of political discourses and representations’” 
(ibid.: 340). The regulation of the fundamental contradiction of capitalism between 
wage minimisation and consumption maximisation was thus institutionalised in the 
mediating mechanisms of the welfare state. However, these institutional forms, 
supporting a largely nationally embedded liberalism, were enabled in the first place by 
Keynesian institutions on the international level, which regulated economic flows in 
the world economy (Lipietz 1987). As such, the PRS adopted an extreme macro-
approach to institutional forms giving primacy to the “wage-labour nexus”, ahead of 
“forms of competition”, “international relations”, “money” and “public authorities” 
(Amable 2000: 664-5). This configuration was labelled the Fordist “growth regime”, a 
coherent economic system enabling a sustained period of growth. 
 
of the conveyor belt. This inevitably results in the separation of conception and execution of the task at 
hand and the replacement of skilled craftsmanship with de-skilled and intensified work. By breaking 
down the production process into fragments, management enjoyed enhanced opportunities for the 
monitoring, controlling and disciplining of the workforce (Ryner 2002: 216fn. 9). As such, the Fordist 
application of Taylorist principles of mass production is conducive to increasing scales of production, 
but also, as I will show in chapter 4, to (the cognitive) alienation of the workforce. 
23 The principle of “de-commodification” empowers labour and stems market sovereignty by making 
“collective action possible. Only when workers command resources and access to welfare independently 
of market exchange can they possibly be swayed not to take jobs during strike actions, underbid fellow 
workers, and so forth. Where the market is hegemonic, the labour movement’s future depends on its 
ability to provide an ‘exit’ for workers that concomitantly ensures collective solidarity” (Esping-
Andersen 1985: 31). 
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 However, the preoccupation of the PRS with the spread of American Fordism came 
with a strong emphasis on Fordism as a ‘system’24 and thus a degree of neglect of 
capitalist diversity.25 The tendency towards “ascribing history a systemic, functionalist 
and logical coherence” is noticeable (Amin 1994: 11). More recently, Boyer (2005) 
has provided a rather strong ‘self’-critique of this tendency within the early PRS, re-
emphasising in its stead historical contingency and the uniqueness of national 
developmental trajectories in the post-war period. As such, Fordism is, if not fully 
discarded (see also Elam 1994: 62-65), reduced to a description of developmental 
similarities and a few shared dynamic factors (e.g. international system). Whilst the 
theorisation of Fordism suggested  
symmetrical macro-economic connections (in terms of growth, productivity, and capital 
intensity), [historically specific economies] could be of a very different nature…Growth was 
export-driven in some of these economies, with competitiveness stemming from a price effect 
(or from quality and innovation) and wage bargaining first occurring in the export sector 
before spreading to the rest of the economy. All of these interconnections reversed the 
direction of causality as postulated in a Fordist model (Boyer 2005: 515). 
 
Hence, I will understand Fordism in abstract terms, as a loose referent to a set of 
dynamics enabling a number of different developmental trajectories. As we shall see in 
chapter 4, the specificities of the Swedish economy, even in relation to other Social 
Democratic economies, are striking (Mjöset 1987). Moreover, when similarities in 
institutional architectures and the composition of the socio-political landscape could be 
identified, the effects of these “varied since the modes of regulation and…the modes of 
growth did not obey the same principles”, along with that the strategic choices of 
actors differed radically from one economy to another (Boyer 2005: 515). Given 
inevitable cultural and socio-political specificities of economic activity, capitalist 
diversity is the rule and the belief in convergence around “a canonical form of 
24 Lipietz here develops it further to imply a “world system” with peripheral Fordism. 
25 This is acknowledged by the PRS (e.g. in Lipietz 1987). 
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 capitalism” naive (ibid.: 516). The ‘organicity’ of institutional configurations is 
however to some extent retained, yet the extreme macro-focus of the PRS has been 
largely abandoned (cf. Aglietta 1998).  
 
Instead, capitalist diversity has increasingly come to the fore of PRS research and with 
that an increasing sensitivity to the notions of ‘institutional complementarity’ and 
‘institutional hierarchy’, more capable of grasping the national specificities of 
regulation (Amable 2000; Amable and Petit 2001; Boyer 2005). This involves a 
revival of a structuralist tendency within the PRS, which “seeks to find the conditions 
under which it is possible to combine the various breakdowns of each institutional 
form or, more generally, the components of a social organization” (reference to Therét 
in Boyer 2005: 528). One significant theoretical development is the Social Systems of 
Innovation and Production approach (SSIP), which despite its name does not infer any 
technological determinism (Amable 2000: 670). The SSIP approach operates largely 
on the same intermediate level of analysis as the VoC approach, but the former is still 
more macroeconomic and distinctly more empirical than the latter (ibid.: 669). The 
antagonistic, complementary or independent consequences of combining particular 
institutional forms have become the focus of this institutionalist approach (Boyer 
2005: 528). Instead of analysing the role of a single institutional form in the economy, 
several institutions, understood in the broad sense, “taken together reinforce each 
other…so that they form a coherent and stable but not everlasting structure” (Amable 
2000: 656).  
Just as one particular institution defines a set of constraints, possibilities and incentives for 
individual agents, several institutions will define a set of interrelated incentives which are 
going to jointly influence the individual agent’s behaviour. (ibid.: 655)  
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 However, their joint impact is specific to the social context in which they operate, and 
of course, as Boyer reminds us in the midst of this rather functionalist language, “most 
institutional forms are the outcome of social and political struggles” (2005: 522). In so 
doing, the endogenous sources of reproduction, contradiction, crisis and change are 
believed to be emphasised further (Amable 2000: 683fn; Lourdon 1997).  
Amable identifies seven sub-systems in his 2000 variation of the SSIP approach:  
• science (forms of research),  
• technology (process and impetus), 
• competence and skills, 
• labour markets, 
• competition (regulation),  
• finance, 
• products (innovation); 
 
two regulatory (in its traditional sense) dimensions: 
• public intervention (forms of), 
• international regime (preference and constraints); 
 
and having consequences for: 
• innovation (nature of process), and 
• industrial specialisation (sectoral management) (671-674) 
 
As such, the SSIP approach is “more restrictive in the set of institutions considered” 
than by the PRS, but shares the objective of analysing whole production systems 
(Amable 2000: 660). Using its five institutional forms (see above), the PRS enables the 
analyst seemingly to flexibly integrate these forms into her accounts, but the hierarchy 
of these, with the exception of the dominant wage-labour nexus, remains unclear. 
Institutions, in the PRS, are hard to attribute to its five institutional forms (ibid.: 667), 
whilst, as I will show in chapter 4, the model of analysis of the SSIP approach suffers 
less from this difficulty. There is no a priori hierarchy between these different sub-
systems, but different hierarchies may be differently compatible and “[c]hanging one 
element of the system may have consequences well beyond the area concerned and 
threaten a certain pattern of complementarity”, as well as the hierarchy of sub-systems 
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 (ibid.: 658). Consequently, the compatibility of different sub-systems enables the 
organic coherence of economic systems and may, therefore “ex post [define] the 
growth trajectories of nations” (ibid.: 664).  
 
On these grounds, Amable (2000) and Boyer (2005) provide four main, ideal-type, 
varieties of capitalism, as opposed to the VoC’s two: 
• Market-based, 
• Meso-Corporatist, 
• European Integration/Public, 
• Social Democratic, 
 
which are each characterised by a general, overarching principle:  
 
 
Figure 4: the general principles of the capitalist varieties of the SSIP approach (taken 
from Amable 2000: 671). 
 
This general principle colours the different sub-systems, which serve to provide a 
tendency towards the development of coherent wholes, in the form of incentives to and 
possibilities for actors. This is expressed in implicitly or explicitly favoured objectives 
with regard to the provision of welfare (ibid.: 677). 
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 Moreover, the SSIP enables, in contrast to the VoC approach and in more specific 
ways than in the PRS, transnational processes to have some impact on processes within 
the regulatory confines of the national economy (ibid.: 669). Hence, change can be 
both endogenously and exogenously driven.  
 
However, while this approach provides the arguably most refined understanding of 
variations in capitalism, it, in very similar ways to the PRS, requires elaboration and 
politicisation of the dynamics of change, the social conditions of complementarity, the 
unevenness of development, politico-strategic agency and the role of the State, if it is 
to be helpful in seeking to grasp the role and function of the introduction of a 
financialised pension reform for the viability of a finance-led developmental trajectory 
in a social democratic context. 
 
IV A Critique of the SSIP Approach (PRS) 
(a) Societal Paradigms, Discursive Struggles and Politics of Representation 
Successions of regimes of accumulation are by Regulationists presented as merely 
evolutionary and techno-economic, and hence rather agentless. The political lies in the 
regulation of such inherently contradictory regimes. Through the formation of a mode 
of regulation, these regimes can be stabilised and become growth regimes. The 
production of a growth regime is thus presented as lying in the political. The early 
enunciations of the PRS problematically spoke, in functionalist terms, about a self-
regulating system (Aglietta 1979: 20), but the PRS has continued to have difficulties to 
conceptually grasp the system’s reproduction. It is only in the work of Alain Lipietz in 
which we find any serious attempts to theorise the system’s reproduction. As he 
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 himself puts it: “[t]he reproduction of a capitalist market economy via its 
transformations is far from self-evident” (1994: 339). With reference to the Gramscian 
concept of ‘hegemonic bloc’, Lipietz has sought to inject a degree of agency in this 
reproduction, yet a functionalist obsession with systemic cohesion is still apparent 
here. The coming of hegemony of a ‘social bloc’, understood as “a stable system of 
relations of domination, alliances and concessions between different social groups”, 
refers to its interests’ correspondence with those of a nation as a whole, the 
marginalised being but a small minority (ibid.: 340). In relation to the regime of 
accumulation and the mode of regulation, the hegemony of the social bloc becomes 
apparent if its constituent and reproducing consensus revolves around economic 
interests (ibid.). Yet, the accusation of functionalism is partly neutralised if, as he does, 
we turn to the work of Jane Jenson and the concept of ‘societal paradigm’. In a rare 
gesture of inclusion of non-Parisian regulationists, the work on the reproduction of 
growth regimes by Canadian Jane Jenson has been allowed to occasionally contribute 
(e.g. Boyer 2005). 
 
To Jenson, ‘societal paradigms’ (see above) are capable of complementing 
‘regulation’, here crucially understood as a process of capitalist reproduction. In this 
process, agency, in the tradition of Marx’s ‘people make their own history’, takes on a 
dual form: “actors are simultaneously subjects of structures and acting subjects 
carrying in their practices and meaning systems the possibilities of both social stability 
and change” (italics in original text, 1989: 236). Societal paradigms are the potential 
and constantly evolving results of politics of representation, or socio-political projects, 
which involve discursive struggles over collective identity, interests and politics of 
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 difference. Collective identities are mobilised by actors on the grounds of socially 
constructed interests for the purpose of “achieving representation”. The politics of 
representation implies struggles and compromises over what and who to be included in 
this achievement.  
Politics therefore involves the formation of collective identities as much as it entails conflict 
among groups and organizations over disputed claims about who gets what, when and how. 
(1989: 238-9) 
 
Because actors are pervaded by a variety of co-existing collective identities in the 
universe of political discourse, “their practices and meaning systems jostle with each 
other for social attention and legitimacy” (ibid.: 238). These different practices and 
meanings have unequal degrees of legitimacy and attract different levels of social 
attention, which impacts upon the social power of actors. This depends upon these 
practices and meanings’ relation to a societal paradigm, which, if enabling, affords 
power, but otherwise seeks to blur the identity of the actor and hence threatens to 
marginalise her in so doing. Societal paradigms contain 
 
a view of human nature, a definition of basic and proper forms of social relations among 
equals and among those in relationships of hierarchy, and specification of relations among 
institutions as well as a stipulation of the role of such institutions. Thus, a societal paradigm is 
a meaning system as well as a set of practices (ibid.: 239). 
 
If a social compromise brings the largest part of society to share the societal 
paradigm’s interconnected premises, the paradigm becomes hegemonic. Each societal 
paradigm includes and excludes contenders for representational power and hence only 
some identities can be constituted under a societal paradigm. This can relate to e.g. 
class, gender, sexual desire, language, rural-urban identities, age, etc. However, 
competing meanings for the same power relation may continue to exist outside, on the 
margins. The societal paradigm seeks to divide and blur these meanings in order to 
prevent the latter actors from forming a collective identity. However, as Scott argues 
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 (1990), this does not necessarily imply that these actors fail to express their shared 
identity. They may do so in between themselves, as a hidden discourse away from the 
coercive apparatus of the hegemonic societal paradigm, or as a sub-culture in open, but 
unrecognised protest (Hall and Jefferson 1976). As such, the discursive struggles of the 
politics of difference revolve around “the representation and reproduction of power 
relations based on difference” (Jenson 1989: 238). Although contributing to the 
regulation of social relations, societal paradigms are not always hegemonic. 
 
The possible eruption of crisis in the societal paradigm can very well cause a crisis in 
the regulatory consciousness. At the same time, a hegemonic societal paradigm can be 
disturbed by intensifying contradictions in the mode of regulation’s ability to distribute 
resources and power, originating from the regime of accumulation, in a legitimate way. 
The emerging conditions may no longer be accounted for by the societal paradigm and 
hence a period of discursive struggle erupts, in which competing collective identities 
seek to account for the new conditions and extend their representational systems. If a 
crisis evolves into a set of social relations in regulation (institutionalised 
compromises), a new societal paradigm is likely to accompany it, which includes 
contributions from new actors who succeeded in extending their representational 
strength during the discursive struggle (ibid.: 239).  
 
On this theoretical basis, Lipietz identifies two forms of struggle: one infra-
paradigmatic and another contra-paradigmatic. The former aims at the 
operationalisation or improvement of regulatory mechanisms, which the hegemonic 
bloc, within the regime of accumulation, is supposed to guarantee. Here, typically, 
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 differences over “the equity or even the reality of the distribution of…benefits” are at 
the centre of the dispute. The latter form of struggle seeks to contest the hegemonic 
paradigm, and in its extension the existing regime of accumulation, mode of regulation 
and the hegemonic bloc, and replace it with a competing paradigm, and “a different 
conception, past or future, of social life” (Lipietz 1994: 340). These may of course, and 
particularly in the latter case, aim to cause a crisis in the societal paradigm to force a 
regulatory crisis on the level of ‘everyday’26 consciousness. As such, discursive 
constructions of crises in the regime of accumulation or mode of regulation can be 
seen as critical to change. The discursive construction of crisis, and the promotion of 
an adherent consciousness, enhance the time and space of possible opportunities for 
change. Crisis is a particularly powerful moment in the struggles on the level of 
discourse (Jenson 1989: 239). The discursive construction of a crisis may involve a 
struggle over what direction of change is to be chosen in the economy in a given time 
and place. As such, a particular discursive construction of a crisis can become 
hegemonic in its wedding to a particular set of solutions as we saw in chapter 1 with 
regard to inverted Malthusianism. 
 
The regulationist SSIP approach equally lacks a discursive dimension to its concepts. 
The looming economic determinism of the notions of institutional complementarity 
and institutional hierarchy require my attention in order for them to become useful for 
my purposes. Following Lipietz’s and Jenson’s valuable incorporation of Gramscian 
concepts, the notion of institutional complementarity must, at least to some extent, be 
understood in discursive terms. Necessarily, institutional complementarity is partly a 
26 This Lefebvrian term will also be properly introduced in chapter 4. 
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 discursive construction, which has to be reproduced continuously. This is neither 
saying that the notion of institutional complementarity has no meaning in a “real”, 
“economic-material” sense, nor that discourse is just an additional dimension to the 
economy; particular designs of economic institutions are more compatible than others, 
but they are all constructed and reconstructed through discourse. In a similar manner, 
the hierarchies of institutions derive their legitimacy from their inscription into 
hegemonic societal paradigms, and cannot therefore be understood in just an 
economic-material way. Yet, even in Lipietz’s and Jenson’s accounts, there are traces 
of ‘organic’ conceptions of the economy. Therefore, Jessop’s reminder is valuable: 
these configurations are “always relative, always partial and always provisional” 
(1988: 151). Similarly, the struggle over the institutional, practical and discursive 
formulation of the desired direction of economic development is hegemonic in nature, 
and cannot therefore ever result in a final, completed project, but is necessarily 
tendential. As Laclau (2000) argues, the struggle for hegemony never ends, the 
universalisation of the particular can never be completed. Thus, with the added role 
played by societal paradigms in capitalism, the tendential functionalism of 
Regulationist approaches is moderated. This brings the critique naturally to the 
regulationist conception of techno-economic change. 
 
(b) Accumulation Strategies 
By understanding the succession of the techno-economic regimes of accumulation in 
largely evolutionary terms, in conjunction with the possible emergence of modes of 
regulation, the PRS, and with that the SSIP approach, see change in insufficiently 
politico-strategic terms. Jessop has advanced the concept of ‘accumulation strategy’ in 
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 order to provide an enhanced understanding of politico-strategically driven economic 
restructuring. Promoted by different, and often competing, fractions of capital, 
accumulation strategies compete with one another over the strategic coordination of 
the crisis-prone moments of social relations within the circuit of capital, which are 
otherwise just formally unified as part of the generalised commodity production. The 
objective is thus the substantial unity of these moments. In brief, “[a]n ‘accumulation 
strategy’ defines a [historically] specific economic ‘growth model’ complete with its 
various extra-economic preconditions and outlines the general strategy appropriate to 
its realization” (Jessop 1982: 89-91). Potentially, a financialised pension system could 
constitute a major element of an accumulation strategy towards a process of 
valorisation on the terms of financial markets. By incorporating the pension capital of 
large numbers of everyday savers into the circuit of capital, and thereby potentially 
transforming the social relations of its internal moments, substantial, as opposed to 
merely formal, unity in the circuit of capital can be achieved. This is, however, only 
possible if this is made compatible with the hegemonic societal paradigm, which may 
very well turn out to be an uncertain or highly conflictual process. Crucially, the 
potential contradictions emerging out of this process could bring the accumulation 
strategy as a whole into question. The introduction of financialised pension reforms in 
social environments, dominated by conflicting societal paradigms, is an uncertain 
process. In accordance with the adopted SSIP approach, institutional complementarity 
around a financialised institutional configuration could, however, be shaped, if this 
were to be successful. Here, the role and function of the capitalist state are key. 
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 Although the PRS, as well as the SSIP, understand the capitalist state as playing a 
critical role in the capitalist economy, it has remained poorly conceived by them.27 
Pension systems are particularly significant ‘mediating mechanisms’ (Aglietta 1998) 
of modes of regulation and it has often been integral in the formulation of 
accumulation strategies. Thus, by constituting the largest form of savings in any 
advanced capitalist economy, pension capital can play a crucial financial role to 
welfare systems and all sub-systems in a SSIP. However, this, of course, depends upon 
the role played by it within the accumulation strategy. However, accumulation 
strategies can only become hegemonic if they are organised through the capitalist state. 
This requires us to better understand what the capitalist state is. Inspiration for a more 
adequate understanding requires us to turn to Joachim Hirsch and his followers (here 
Alnasseri et al. 2001) in, what Jessop refers to as, the “West German School” of the 
regulation approach (Jessop 1990a).28  
 
Such Poulantzas-inspired State theory opposes both liberal and orthodox Marxist 
approaches. On ideological grounds, it opposes liberal state theory, separating the State 
and economic forms through political enforcement (Ryner 2002: 111). On a theoretical 
basis, it disagrees with the ‘vulgar economism’ of the Marxism of the 2nd and 3rd 
Internationals, which reduces the State to the interest of capital. Thus, I here conceive 
of the capitalist state as having two roles in the context of reproducing the capitalist 
economy. Firstly, in its quest to secure its tax base, the State seeks to provide the 
27 This is despite the fact that Aglietta paid dividends to a rather sophisticated understanding of the 
capitalist state, already in the “founding” piece of work of the PRS (1979: 26-9). In the attempts made, 
the PRS aims to strike a delicate balance between the capitalist economy’s different sources of 
regulation. As such, [t]he régulation perspective consciously strives against an ‘over-politicisation’ of 
the state and ‘under-politicisation’ of the other arenas where social cohesion is secured” (Elam 1994: 
60-1). 
28 However, noticeably, my approach does not follow the State theory of the West German School 
perfectly, but modifies and elaborates upon it. 
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 institutions and the policies, which serve to integrate the economy. By seeking to 
mediate in the conflictual relations between capital and labour (Alnasseri et al. 2001), 
it renders the economy capable of generating the necessary tax revenue for the State’s 
survival. This integrating function is thus necessary for the reproduction of the 
capitalist economy (cf. Lipietz 1988: 24). Secondly, the state furnishes the historical, 
yet regulated, space in which the historical struggle between capital and labour, 
emanating from the capital relation, is played out and reflected in. As such it is not just 
a social relation (Alnasseri et al. 2001), but an institutionally mediated struggle. In the 
context of financialisation, a term which we will discuss in section five of this chapter, 
or, in brief, the reorientation of economic activity in line with the disciplinary power of 
financial markets, we can imagine several social actors seeking to impose their 
agendas on state regulation. However, they do so in a historically and institutionally 
specific context. For instance, Posen discusses how the idea of central bank 
independence became so influential so quickly in the monetary policy of governments 
in advanced capitalist economies. He argues that the financial sector’s opposition to 
inflation was based on its (flawed) conviction of the correctness of monetarist, neo-
classical economists’ theorisation of the deflationary impact of central bank 
independence. Following this conviction, the financial sector’s lobbying had a strong 
impact upon this policy shift. Yet, institutions, such as central bank policies, require 
“the support of a politically powerful interest coalition – as a form of…life insurance” 
(1993: 46). When labour union support for traditional central banking is politically cut 
off, “or its political effectiveness wanes”, the ‘life insurance’ for the existing monetary 
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 policy is largely removed and the financial lobby becomes significantly more effective 
(ibid.; see also Watson 2002: 190; Hay 2004a).29 
 
As such, the regulatory space provided is a historically specific terrain, which creates 
biases in favour of and against competing accumulation strategies as well as projects 
striving towards the hegemony of societal paradigms. This institutionally mediated 
struggle takes its discursive expression in the production, reproduction and disciplining 
of institutions, which are both “within” the State (state institutions) and in civil society 
more generally. These discursive expressions thus have clear material consequences 
for ‘daily life’. Yet these material consequences are shaped by their complementarity 
and its reproduction partially dependent upon the historically specific, subjective 
responses in daily life. ‘The everyday’30 consciousness of uneven conditions of 
exploitation, representation and processes of commodification and de-commodification 
are strongly related to the everyday conflicts between competing accumulation 
strategies and societal paradigms. The State has historically played a crucial role in 
these articulations as a legitimating force, derived from “the cloak of state sovereignty 
forged by the history of civil and foreign struggles” (Lipietz 1988: 24, see also Hay 
2006: 230-3) and pluralist democracy. The quantitative and qualitative shape of the 
economy is thus rearticulated, displaced and condensed through processes regulated by 
the State (Alnasseri et al. 2001: 165). 
 
(c) The Regulation of Uneven Development 
29 See Martin and Ross (1999) for the historically and institutionally specific role played by European 
labour unions in the more general struggle in relation to neoliberal restructuring. 
30 I use the term ‘daily life’ to refer to the microsocial foundations of the economy. ‘The everyday’ 
relates to daily life as dialectically exposed to spatial processes of financialisation (cf. Lefebvre in 
Davies and Niemann 2002: 558fn.). 
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 Regulation is a form of legitimation, a process in which the capitalist state plays the 
main role. The major social transformations of the post-war period, including the 
universal extension of the wage relation (and thus linked welfare rights, with pension 
rights dominating), implied a tendency towards a unification of the wage-earning 
classes. This occurred, of course, differently in each economy, yet the trend in many 
advanced capitalist European economies was major industrialisation, urbanisation and 
concentration of capital leading to a deep division within the capitalist class (Aglietta 
1979: 18-19). Despite these acknowledgements, the PRS, and with that the SSIP 
approach, has shown limited interest in uneven development and the role of the 
capitalist state therein. Economic geographers have, however, picked up on this 
relation and inserted it in a regulationist framework (esp. Peck and Tickell 1995). 
Although ‘uneven development’ is a constant feature of capitalism, the Fordist ‘phase’ 
reflected a new, wage-labour oriented sequence in the role of the capitalist state in 
legitimising this particular regime of accumulation (Offe 1987: 513, 529). Thus, this 
specific division and systematic reallocation of the social product (Lipietz 1988) 
displayed, as all, a particular spatial and demographic structure, or economic 
geography. Capitalist development is ‘variegated’ (Peck and Tickell 2002). As 
Marsden et al. argue,  
[e]ach regime's distinctive territorial division of capital and labour is superimposed upon and 
so modifies, and is modified by, previous geographies and is then subsequently transformed 
(restructured), so creating simultaneous spatial patterns of economic growth and decline 
(Marsden et al. in Bowler 1994: 347).  
 
Uneven development, as significantly state-orchestrated and as understood by Harvey 
(1982), is both geographical and demographic. As traditional spatial barriers have 
become more deregulated and more penetrable, firms have become more transnational 
in their ownership. Hence, the threat of exit has been consequently more powerfully 
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 made. This understanding of the hypermobility of production, coming under the 
ambiguous term of globalisation, is powerful, yet far from producing the expected 
consequences in national economies (Hay 2004a; 2006). As Harvey (1982: 239-412; 
1997: 294-8) argues, space has not become less important, but more important. Spatial 
competition between places generates both processes of convergence and divergence 
as different capitals seek different factors of production. In turn, with the 
dematerialisation and de-spatialisation of financial capital and its resulting uncertainty, 
the compression of time-space through credit-based financial manipulation becomes all 
the more important to capital. This development carries with it contradictions, which 
are relatively speaking neglected at this historical juncture. A very good example is the 
ongoing rapid and unstable transformation of the Swedish economy (Khakee 2005). 
This quest for time-space compression through credit-based financial manipulation 
(Harvey 1997: 294-298) has, over time, unevenly contributed to the emergence of a 
bubble-prone, financialising economy. It projects biases in both geographical terms 
and in terms of subject-formation. The uneven distribution of circuits of capital across 
space, time, social class, gender, sexual desire and age, strongly contribute to the 
production of particular outcomes, discourses and practices. In this context, the 
capitalist state plays a critical role in the execution of accumulation strategies, in 
ensuring the reproduction of its tax base as well as expressing historically specific, yet 
institutionally mediated capital-labour relations, i.e. in the legitimisation and 
orchestration of particular processes of subject-formation in the spatial economy. Yet, 
as we will see in chapters 3, 4 and 5, these are processes which are particularly 
difficult to control, thus having a multitude of unintended consequences. 
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 V The finance-led growth regime, Pensions and Financialisation: the importance 
of cultivating mass investment cultures 
Risk-oriented pensions, discussed in the previous chapter, are central to the economic 
model, known as the “finance-led growth regime” (an ambiguous variant of the SSIP’s 
‘market-based’ model), in which financial markets, in a de-regulated environment, are 
at the top of the institutional hierarchy (Boyer 2000). Boyer argues that this seems to 
be the direction of development in many advanced capitalist economies today, and 
since the mid-1990s several of these are showing clear signs of resemblance:  
Many giant mergers, capital mobility between countries, pressures on corporate governance, 
diffusion of equity among a larger fraction of population; all these transformations have 
suggested the emergence of a finance-led accumulation regime…[Also known as] ‘the new 
economy’: this regime would combine labour-market flexibility, price stability, developing 
high tech sectors, booming stock market and credit to sustain the rapid growth of 
consumption, and permanent optimism of expectations in firms. (ibid.: 116) 
 
Given that such a regime of accumulation is at all viable, financialising pension 
reforms are critical to ensuring the stability and institutional complementarity of 
economies operating according to its logic. However, risk-oriented pensions are 
critical to the finance-led growth regime, not because they are capable of ensuring 
welfare and thus regulating ageing economies (cf. Boyer 2000; Aglietta 1998), but 
because they fuel financial markets, boost asset-prices and enable the structuring of the 
economy according to shareholder value prerogatives. In this section, I will discuss 
what function the infusion of risk-oriented pensions has in the finance-led growth 
regime through a review of three key texts on the topic (Boyer 2000; Watson 2008; 
Froud et al. 2002). I will consider the impact of ‘financialisation’ on firms (innovation, 
production and wage relations), its required mode of regulation (institutional investors 
and central bank) and the importance of cultivating mass investment cultures to 
financialising accumulation strategies.  
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In an arguably provocative31 paper in a special issue of Economy and Society on the 
impact of financialisation and shareholder value on present-day capitalism, Boyer 
hypothesised what a finance-led growth model would look like. He modelled this 
vaguely upon the financialised, ‘new economy’ emerging at the end of the long search 
in the US economy for a new growth regime, following the long crisis of American 
Fordism. The contrasts between the two growth regimes are striking. Rising to the fore 
of the economy was the priority of shareholder value (see Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000), demanded by institutional investors largely at the behest of increasingly 
demanding pension savers, which became internalised in the corporate governance 
structures of firms. In the model, the shareholder value prerogative forces firms to slim 
their activities, become more cautious in their productive investments, flexibilise the 
labour contract - to overall adopt a short-termist outlook on the firm’s activities. For 
households, the income insecurity deriving from the flexibilisation of the labour 
contract is supposedly offset by financial gains resulting from equity holdings.32 
Hence, the “malaise that eats into the individual psyche when the energy that used to 
be channelled into work is converted into fear of an unforeseeable future” (Aglietta 
1998 72) is, at least, partly socially regulated. Discourses of inverted Malthusianism 
undermining the credibility of pension systems and promoting individualised, private 
solutions also contribute to the dependence upon financial market performance for the 
securing of welfare. Decisions on whether to consume or save are thus strongly 
31 As it, rather uncritically, assumes a number of dynamics in the economy, which are, firstly, highly 
questionable on their own terms and, secondly not in line with the Marxist-inflected PRS. Particularly, 
this relates to the constraints of the regulatory role of the State in the economy. 
32 Boyer adds: “[t]his is true whether households use pensionfund intermediaries or whether they invest 
their savings directly on the stock exchange, or even if they join savings plans run by the firm” (2000: 
120). 
 103 
                                                 
 influenced by the performance of these equity holdings on financial markets, 
particularly affecting purchases of homes and durable goods. Short-termist 
consumerism is instead encouraged by the promotion and extension of consumer 
credit. Through the securitisation of consumer debt, the risks of providing consumer 
credit are pooled and transferred to the consumer in the form of individualised credit 
costs, which also impacts upon consumption/saving decisions in ‘the everyday’ (see 
also Montgomery 2006). As such, household economic behaviour is ‘wealth-driven’ in 
the finance-led growth model. Similarly, the sensitivity of the State to actual rates of 
state bonds, due to the crisis-legacy of high levels of public indebtedness, and 
decreasing capacities to tax capital forces the State to bring its public expenditure in 
line with the disciplinary expectations of financial markets (cf. Swank and Steinmo 
2002) and credit rating agencies (see also Sinclair 1994). Financial market discipline, 
however, “relieves” central banks of their more recent priorities of fighting inflation 
and encouraging growth, just to be replaced with the supposedly critical regulatory role 
of containing the speculation of skittish investors and thus financial bubbles (Boyer 
2000 118-121). The mechanisms of a hypothetical finance-led growth regime are 
shown in figure 5. 
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Figure 5: the mechanisms of a finance-led growth regime and its institutional forms, 
(taken from Boyer 2000: 117). 
 
Matthew Watson’s more detailed account of the dynamics of the finance-led growth 
regime (2008) is highly sceptical of its viability arguing that its microfoundations are 
contradictory and will result in the withering of financialisation. Two types of actors 
are considered to play key roles in this context. As in Boyer’s account, the primary 
actor is the firm. In the quest to attract shareholders, (high rates of) ‘shareholder value’ 
becomes more a marketed ‘product’ than a realistic objective of corporate governance. 
However, the short-term demands of the stock-market are internalised in the 
organisation and the running of the firm (Froud et al. 2000). With the spread of 
shareholder value-inflected corporate governance structures (Williams 2000) and 
accounting techniques (Froud et al. 2000), firm managers, compensated in part with 
stock options for the purpose of aligning their interests with those of the shareholders, 
seek to boost the price of their stocks primarily in two ways: by continuously altering 
‘the capital structure’ of the firm and by seeking optimal accounting methods. 
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 Myopically, firms come to seek disinvestment, retaining just their most profitable 
parts, as well as to promote the misrepresentation of financial information, through the 
direct or indirect encouragement of accounting dodges. The immediate results are a 
reduced potential for product market growth and a supplanting of financial risk to 
individual investors. The result is that “the firm’s health…becomes a reflection of its 
stock price rather than the stock price being a reflection of the firm’s health” (Watson 
2008: 4). 
 
In parallel, with the financialisation of public welfare systems and the increasing 
volumes of private savings being channelled into financial markets, individual 
investors, or rather the fund managers of institutional investors play the second critical 
role for the contradictory dynamics of a finance-led growth regime. Due to a ‘funnel 
effect’ of private savings, the decisions of individual investors rarely constitute more 
than an indication of investment orientation leaving the ‘real’ decisions to a fairly 
small and homogenous group of fund managers, broadly sharing investment strategies. 
This seems to be particularly the case with reference to pension capital. Blackburn 
(2002: 115) therefore refers to pension capital as “grey capital”, as  
[t]he division of responsibility between trustees, money managers and consultants, the power 
of the sponsor and the limited rights of the policy holder or members all conspire to ensure 
that retirement funds will be ‘grey capital’…because the property rights represented by the 
funds represent a grey area in terms of law and political economy – that they are also funds 
held to finance old age is a source of vulnerability to those whose sacrifices have established 
them. 
 
The demands on fund managers are two-fold: portfolio diversification and short-term 
performance. Thanks to new, technologically enabled financial instruments, serving to 
integrate stock and index options (derivatives), fund managers can with little difficulty 
create ‘superportfolios’ - index-tracking portfolios. According to Sharpe’s Capital 
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 Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), central to Financial Economics and any MBA 
programme pursued by most fund managers, ‘beating the index’ is down to luck, 
whereas tracking the market is both possible and the most efficient investment 
strategy. On the one hand, while shareholder value-inflected firms seek to persuade 
individual investors and fund managers to purchase their stocks, the CAPM renders 
shareholder value strategies transparent hoaxes in the eyes of MBA-educated fund 
managers (Watson 2008). On the other hand, fund managers are subjected to tough and 
frequent performance assessments generating a highly short-termist investor outlook 
(O’Barr and Conley 1992).  
 
This myopic perspective leads fund managers to move out of uncertain markets to 
those with clear price trends and to take forward positions within these markets. This 
leads to price overshooting and pro-cyclicality, which reinforces the tendencies 
produced by the firm’s disinvestment strategies. Worse still, price overshooting and 
pro-cyclical investment behaviour are key characteristics of financial bubbles, which 
fund managers are not slow to exploit. The result is that financial bubbles are inflated 
additionally. Thus, according to Watson’s account, if power is closely related to 
shareholder value, and hence the management’s ability to generate this, firms are only 
powerful to the extent that their financial manipulation successfully attracts household 
savings in the form of direct shares. As such, direct shareholding is crucial to the 
corporate economy as firms are dependent on this for retaining of their power. Without 
direct equity holdings, they have little or no power over the stock price apart from the 
use of share buybacks.  
 
 107 
 In Watson’s account of the finance-led growth regime, financial bubbles hence become 
a structural feature, underpinned by increasing volumes of private savings. Given the 
index-tracking strategies of fund managers and the promotion of the shareholder value 
concept by firms, whose financial information is likely to be misrepresentative of 
‘economic fundamentals’, individual investors are the ones who end up losing out. So, 
while this regime feeds off asset-based welfare and the flexibilisation of production, it 
also carries within it the contradictions potentially threatening the very policies that 
enabled it in the first place. The extent to which these processes and logics are in place, 
even in the US economy, is of course uncertain. Looking specifically at the Anglo-
American economies, the British Social Accountants (BSA), Froud et al. (2002) claim 
that this logic(s) is spreading, although unevenly, across the economy. 
 
The BSA, operating on a more historically concrete level of analysis, have developed a 
model to describe an economy in which financialisation is occurring: “coupon pool 
capitalism”. 
Coupon pool capitalism is constituted when, under specific conditions, the capital market 
moves from intermediation to regulation of firm and household behaviour (Froud et al. 2002: 
126). 
 
At the core of this form of capitalism is, thus, the problematic institution of the pool of 
coupons (financial papers of various types), from which firms draw or inject (share 
buy-backs) capital to enhance their performance. Instead of providing a coherent and 
harmonious structure, the existence of coupon pool capitalism “intensifies 
contradictions and inaugurates incoherence at the level of firms and households at the 
same time as it increases instability” (ibid.: 135). This is the moment from which 
“financialisation” unfolds, i.e. from a gap between financial market expectations on 
firm performance and outcomes (ibid.: 126, 140), or simply between profit level 
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 demands and the capacity of firms to recover costs (ibid.: 137). Here, shareholder 
value plays a crucial normative role as “a powerful object of emulation” in 
management and media discourse, although its meaning or optimal method, beyond 
emphasising results, is contested (ibid.: 122-3; Froud et al. 2000). This performance 
gap is problematically persistent and thus forces the shareholder value rhetoric, which 
in itself largely sustains the objective of maximising shareholder value.  
 
However, financialisation is uneven, particularly among blue chip corporations and 
other productionist firms, which serves to partly suspend the discipline of the stock 
market on managements. In contrast to Boyer’s model, the BSA includes commodity 
trade and capital flows, which enhances our ability to envisage possible variations of 
coupon pool capitalisms. This would be critical to the case of Sweden, whose 
historical openness to trade (Katzenstein 1985) and more recent vulnerability to capital 
flows (Svensson 2001) can impact significantly on the disciplinary impact of 
financialisation on firms. This discipline varies with economic sectors, but overall 
tends to force firms, in the medium-term, towards financialisation, the adoption of 
shareholder value strategies or financial sub-firms (Froud et al. 2002: 138). As such, 
they believe themselves to have constructed a historically concrete model with open 
dynamics, as opposed to the more abstract and “mechanical models” of the regulation 
theorists, and arguably the one of Watson. Yet, despite their supposedly open-ended 
argument that these tendencies may vary from one financialising economy to another 
and that shareholder value is “an unrealisable project” (Froud et al. 2002: 140), 
convergence around particular firm behaviour, in accordance with shareholder value 
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 objectives, seems unavoidable due to the centrality attributed to shareholder value as 
norm and discourse. 
 
In their treatment of the financialisation of the ‘everyday’, they claim the existence of a 
degree of delinking with the corporate economy, which is not present to the same 
extent in Watson’s or the Regulation theorists’ accounts. Firms are here deemed to be 
largely self-financing, conceiving the secondary market as mediating between “the 
immobility of productive investment and the time-preferences of household savings” 
(ibid.: 126). This differs from “productionist capitalism” where “the capital market is 
[a supposedly] unproblematic intermediary between saving households and 
productionist firms, or between some firms such as banks or network leaders who own 
stakes in other firms” (ibid.). Following the privatisation and financialisation of 
pension savings, in particular, households contribute to these “specific conditions” by 
creating large flows of capital into a secondary market, which is ‘liquid’, through an 
alteration of their saving patterns towards directly or indirectly held securities and 
away from bank deposits (ibid.: 126-7).  
 
Coupon pool capitalism is fuelled by middle class savings. The BSA find that only the 
top forty percent in the Anglo-American cases has the sufficient margins to save for 
retirement and welfare, and hence very few are in a position to secure their welfare or 
‘life investments’ through financial market investment. Thus, in marked contrast to 
Boyer’s account, very few will ever benefit from any substantial dividends or the rise 
of corporate share prices (ibid.: 142). Also, within these forty percent, there are marked 
differences in income and savings patterns, which themselves contribute to increasing 
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 inequality also within this top forty percent in the everyday economy (ibid.: 143). 
Financialisation promotes circuits of accumulation and procyclical patterns of price-
formation, which accelerate inequality in ways that increase the importance of the 
household (ibid.: 141-2). Increasing dependency on the core family could thus be 
expected to develop out of financialisation. Yet, with the institution of the family 
unravelling in the 21st Century (family relations becoming increasingly serial as life 
expectancy increases), the household is likely to provide a weak buffer against the 
volatility of asset values, which in turn calls for the re-pooling of stock market risks in 
“social funds” (ibid.: 145), or the reconfiguration of family relations. 
 
In sum, the fates of firms and households seem clearly interlinked according to these 
three accounts. The consideration of the transnational dimension by the BSA approach 
must not be marginalised in our understanding of the unfolding of financialisation in 
different economies. While the finance-led growth regime may have no historically 
concrete corollaries in present-day capitalism, its mechanisms and processes are 
spreading. As such, it seems reasonable to consider financialisation in the context of 
coupon pool capitalism, rather than finance-led growth regimes. However, by focusing 
on the key characteristics of these, i.e. shareholder value, the appreciation of variety 
within finance-led economies is to some extent lost. Although their insights into 
finance-led growth are crucial to the argument of this thesis, the broader range of 
issues that the PRS-based SSIP approach considers have to be considered. To any 
variety of finance-led capitalism, financialised pension systems, even if they are not 
purely funded systems, are necessary complements. 
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 Whilst this finance-led economy is increasingly understood as attractive by finance, 
banking and some venture capitalists, firms, particularly ‘national’ blue-chip and 
‘productionist’ firms may be rather ambiguous about financialisation. According to the 
SSIP approach, many of these firms rely heavily upon innovation for their cost 
recovery models. Indeed, structuring of the innovation processes remains one of the 
crucial factors in the competitiveness of modes of regulation. There is here a strong, 
yet contingent, path-dependency inscribed (Amable and Petit 2001). During the second 
half of the 1990s, this became apparent with the emergence of the ‘new economy’, yet 
financial systems and societal paradigms prevented this from succeeding.  
 
Seemingly suitable to such a development, the US-modelled market-based SSIP 
provides a system for the innovation process, complete with a sophisticated system of 
financial risk management, which is conducive to “Schumpeterian waves of (radical) 
innovations; importance of patents and individual rewards to innovation” (Amable 
2000: 674). This system of innovation was the foundation for the US economy’s 
attempt to make the great leap towards a technology-intense ‘new economy’. Yet, 
given its preoccupation with shareholder value, the economy did not reward radical 
innovation more than e.g. shedding labour or outsourcing as investment strategy 
(Boyer 2000: 123), which may very well have diverted the innovation efforts away 
from sustainable cost recovery models (Feng et al. 2001). On the extreme other hand, 
the social democratic SSIPs, exemplified by Sweden and Finland, are “characterised 
by their production system’s high level of technological intensity…[and] by their 
international competitiveness” (Amable and Petit 2001: 25-26; see also Hay 2004c), 
yet their ‘turn’ to the ‘new economy’ in the late 1990s could not have occurred without 
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 rapid restructuring of their financial systems and the privatisation of pension provision, 
as we will see in chapter 5. Venture capital seemed to exist in abundance, yet the 
‘everyday’ economic outlook, informed by the hegemonic societal paradigm, did not 
allow the new economy to succeed. The above accounts of the finance-led growth 
regimes do not seem sufficiently to account for the complementarities between 
dimensions of innovation, financial system and societal paradigms. Accumulation 
strategies seeking to render the finance-led growth regime viable must address both 
societal paradigms and structures of innovation for the ‘new economy’ to be viable.  
 
Still, many European economies seem keen on retaining some coordinating elements 
and welfare institutions providing a degree of de-commodification. However, the 
previous large-scale socialisation of risk, through de-commodifying welfare 
institutions and commitment to solidaristic wage policy and full employment, is now, 
according to inverted Malthusianism, the post-industrial trilemma and the moral hazard 
thesis, costly obstacles to competitiveness. As I will show with reference to Sweden, 
neoliberalised social democrats in Europe have embraced different versions of 
Giddens’s ‘third way’ thesis. Based on the microeconomics of the neoliberal economic 
arguments (esp. Lindbeck, e.g. 1995a, 1995b, 1998), the previous social democratic 
commitment to risk-socialisation has come to generate “disincentives, sub-optimal 
economic behaviour, and inefficiencies” in the economy (Giddens in Ryner 2002: 12). 
Although not advocating full-scale re-commodification, risk should be individualised 
to the extent that “the positive or energetic side of risk” is harnessed and encouraging 
the entrepreneurial spirit in society (ibid.: 13). In this sense, strict labour laws, 
common in the advanced capitalist economies of Europe, may be acceptable as long 
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 they do not encourage moral hazard, such as long-running generous benefits (Giddens 
in Ryner 2002: 16). In such ‘moderated risk economies’, the universal entitlements of 
defined benefit systems have been and continue to be a key target for such a discourse. 
Instead, people must learn to take responsibility for the performance of their pensions, 
yet pension provision guaranteeing a ‘decent standard of living’ in retirement must be 
provided. Whilst much of the corporate economies and political elites of ‘coordinated 
Europe’ seem to be for ‘uneven financialisation’, the project of transforming the 
societal paradigms, which came to be hegemonic during the ‘Fordist’ post-war period, 
towards the entrepreneurial embrace of risk is a considerable and uncertain project, as 
it also involves politics of representation, not just economic incentives (see chapter 1).  
 
In line with this risk-oriented Third Way politics, neoliberal restructuring both enables 
and emphasises the development of the financial dimension of the economy (cf. Ryner 
2002). In restructuring social democratic economies, in which universalistic, yet 
modified, welfare systems still are in place, this is a complex scenario, which lacks 
scholarly treatment. The introduction of hybrid, partly financialised pension systems to 
financially deregulated social democratic economies produces a complex set of signals, 
contradictions and conflicts, whose regulation requires the modification of structures 
of experience and the introduction of risk-management practices in the ‘everyday’. As 
shown in chapter 1, the financialised element of such pension systems targets two 
objectives. Firstly, it seeks to provide efficiently allocated investment capital to the 
economy by individualising and privatising risk. Secondly, as a prerequisite for the 
former, it seeks to transform passive pension savers into active, financially literate, 
investor subjects. It thus has a socialising function. However, this is a socialisation of 
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 financial ideas and practices, which is conducive to neoliberalisation, possessive 
individualism (Harmes 2001) and societal divisions on the grounds of inequality 
(Leyshon and Thrift 1996: 1150), notions which stand in some contrast to the societal 
paradigms developing out of ‘Fordism’. Nevertheless, the (im)plausibility of such a 
major societal shift, even in the highly unlikely case of Sweden, cannot be derived 
from studies of Fordism alone. This can only be achieved through an historically 
concrete analysis, which is sensitive to shifts in subject-formation. However, as Aitken 
(2005) shows, processes of subject-formation are historically constituted; there is a 
strong continuity in these processes. Accordingly, the historically concrete analysis of 
this thesis will emphasise the continuities in the interplay between financialising 
accumulation strategies and struggles over societal paradigms in the Swedish economy 
in the context of pension reform. Thus, this thesis aims to overcome the VoC-inspired 
literature on the financialisation of the Swedish economy (e.g. Henreksson and 
Jakobsson 2003), which, focusing merely on institutional change, overstates the 
resilience of neoliberal restructuring in what could be expected to be a socially 
inhospitable environment for such change. Hence, such literature states the likelihood 
of convergence of the Swedish economy around a neoliberal, Anglo-American 
economic model, while a more complex institutionalist PRS-SSIP approach has shown 
the historical contingencies of such developments by pointing at the potential 
institutional incompatibility and systemic fragility of the resulting matrix of 
institutions.  
 
In order to go beyond this impasse, I will, in the next chapter, adopt a cultural political 
economy approach to financialisation, in which processes of financialisation are 
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 situated in the uneven spaces of the everyday. The PRS-SSIP framework here 
developed will contribute to this approach by informing my view of economic 
structures and their inherent social contradictions; however, it “tends to overlook 
human subjects, their changes and what is happening to them with the disorganisation 
and reorganisation of social relations” (Gambino 1996: 43). 33 Therefore, the cultural 
economy approach will be invaluable as it will emphasise processes of subject-
formation and the contingencies of such, as embedded in the regulated economy.    
 
V Conclusion  
This chapter has developed a Regulationist theoretical framework for the purpose of 
being able to conceptualise the economic restructuring that has taken place in the 
Swedish economy in recent decades in chapters 4 and 5. This framework was 
developed out of a critique of the dominant Varieties of Capitalism literature and its 
assumption of the post-industrial trilemma. I argued that this approach inadequately 
conceives institutions, the political and contingency, and thus tends to overemphasise 
convergence. By instead turning to Parisian Regulation theory and its Social Structures 
of Innovation and Production approach, I developed a platform for grasping these 
dimensions better. This platform allowed for the development of a framework, which 
considers the institutional specificities of national economies and contingency. By 
33 This seems to derive from what much of the PRS (other than the more experimental Lipietz) considers 
to be the difficulty in integrating micro- and macro-levels in the same account: “[w]here heterogenous 
features are taken into account in the behaviour of microeconomic players, the coherence of the entire 
system becomes a puzzle” (Aglietta 1998: 43). Aglietta argues that “microscopic and macroscopic 
phenomena cannot be described with the same formal tools”, and that this is a well known problem in 
the physical and social sciences. Yet, fundamentalist, but still hegemonic, neo-classical economists 
refuse to address this issue by stubbornly adopting a methodological individualism. The problem is 
ignored in order to satisfy the “desire to found macroeconomics on microeconomic principles[, 
perpetuating] the postulate of homogeneity against all empirical evidence” (ibid.). For this reason, 
Regulation theory is, following my critique in chapter 3, partly useful. The difficulties of bridging the 
micro-macro-gap, should not simply be accepted as unbridgeable. Through the critique provided in 
section IV above, the foundations of this bridge have already been made.  
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 calibrating the notions of “accumulation strategy”, “societal paradigm”, “the capitalist 
state” and “uneven development” to fit with this framework, the aftermath of the crisis 
of Fordism can be understood as politico-economically strategic and contingent.  
 
The significance of the financial direction of this development and the role of pension 
reform therein led me to pay particular attention to the modelling of the “finance-led 
growth regime” and “coupon pool capitalism”. I also discussed actors, such as the 
“financial lobby”, and processes, like financialisation, which seem likely to contribute 
to the emergence of economies resembling such models. Nevertheless, agency is not 
predictable and such processes are not uncomplicated. Societal paradigms still 
answering to notions of risk-sharing and solidarity, which seem likely to be 
particularly entrenched in the Swedish economy albeit unevenly, will inevitably 
constitute resistant logics, meanings and practices to processes of financialisation. 
Thus, the Swedish case is here understood as critical to grasping the limitations of the 
finance-oriented neoliberal project. An analysis of the social impact of the introduction 
of a risk-privatising pension reform in the Swedish economy, however, requires an 
elaboration of this Regulationist approach in order to sensitise the study to the 
tendencies and countertendencies in subject-formation in Swedish daily life through 
the imposition of processes of financialisation. 
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 Chapter 3 - The Financialisation of Daily Life 
 
I Introduction 
In chapter 1, I argued that the partial financialisation of pension savings has, enabled 
by the large-scale deregulation of financial systems, become a strong objective for 
many governments in the advanced capitalist economies of Europe. The increased 
freedom of financial actors in the economy has allowed for the promotion of 
individualised, private saving forms, which, prior to pension reform, has resulted in 
significant increases in the pensions capital injected into European financial markets 
and beyond. Risk-privatising pension reforms were seen as a key strategy for the 
further development of financial markets capable of efficiently allocating large 
volumes of capital into the European economy. These developments have laid the 
foundation for, and have indeed aimed for, the financialisation of ‘daily life’ in 
Europe. I understand financialisation as a set of interlinked and contingent processes 
along the interface between the credit system, on the one hand, and 
production/consumption, on the other hand, exposing more and more parts of the 
economy to the valorising processes of financial markets. As such, it is having 
tangible, material effects, which are formally and informally institutionalised in the 
everyday.  
 
Chapter 2 developed a Regulationist conceptual framework to understand 
financialisation of advanced capitalist economies. This framework, which is sensitive 
to meso-level institutional change, allows for contingency and variety in capitalist 
development and is capable of grasping politico-strategic action in relation to the 
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 economy. Financialisation is also a strongly normative set of processes, which serves 
to transform our approach to life, credit, savings and consumption. Generally speaking, 
money should be put to work on the markets for the enhanced well-being of the 
individual or the household (partly depending on context) rather than serving particular 
political strategies in the economy, as under Fordism. At the core of this normative 
shift is the notion of risk. While risk was socialised to a significant extent under 
“Fordism”, the coupled processes of neoliberalisation and financialisation attribute 
particular significance to individual appreciation and practice of financial risk-
management in the everyday. The privatisation of financial risk is thus inevitably 
causing inequalities. As a consequence, this becomes more than a norm – it becomes a 
life strategy (Martin 2002).  
 
With regards to the notion of regulation, as developed in chapter 2, our understanding 
of the impact of financialisation on the economy must include a serious consideration 
of the everyday. The contradictions of coupon pool capitalism are very much present 
in the microfoundations in the everyday. For its reproduction, these microfoundations 
have to be in regulation. It is indeed questionable whether this is feasible, and thus 
whether finance-led growth regimes, in its extension, are viable at all. Public pension 
systems are particularly significant mediating mechanisms in modes of regulation. The 
financialisation of pensions further shortens the calculative time-horizons for firms and 
fund managers, whilst extending them for pension saving wage-earners. With the 
weight of the responsibility for welfare and consumption shifting towards wage-
earners and households, financial concerns in the everyday often take on proportions of 
being central to individual life strategies, whilst the financial concerns of firms and 
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 fund managers relates increasingly to that of shareholder value in the short-term. 
Moreover, I conceive of financialisation as central to the uneven capitalist 
development, which has become so pronounced under modes of neoliberal governance 
and government since the early 1980s. Financialisation redistributes risk in 
geographically and demographically specific ways, frequently discriminating for the 
urban and the “superincluded”, relatively wealthy and financially literate (Leyshon and 
Thrift 1996: 1150) and against the hinterland and the excluded. The uneven 
distribution of financialised circuits of capital consequently impacts upon the meanings 
and practices of economic activity in the everyday. Finance-led capitalist development 
becomes variegated. Variegated capitalist development also sets demands on 
accumulation strategies pushing for financialisation, which, depending on existing 
societal paradigms, will address the contingencies and contradictions of financialised 
pension systems in order to enable regulation.  
 
This chapter will conceptualise financialisation in the everyday, in order to grasp its 
potential tensions and contradictions. The literature on the financialisation of the 
everyday predominantly focuses on the neoliberal Anglo-American economies. 
Financialisation of the everyday in social democratic Sweden is a very different and, 
arguably, more complex set of processes. Contradictions and tensions can be expected 
to be rife. In order to approach this, I must, through a critical engagement with this 
literature, develop an understanding of daily life which is sufficiently complex as well 
as of explanatory power for this radically different social context. This is an absolutely 
essential exercise to enable the historically concrete analysis of financialisation in 
Sweden, in chapter 5, as founded on the analysis of subject-formation in the context of 
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 Swedish Fordism and its crisis in chapter 4. Chapter 5 will set a number of criteria for 
the assessment of the extent to which the financialisation of the Swedish economy, 
very much inclusive of the everyday, is occurring and whether it is possible to identify 
tendencies and countertendencies testifying of the viability of a finance-led economy 
in Sweden. 
 
I will proceed in the following manner. Firstly, I will develop a cultural political 
economy approach to the financialisation of daily life, which considers the multi-
levelled sociologies underpinning economic activity. Following the Regulationist 
approach developed in the previous chapter, this must originate from the social 
contradictions emerging out of the crisis of Fordism and financial deregulation. The 
next step in this conceptual move is to develop the notion of ‘economic aesthetics’. 
This notion will be capable of grasping the complex everyday constitution of 
subjectivities formed at the busy crossroads between accumulation strategies and 
politics of representation in the variegated economy. As such, it is sensitive to 
discourses of class, gender, age, language, rural-urban identities, etc. In the context of 
the financialisation of the critical case of the Swedish economy, conflict can be 
expected to arise along these lines as processes of subject-formation clash. This 
conceptualisation of the everyday will also enable us to grasp the emergence of 
particular forms of resistance to, and non-participation in, a financialising economy. 
Finally, I will discuss the implications of analysing financialisation beyond the Anglo-
American cases. This will result in the formulation of a number of questions regarding 
the viability and resonance of financialisation in the Swedish economy, and the 
legitimacy and credibility of the finance-led accumulation strategy striving towards its 
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 regulation through the introduction of a partly financialised pension. Only a historical 
account, assessing the impact and role of the new pension system on Swedish daily life 
can answer these questions (see chapters 4 and 5). 
 
II Fordist Legacies for Subject-Formation under Financialisation 
The impact of financialisation is the neutralisation of fiscal policy and a radical 
transformation of firm and household behaviour. The transformation of household 
behaviour is predicated upon “the development of household shares or securities 
portfolios” tying the welfare of households and individual fates to the performance of 
financial markets. As such, stock-market values play a key role in the everyday 
decisions between savings and consumption (Boyer 2000:123). Beyond such 
seemingly rational, monetary deliberations, the approach to the risk of missing out on 
financial gains by opting for consumption, similar to a gambler’s dilemma in the 
context of largely incalculable risks (Forslund 2004), is frequently subjected to 
processes of re-enchantment (Martin 2002:91). As such, the strong normative and 
psychological dimensions impacting upon the social relations of financialisation 
cannot be underestimated. As “money is the primordial social link in market 
economies” anyway (Aglietta 1998: 46), financialisation threatens to make money 
even more central to social relations. However, in the first place, the overarching 
requirement of the formation of a ‘coupon pool’ is large scale flows from households. 
Considering the contrasting Fordist organisation of savings, and particularly retirement 
savings, as underpinned by a hegemonic societal paradigm emphasising the importance 
of the socialisation of risk in order to enable solidarity and relative equality, the 
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 normative and psychological basis for these meanings and practices has to be largely 
dismantled and reshaped. 
 
The PRS enables us to consider the processes of subject-formation inaugurated under 
the Fordist mode of regulation and how their contradictions point to their crisis. 
According to Aglietta (1998), regulation under the Fordist growth regime primarily 
focused on the wage relation. Income insecurity of wage-earners was significantly 
reduced by two factors: the relative stability of the internal rules of welfare institutions 
and rigidly institutionalised compromises between interest groups. Stimulated by 
capitalism, one fundamental compromise was the (further) inclusion of labour into the 
process of the circulation of wealth. This compromise  
established constraints on the accumulation of capital which [gave] a collective purpose to the 
pursuit of interests, thereby legitimizing both parts of the dichotomy between individual goals 
and membership of society (Aglietta 1998: 54). 
 
The spread of the wage society generated new markets, while at the same time wage-
earners acquired new social rights to the wealth they produced. Thus, capitalism was 
allowed to expand on the legitimating premise that it allowed for social progress 
(ibid.). Hence, a societal paradigm, formulating a sense of belonging, was constructed 
on the grounds of the destruction of the normative and practical foundations of pre-
Fordist forms of life (ibid.: 55). Social progress was ensured under the auspices of 
large industrial and financial organisations making the necessary compromises to 
ensure the expansion of the wage society to the benefit of all parties, often under the 
coordination and mediation role of the state (particularly in the case of Sweden). This 
belonging was supposedly based on collective risk-sharing and the enabling of social 
mobility. Universal education, employment security, and clear labour market 
hierarchies committed to ‘equal pay for equal work’ ensured supposedly fair rules for 
 123 
 social mobility (yet, social mobility was constrained in the Swedish case by high and 
flat income tax rates (see Steinmo 1992)) and solidarity. Countercyclical monetary and 
economic policies along with guaranteed and high replacement rates during 
unemployment, illness, parental leave and retirement rendered private forms of savings 
and insurance a practice of primarily high-income earners. Thus, individual goals such 
as social mobility, as defined primarily by status rather than income, were conceivable 
to the individual (Aglietta 1998: 56-7). 
 
However, the processes enabling the achievement of these goals may come to threaten 
the stability of a growth regime. Its inherent social contradictions may mature and 
surface to contribute to the crisis of the very same growth regime. According to 
Aglietta, “the renewal of individual interests” was the consequence of the maturing of 
the Fordist growth regime (ibid.: 62). Rising individualism has weakened collective 
identities, reduced solidarity and weakened collective objectives (ibid.: 66-7). Fordist 
regulation had both enabled and constrained individual ambitions. One example 
derives from the encouragement of the norm of mass consumption to provide demand 
for mass produced goods in the Fordist regime of accumulation. Once a certain level of 
material standard was satisfied and incomes came to “exceed the levels required for the 
mere perpetuation of existing lifestyles” (ibid.: 70), a more varied range of goods 
began to be demanded, which in turn increased production costs as flexible forms of 
production were required (Piore and Sabel 1984). The production of a greater range 
and more individualised lifestyles grew and enabled social markers of belonging and 
differentiation. The Fordist regime of accumulation was becoming exhausted. Its crisis 
is however only understandable when considering the changes, which extended beyond 
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 the national mode of regulation. With the suspension of the US-Dollar standard, 
decreasing levels of productivity, increasing indebtedness, rising inflation, 
“offshorisation” (Palan 1998) and an increasing transnationalisation of production, 
labour union power was weakening resulting in the undermining of collective wage 
bargaining and increasing wage drift. Wage solidarity increasingly came to be replaced 
by the individualisation of wage structures and thus heightened competition on the 
labour market. Productivity increases and ‘real’ wages became increasingly 
disconnected and with that the regulatory foundations of the Fordist growth regime 
were undermined.  
 
Claus Offe ‘completes’ this picture of structural disintegration with his account of the 
decline of the legitimacy of the welfare state, crucial to Fordist regulation. He points to 
a number of different explanatory variables, out of which the wealth-induced rising 
individualism discussed by Aglietta is central. However, he also refers to the 
significance of the uneven development of leftist politics of industrialisation and 
urbanisation (1987: 513; 527; see also Ryner 2002: 58). The dissolution of welfare 
state-supporting “self-conscious collectivities of political will, economic interest, and 
cultural values” and the looming fiscal crisis, captured by the notion of inverted 
Malthusianism, provided the structural opportunities for ideological and strategic 
attacks (Offe 1987: 527). The loss of the former, and the increasingly serial nature of 
family relations (Froud et al. 2002: 145), deprived the welfare state of its necessary 
conditions: “solidary and collectivist attitudes and ideologies” (Offe 1987: 527). 
Consequently,  
an interpretive pattern that is deeply distrustful of social policies as ‘public goods’, and that 
tends instead to unravel [substantially de-commodifying policies] in terms of gains and losses, 
exploitation, free-riding, redistribution, and so on that is, in individualist "economic man" 
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 categories, the behavioural consequences of which are best captured and predicted by rational 
choice theory (ibid.: 528). 
 
The societal paradigm underpinning the welfare state was thus being undermined by its 
own inherent contradictions. The moral appeal of the welfare state as a ‘just’ and 
‘progressive’ socio-political project was, however, also ‘actively’ undermined by the 
reluctance of governments, even social democratic ones, to intervene preventatively to 
avoid the moral crisis of the welfare state (see also Hacker 2004). Moreover,  
[t]he more the interpretation finds a base in perceived reality that the distributive effects are 
much more intertemporal (i.e., self-paternalist) in nature than intergroup (i.e., redistributive), 
the appeal and legitimacy of the welfare state project as a secularized and modern version of 
Christian ideals of charity must necessarily suffer severe damage (Offe 1987: 534). 
 
Finally, social democratic parties and labour unions lack the ideological tools to defend 
the welfare state against the discourse of inverted Malthusianism, which, as we have 
seen in chapter 1, incentivises citizens to “jump the sinking boat” and ‘go private’ 
(ibid.). Offe claims that the open turn to a pure individualism is justified through a 
process of subject-formation, of a “moralizing and/or particularistic kind” (ibid.: 533). 
As we saw in chapter 2, neoliberal Third Way politics have tended to replace the de-
commodifying and solidaristic policies of social democratic governments and, as 
Lipietz argues, labour unions on the defensive tend to serve the project of perfecting 
the capitalist system, “by implicating itself in the struggle for productivity and quality” 
(1989: 91).  
 
Although this account of the breakdown of the Fordist growth regime provides us with 
potential tendencies and continuities in its aftermath, it has its natural limits in 
understanding subject-formation during its aftermath as well as under financialisation. 
For instance, the Nordic experiences of the period of crisis in the 1970s, policy 
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 fumbling in the late 1970s and early 1980s and major economic restructuring during 
the 1980s (Mjoset 1987: 445- 454) are not adequately understood by the PRS. Such 
times of intensified discursive struggle and politics of representation, which in turn 
enabled new societal paradigms to form and new accumulation strategies to be 
institutionalised and seeking regulation through the capitalist state, cannot be grasped 
with reference to the Regulationist framework developed in chapter 2 and so far here 
alone. Recently there have been some attempts to get to terms with this. They have 
contributed to the understanding of financialisation, yet remain conceptually 
inadequate to simultaneously deal with the complexity of subjects and processes of 
social transformation. 
 
Adam Harmes (2001a; 2001b; 2002), a neo-Gramscian, has analysed the ideological 
consequences of the privatisation of pensions in the US, Canada and the UK as 
“transforming tens of millions from passive savers into ‘active’ investors”. By 
producing “mass investment cultures”, he argues that financialising pension reform 
creates a “powerful ideological tool” to expand the consensus behind neoliberal 
macroeconomic policies. Neoliberalism is thus naturalised and depoliticised. The 
hegemonic project of securing the participation of wage-earners from above is 
reproduced from below, through the engagement with public policy initatives, financial 
education programmes, advertisement campaigns and other opinion-making drives. 
Financialisation is thus produced from above and consumed by the masses. In fact, he 
argues, “the origins of mass investment lie in the privatization of pensions” (2001a: 
105). While the latter may be a key objective of the introduction of financialised 
pension systems, the successful completion of such objective cannot be taken for 
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 granted. In fact, even in the US, this process is proving to be a far from smooth and 
predictable process (Munnell and Sundén 2004; Langley 2006a: 927, 931). One critical 
reason for this may be the contradictory processes of subject-formation under 
neoliberal governmentality (Langley 2006b). In brief, Harmes underestimates the 
complexity of subject-formation under financialisation. Here, Langley offers a 
seemingly more convincing account. 
 
Reacting to ‘capitalocentric’ neo-marxist and neo-gramscian accounts34, notably the 
work of Harmes (2001), Langley constructs a rather sophisticated, Foucauldian 
framework, which understands subjects performed in Anglo-American economies as 
uncertain. Langley makes use of a Foucauldian understanding to allow him to 
demonstrate the uncertainty of subjects ‘called up’ under neoliberal governmentality. 
Under the disciplinary power of discourses of neoliberal governmentality, subjects are 
both the means by which discourses of power are rendered fragile and vulnerable and 
the vehicles of these discourses (Amoore). Here, neoliberal governmentality puts 
coexisting subjectivites, such as the ‘investor subject’, the ‘worker-entrepreneur’ and 
the ‘consumer subject, at odds with one another (Langley 2006b: 78-85). He contrasts 
his approach with neo-Marxist and neo-Gramscian accounts of the investor subject to 
show their weak understanding of such subject positions: “the investor is [in these 
approaches] performed relatively smoothly as the processes of financialization and 
neoliberalization march on. He further claims that neo-marxist and neo-gramscian 
34 Echoing Gibson-Graham, ‘capitalocentrism’ “manifests itself in two major problems”: the ubiquity 
and omnipotence of financialisation on the one hand and an unsatisfying account of consciousness and 
resistance on the other (Langley 2006b: 86-7). The second problem is a consequence of the first: the 
lack of contingency in the everyday life in such accounts. This lack of contingency “prompt[s] forms of 
politics that clearly and unequivocally refute financialization” (2006b: 86). 
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 approaches “remain inadequate for understanding the embodiment and performance of 
everyday investment” (Langley 2006b: 72). Everyday investors continue to appear as 
artifacts of, and not architects in, processes of change” (2006b: 72-3). Following 
Aitken (2005: 334), he states that finance capital should not be understood as a 
“macro-structural entity, but as something made in the spaces of everyday life” 
(Langley 2006b: 72). However, in Langley’s account we are not offered any other 
competing discourses than those originating from neoliberal governmentality. Surely, 
even in the case of the US, competing discourses exist.  
 
However, the pension reforms introduced in the Anglo-American economies do not 
follow the recipe of mandatory financialisation of pension savings. New, financialised 
Anglo-American pension systems are to a large extent either voluntary, or only cover 
some employees. Thus, they end up, like in Chile, applying primarily to ‘the fortunate’ 
forty percent constituting the middle classes in these economies (Langley 2006c). 
However, as Aitken points out, the cultivation of mass investment cultures are 
historically and culturally specific moments of financialisation. Neo-Gramscian 
accounts of neoliberal hegemony, according to him, are too epochal, stressing 
discontinuity too much (2003, 2005). He claims that there are plenty of examples of 
efforts to appeal to popular notions of finance across time and place (2005).  
 
Indeed, neo-Gramscians like Harmes tend to overplay the power of what can be 
referred to as accumulation strategies in their accounts, while downplaying the 
complex and potentially conflictual, materially and culturally specific of the everyday 
(see Harmes 2001a: 103). Neglecting the hegemonic processes relating to societal 
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 paradigms, subject-formation becomes merely a function of accumulation strategies. 
Aitken claims that instead of the epochal and discontinuous accounts of many neo-
gramscians, analyses of popular appeals of finance must seek the historical 
continuities, upon which such are built (Aitken 2005: 357-8). As Forslund shows, there 
are strong continuities in present attempts to popularise finance in Sweden, which 
draw upon values, norms and practices rooted in historically and culturally specific 
societal paradigms (forthcoming 2007). 
 
The conceptual framework, which will be developed in the next section, agrees with 
many of the objectives of the account of Langley, yet with two notable differences. 
Firstly, this approach will, building upon the Regulationist SSIP approach in the 
previous chapter, consider the macro-processes of financialisation very seriously. It 
will, however, combine this with a micro-understanding of subject-formation. As such, 
it disagrees with Langley’s belief that neo-marxist approaches are incapable of 
grasping subjects under financialisation. As argued previously, subject-formation 
occurs at the busy and complex crossroads of struggles over accumulation strategies 
and societal paradigms in a variegated capitalism. Secondly, although resistance, or 
‘dissent’ as Langley calls it (2006b: 87), to financialisation is taking place, and one 
should take care not to undervalue these efforts, unorganised resistance is likely to be 
insufficiently powerful to overcome it. Here, re-radicalised trade unions (Lipietz 1989: 
87) may very well play a significant role in the construction of collective identities and 
interests, which can come to seek the moderation of or even transgression of 
financialisation, as Aglietta argues (1998: 80-1). 
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 III Cultural Political Economy and the Economic Aesthetic 
Political Economy, indeed, tends to understand subject-formation as ‘from above’. 
Arguably deriving from Marx’s understanding of labour, there is a distinction made 
between ‘work’ and ‘interaction’ (Habermas in Wittel 2004: 17). ‘Work’ relates to the 
objectively economic and ‘interaction’ refers to the ‘cultural’ or ‘social’. In a linear 
manner, from disciplined production to cultural consumption, a causality is sustained. 
The former is shaped by elites and subsequently consumed, in a submissive and 
unquestioning fashion, by the masses (Adorno and Horkheimer 1976). “The culture 
industry produces mass deception and a false sense of happiness; it promotes an 
affirmative and conformist consciousness, thereby disallowing critical thinking.” 
(Wittel 2004: 13) Economy and culture are two distinct spheres in which the interests 
formulated in the former determine the action in the latter; the idea of economic 
determination in the last instance echoes here. As such, agency is reserved for the few 
at the top of socio-political hierarchies. Recently, O'Brian has called for a greater 
acknowledgement of agency within Political Economy. He argues that Political 
Economy “ignores the agency of non-elite groupings of people”, which “is a mistake 
both theoretically and empirically' (O'Brian 2000; see also Davies and Ryner (eds) 
2006). This does not deny that certain agencies are more influential within particular 
contexts than others or that some are more problematically exposed to capitalist forces 
than others. The suggestion by Laclau and Mouffe’s post-structuralism, following 
Derrida’s re-working of Lacan’s understanding of the subject and unsettling of 
Saussure’s relational conception of language (Ryner 2004b: 5-7), “that there is no 
logical relationship whatsoever between position in the social relations of production 
and the mentality of the producers” is highly problematic (1984: 84-5). This claim, 
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 pointing at a ‘free play of difference’, implies a rejection of the social processes under 
advanced capitalism, which both enable and constrain such ‘freedom’ (Ryner 2004b: 
34-5). As Hall argues, 
[w]hat has resulted from the abandonment of deterministic economism has been, not 
alternative ways of thinking questions about the economic relations and their effects, as the 
‘conditions of existence’ of other practices…but instead a massive, gigantic, and eloquent 
disavowal. As if, since the economic in the broadest sense, definitely does not, as it was once 
supposed to do, ‘determine’ the real movement of history ‘in the last instance’, it does not 
exist at all! (1996: 258) 
 
In order to avoid this, it is crucial, for epistemological and political reasons, to retain a 
notion of ‘the real’, although distant and historically specific, which structures 
economic action. Discourses must be understood as formulated intersubjectively 
within and beyond societal paradigms and accumulation strategies to construct 
collective identities, which in turn afford actors with different positions of influence. 
As such, class, gender, race, age and rural-urban identities are crucial. Discursive 
struggles seek to modify these positions, as well as the matter of inclusion/exclusion. 
Less powerful, even excluded, actors can thus seek to achieve the commonsensical 
status of a particular discourse or, better, societal paradigm. As such, even the way in 
which ‘economy’ and ‘culture’ are discursively filled with meaning and separated is a 
political process, which shapes the material reality of daily life (Castree 2004: 213-
214). 
 
The challenge in constructing a cultural political economy, which acknowledges 
differentially empowered agency to a greater extent, is to afford greater complexity to 
subjects in their relation to social relations, not more individual voluntarism. I will 
tackle this by building upon Buck-Morss’ interpretation of Walter Benjamin and Henri 
Lefebvre.  
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In a context in which financialisation is young and tendential, where we cannot assume 
that neoliberal governmentality is the only alternative set of discourses and in which, 
following the introduction of public, partly financialised pension systems, equity 
ownership is not reserved for the middle classes, I understand processes, discourses 
and practices of financialisation to trigger linked subjectivities formed under a 
historically unevenly developing economy. These in turn potentially render 
financialisation fragile. Over these subjectivities, there are constant struggles. These 
struggles occur over the societal paradigm and over accumulation strategies, and can 
either seek to address these from within or overcome them altogether. In combination 
with the traumas and desires emerging out of variegated capitalism, struggles over 
financialisation render subjectivities fragile, yet also potentially stable. As I argued in 
chapter 3, both accumulation strategies and societal paradigms can become hegemonic. 
This means that they with a degree of ease trigger supporting subjectivities in daily 
life. Understandings of what is, what is not, how to, how not to, what is moral and 
what is immoral become more or less commonsensical. As should be starting to 
become clear is that their full mutual correspondence is extremely rare, if not 
impossible. Instead, one finds different degrees of correspondence. 
 
As I have shown, the importance of consumption to daily life became central with 
Fordism. Over time, social hierarchies and mobility became partly (see Bourdieu 1984 
for other sources of status) predicated upon symbolic values (Baudrillard 1998) and 
exchange-values of commodities and leisure activities (e.g. tourism) (Diggens 1999). 
Consumption and partaking in leisure activities came to be understood as 
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 emancipatory processes. This understanding of consumption as emancipation was 
derived from the ‘reification35 of consumption’. The projected prospects of 
consumption, in the form of e.g. advertisements and shopping windows, were 
‘phantasmagorias’ targeting what Buck-Morss calls the ‘synaesthetic system’. 
 
Susan Buck-Morss through her reading of Benjamin and, in turn, his reading of Freud, 
understands consciousness as closely related to sense-perception. She claims that she is 
capable of rescuing the notion of ‘the aesthetic’ from the clasps of the bourgeoisie in 
this way. She points to its inference as ‘sensibility’, ‘fictitiousness’ and the 
‘heteronomous’, before ending up in Habermas’ neo-Kantian schemata as “a kind of 
sandbox to which one consigns all those vague things…under the heading of the 
irrational…[where] they can be monitored and, in case of need, controlled (the 
aesthetic is in any case conceived as a kind of safety valve for irrational impulses) 
35 The notion of reification originates from Lukàcs and was integrated in a less totalising and 
considerably more open-ended and dialectical form into the work of the Frankfurt School by Walter 
Benjamin and Theodor Adorno (Buck-Morss 1977). My understanding of reification elaborates upon 
primarily Benjamin’s work. In brief, according to Lukàcs, under capitalism, material social conditions 
came to be in a dialectical relationship with the Enlightenment consciousness and intellectual efforts of 
the bourgeoisie. In a complex manner, capitalism was reflected in the thought structures of the 
bourgeoisie. Not even the best or the most honest intellectual endeavours of bourgeois intellectuals and 
artists were thus capable of resolving the “contradictions in their theories, because the latter were based 
on a reality which was itself contradictory” (Buck-Morss 1977: 26). This reality was strongly 
characterised by what Marx had called “the commodity structure”. In fact, the commodity was “the 
central structural problem of capitalist society in all its aspects”; it was the “model of all the objective 
forms of bourgeois society, together with all the subjective forms corresponding to them” (Lukács 1971: 
83). As bourgeois intellectuals and artists accepted this given social reality as the reality, the commodity 
structure, on which this reality was modelled, posited “a barrier of irrationality which could not be 
overcome, because that barrier could not be removed from theory without being removed from society” 
(Buck-Morss 1977: 26-7). Bourgeois thought – idealism – was hence in a dialectical and inseparable 
relation to the capitalist economy. Buck-Morss (1977: 26) argues: “[j]ust as commodities in the realm of 
production took on a reified form, became ‘fetishes’ which appeared cut off from the social process of 
their production, so bourgeois theory’s reified conception of the ‘object’ as an immutable ‘given’ 
obscured the sociohistorical process through which it had come to be. And just as the reified 
commodities took on an abstract exchange value, divorced from their social use value, so the reification 
of bourgeois logic was manifested in its abstract separation of form from content.” In Benjamin’s and 
Adorno’s terms, reification derives from the Bourgeois Enlightenment Project, which promised 
emancipation, in the form of the universal truth – the gaining of true consciousness. Society gradually 
came to embody its instrumental rationality as institutionalised in bureaucratic-corporate practices as 
well as in various forms of aesthetic production. 
 134 
                                                 
 (Jameson 1990: 232)”. Returning to its ancient Greek origins, the aesthetic has two 
related meanings, both of which are relevant here: Aisthitikos refers to that which is 
perceptive by feeling, whereas Aisthisis signifies the sensory experience of perception. 
Sensing occurs through our nervous system, which connects our body surfaces with 
the brain. The exact nature of the effect of sensing is, however, a matter of theory and 
not (yet) scientific empirical study. The belief in the ability of (wo)man to completely 
separate mind from matter is a product of a flawed Enlightenment project inspired by 
Kant. Instead, the nervous system is not contained within the limits of the body, it is in 
fact a completely open system: 
As the source of stimuli and motor response, the external world must be included to complete 
the sensory circuit…Sensory deprivation causes the system’s internal components to 
degenerate…The field of the sensory circuit thus corresponds to that of ‘experience,’ in the 
classical philosophical sense of a mediation of subject and object, and yet its very composition 
makes the so-called split between subject and object (which was the constant plague of 
classical philosophy) simply irrelevant). (Ibid.: 12-13) 
 
The synaesthetic system is thus an aesthetic system of sense-consciousness.  
 
Experience in capitalist modernity revolves around the neurological. In a Freudian 
manner, Benjamin understood capitalism as providing stimuli (‘excessive energies’), 
threats of ‘shock’, against which the ego deployed consciousness to prevent these from 
imprinting themselves in memory. Thereby, trauma is prevented by isolating present 
consciousness from past memory. Without memories to relate experience to, the latter 
is impoverished. Yet, as modernity proceeds and Taylorist production processes 
‘exploits’ labour (in a cognitive sense), shock becomes “the very essence of modern 
experience” (ibid.: 16-17). Modern experience involves the transformation of mimetic 
capacities from those of “empowerment or innervation” to that of a defensive “shock 
absorber” (ibid.: 17). Hence, the organism is paralysed or deprived of its active 
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 response, robbed of its imaginative capacity. Consequently, the system undergoes a 
reversal of functions. The synaesthetic system takes the role of protector, while 
consciousness is sidelined. The threats of bodily trauma and perceptual shock are now 
the task of the synaesthetic system to deal with. This cognitive system becomes a 
system of anaesthetics: 
Of course, the eyes still see. Bombarded with fragmentary impressions they see too much – 
and register nothing. Thus the simultaneity of overstimulation and numbness is characteristic 
of the new synaesthetic organization as anaesthetics. The dialectical reversal, whereby 
aesthetics changes from a cognitive mode of being ‘in touch’ with reality to a way of blocking 
out reality, destroys the human organism’s power to respond politically even when self-
preservation is at stake. (ibid.)  
 
This is a crisis of “cognitive experience…that makes it possible for humanity to view 
its own destruction with enjoyment” (ibid.: 37). She ends this part of the paper with a 
quote from Benjamin: “[s]omeone who is “past experiencing” is “no longer capable of 
telling…proven friend…from mortal enemy” (Benjamin in ibid.). It is meaningful to 
stop this account at its most gloomy, where there seems to be no hope.  
 
Given this effort to conceptualise capitalist modernity, it is questionable whether 
Buck-Morss would conceive of financialisation with its emphasis of risk, rising 
inequalities and rampant advertising campaigns in anything else than a desperate 
manner. It presents a picture of seriously damaged humanity, seemingly beyond repair. 
Yet, fortunately, Buck-Morss’ account is too deterministic and too pessimistic. Let me 
rewind and seek to approach this slightly differently in order to inject agency and hope, 
because, although capitalism may seem hard to overcome, financialisation is a fragile 
set of processes in which struggle continues to be rife.  
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 Returning to the notion of phantasmagorias in Buck-Morss’s account, human beings 
having been given the hope of emancipation by the Enlightenment project, against the 
background of the ideology of religion (Marx 1845 [1975]), to be able to find the paths 
to the utopia of truth, or real experience, through sense-perception, capitalism 
disappoints humanity. Instead, the reification of consumption sets in. According to 
Buck-Morss, phantasmagorias target the synaesthetic system, seeking to manipulate 
them by flooding them. They attempt to “alter consciousness, much like a drug, but 
they do so through sensory distraction rather than chemical alteration, and – most 
significantly – their effects are experienced collectively rather than individually”, 
assuming the status of objective fact (ibid.: 22-3). Here lies the difference in our 
accounts.  
 
Indeed, phantasmagorias target the synaesthetic system, but whilst Buck-Morss 
believes that consciousness has, through the reversal of the system, become the 
protected and the synaesthetic system the shield, I claim that consciousness remains in 
place as protector and guardian of the desires and traumas of the synaesthetic system. 
As such, consciousness primarily anaestheticises the synaesthetic system, but it is an 
imperfect serum. The synaesthetic system is still capable of forming some desires and 
still experiences trauma. In relatively non-phantasmagorical environments, 
consciousness tends to switch off enabling the synaesthetic system to sense-perceive 
its environment and connect experience with past memories. This may allow for 
‘critical moments’ to emerge as consciousness gives in to the desires and traumas of 
the synaesthetic system.  
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 However, as capitalism and its phantasmagorical projections intensify, the ego’s 
increasingly desperate deployment of consciousness to protect the synaesthetic system 
takes its toll on the connectivity between the ego and consciousness. Consciousness, 
increasingly disconnected from the role given by the ego, yet continuing to ‘protect’ 
the synaesthetic system, becomes tendentially reified. As such, it starts to accept 
certain, frequently phantasmagorically presented, ‘imperatives’ as threats to the 
possibility of ‘real experience’, i.e. consumption and leisure activity. The most 
frequently and seriously deployed imperatives may thus be projected onto the 
synaesthetic system, creating traumas and reactions of urgency by the latter, which in 
turn are attended to by guardian consciousness. In response to these imperatives, 
‘calculating agencies’ (Callon 1998) are created by consciousness to hedge against the 
risk of lost ‘real experience’.36 Of course, the meanings and practices of these 
calculating agencies are also socially constructed as disciplinary, yet, as clarified by 
the above discussion, this social construction is not an automatic process of 
internalisation. It is full of uncertainty and conflicts. Equally, ‘critical moments’ may 
imply the birth of a discourse, which is averse to processes of reification and 
commodification. Critical discourses are produced when consciousness channels the 
desires and traumas of synaesthetic system in directions where they find resonance in 
others’ desires and traumas. Competing with conflicting, reifying discourses, critical 
(or reifying) collective identities around particular interests may thus be shaped in 
politics of representation. As a result, societal paradigms can become hegemonic, 
although always threatened by reification. Similarly, under capitalism, reifying 
discourses, which seek to rationalise different processes of commodification, and 
36 “Calculative agencies must be framed and formatted by calculating tools which organize agents in a 
particular way and which allow actors to perform certain kinds of calculations.” (Callon cited in Aitken 
2005: 350) 
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 practices, which operationalise such processes, can be combined to form regulatory 
mechanisms, which in turn are the bases for accumulation strategies. Regimes of 
accumulation, which unevenly and systematically reallocate the social product both 
geographically and demographically, may thus require a hegemonic societal paradigm 
to complement an accumulation strategy, although they may be partly conflicting. 
According to this framework, human agency is economically determined ‘in the first 
instance’, due to its internal and intersubjective complexity in the variegated economy 
(Hall 1996). The term for this historically shaped system of sense-consciousness, the 
regulation of which the economy relies upon for its reproduction and legitimacy, will 
here be called ‘the economic aesthetic’. 
 
It is here argued that in order to understand the tendencies or countertendencies in, and 
the stability or fragility of financialisation, we need to understand how and to what 
degree financialising meanings and practices are embedded in the variegated 
economy, consciously and unconsciously, because such constructions need to 
overcome potentially resistant logics. This can most usefully be understood through 
this theorisation of economic aesthetics where everyday meanings and practices are 
shaped bodily and intersubjectively. Individual economic aesthetics are thus 
characterised by trauma, desire and fragile strategic-political processes, as bodily 
mediated discourses in the everyday. The economic aesthetic is formed in the everyday 
of space.  
 
Lefebvre tells us that the everyday is “an object of programming…, whose unfolding is 
imposed by the market, by the system of equivalences, by marketing and 
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 advertisements” (in Davies and Niemann 2002: 558; see also Adorno). Space thus 
relates to the socially produced grids and horizons of social life that guide as well as 
render possible the development of socio-economic relations over space and time 
(Lefebvre 1991: 129). The economic aesthetic is therefore our unstable normative and 
practical positioning in relation to the unevenly developed economy. As such, it is an 
umbrella term for subjective, everyday dispositions towards the economy.   
 
In advanced capitalism, starting with Fordism, economic aesthetics have been shaped 
in the context of dramatic transformations. Fordist accumulation strategies and societal 
paradigms implied processes of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1934) favouring 
industrialisation, urbanisation, suburbanisation and specific processes of exclusion-
inclusion. With regard to the latter, despite the expansion of the workforce and 
granting of certain rights (particularly welfare), it was also based upon the coercion 
and disciplining of threatening discourses, such as Marxism (e.g. the Red Scare in the 
US and the surveillance and disciplining of Marxist workers and intellectuals in 
Sweden). Such critical discourses increasingly came to take on less vocal and more 
“hidden” forms (Scott 1990).  
 
Against the backdrop of coercion, Fordist creative destruction was a particularly brutal 
set of processes involving mass social dislocation and social disciplining, but also the 
creation of desires of consumption and social mobility. Particularly, Fordism caused 
traumas in the areas and amongst the social groups, whose consumption and leisure 
patterns were, at least temporarily threatened. The crisis of Fordism and the fumbling 
turn to ‘flexible accumulation’ (Harvey 1997: 147-197) in the late 1960s, 1970s and 
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 early 1980s also involved processes of creative destruction. While Fordism was brutal, 
stagflation and the subsequent turn to neoliberal anti-inflationary policies involved a 
new threat, particularly to some: the risk of unemployment and reduction of welfare.  
 
Post-industrialisation and the rationalisation of agricultural production have involved 
further social dislocation, as unemployment has risen dramatically in the de-
industrialised hinterland. The construction of the neoliberal imperative of risk, as 
implying the threat to individual consumption and leisure activities in terms of both 
financial and physical ability, has transformed societal paradigms, politics of 
representation and accumulation strategies radically. With financialisation, the 
socialisation of financial risk under Fordism has increasingly come to be replaced with 
the construction of risk, both discursively and institutionally, as individual and 
competitive (see Reith 2004). As such, risk becomes ambiguous and contradictory. On 
the one hand, it implies an imperative: a threat to the possibility of real experience. On 
the other hand, it is constructed as implying the chance to increase the possibility of 
real experience, if competitive choices are made. The choice is the individual’s and 
with that the consequences. The individual thus faces a gambler’s dilemma, or what 
Forslund (2004: 10-11) has called ‘opportunity risk’: the risk one exposes oneself to, if 
the risk of missing out on considerable financial gain is avoided.  
 
Particular calculative agencies are created in the everyday to manage risk under 
financialisation. As such, they perform an essential role in the development of the 
kinds of capacities, which are central to financialisation itself (Callon 1998). Yet, these 
calculative agencies are less likely to form where the imperatives of financial risk are 
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 poorly spread and economic traumas are deep. With financial market activity and 
venture capital concentrated to the urban cores and research-intense areas (notably 
university towns) under the prerogatives of financialisation (Martin et al. 2002; 
Leyshon 2004), the exposure of the hinterland to the imperatives of financial risk is 
reduced, despite technological developments making the internet and cable-television a 
normality everywhere. The simultaneous processes of conformation and division of 
economic aesthetics, thus, seem to intensify under financialisation. Its consequences 
for equality can only be understood through the investigation of historically and 
regulation-specific processes. 
 
IV Beyond the Anglo-American frontier: exploring the extension of 
financialisation to the Critical Swedish Case 
To account for financialisation beyond Anglo-America involves the challenge of 
dealing with conditions, in which non-financial logics are not fully suspended. “In the 
early stages of financialisation, financial logic can be absorbed, assimilated and 
adapted by resistant institutions and non-financial logics”, as the institutional 
preconditions are not fully met and employment relations and income distribution are 
not wholly determined by financialisation (Froud et al. 2002: 133-4). Consequently, 
price-movements on financial markets do not fully determine everyday decisions 
between saving/investment and consumption (Boyer 2000a: 123). As we saw in 
chapter 2, in Boyer’s model of the finance-led growth regime, these dynamics are in 
full flow. In contrast, in the British Social Accountants’ (BSA) model of coupon pool 
capitalism even the Anglo-American economies cannot be claimed to fully harbour 
such dynamics and everyday logics. Yet the preconditions for financialisation exist 
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 nevertheless, but only for the affluent middle classes. Their participation in the 
circulation of “coupons” contributes to unstable and contradictory processes of 
financialisation of the economy, as their demands for high rates of return structure the 
behaviour of firms. Due to price volatility, the household plays a central role as buffer 
when the savings of individuals fail to provide the financial security deprived through 
neoliberal restructuring. Yet, the PRS, the BSA and Matthew Watson remain sceptical 
about the viability of a finance-led growth regime even in Anglo-America, yet spend 
very limited time identifying any social processes which could challenge it.  
 
In seeming contrast to Boyer’s claim that “financialization affects open economies”, 
the literature claims that the study of financialisation is not meaningful beyond Anglo-
America, as such processes require particular discursive (neoliberal governmentality) 
(Langley 2006b) or economic conditions, and the absence of institutional resistances or 
incompatibilities (Montgomerie 2006: 207). Here, the literature is problematically 
biased. Firstly, in small and open economies (e.g. Sweden), commodity trade and 
capital flows become central concerns in a neoliberalising economy, as the exposure of 
the economy to these flows becomes significantly greater. Secondly, and related, the 
sustaining of a considerable, yet labour market-oriented, welfare system in the more 
coordinated economies, particularly the small and open ones (Katzenstein 1985; 
Mabbett 1995), maintains relatively low levels of reliance of individuals upon the 
household. The risk-oriented individualism required and promoted by financialisation 
may thus find fertile grounds there. Thirdly, indeed, as Amable and Petit shows (see 
chapter 2), small and open economies like Sweden and Finland showed at the end of 
the 1990s a surprising resemblance to models of the ‘new economy’, with high levels 
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 of private equity, venture capital and research-based technological development. 
Fourthly, the construction of the European single market, particularly for financial 
services, and the Lisbon Agenda promise increasing exposure to financial markets. 
 
As my discussion in chapters 2 and 3 have shown, the Fordist State-sponsored 
encouragement of individualisation and financial autonomy lends itself to processes of 
State-sponsored financialisation, such as the marked privatisation of pensions in the 
1980s and 1990s in several European economies, and more recently the introduction of 
partly financialised pension systems. With the crisis of the European welfare states, the 
individual securing of a continued high material living standard throughout retirement 
has been presented as an imperative, although income security in retirement depends 
upon the uncertain performance of equity holdings. The encouragement of equity 
savings has, indeed, resulted in high rates of compensatory private savings, especially 
in those groups most negatively affected by uneven development. Disappointingly, the 
literature’s focus on the unequal Anglo-American economies has resulted in an 
understanding of financialisation as a phenomenon deriving from the equity savings of 
the forty percent of the population with the highest incomes. Focusing on advanced 
capitalist economies of Europe, which have experienced significant neoliberal 
restructuring (Ryner 2002) and a considerable degree of financialisation, particularly in 
the context of the recent wave of public, risk-privatising pension reform, entails the 
consideration of pretty much the whole population as owners of pension savings in 
equity. Could this result in the emergence of mass investment cultures in European 
economies? What is clear, however, is that the nature and impact of financialisation on 
these economies, and daily life more specifically, promise to be very different from 
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 Anglo-America and highly contingent upon historical and State-led economic 
processes. 
 
The challenge in this thesis is to identify how the state-sponsored, uneven and 
incomplete process of financialisation, as potentially furthered by a partly financialised 
pension system, affects the Swedish everyday and to what extent this influences 
decision-making in the corporate economy. That is, to what extent have financial risk-
oriented economic aesthetics been formed in Sweden, and what has been the impact of 
the introduction of a partly financialised public pension system on this process? If such 
economic aesthetics have become the norm, then the “Swedish Model” may well just 
be “alive in theory” (Mahon 2007: 79-80), the consequences of which may be the end 
of social democracy and the ‘proving right’ of the ‘dual convergence thesis’, or worse 
the hyper-globalisation thesis. 
 
One way to approach this is through the deployment of the conceptual framework 
developed so far in this thesis. As such, the analysis must engage in a historically 
concrete study of subject-formation in Sweden ending in the assessment of the impact 
of the new, partly financialised pension system on economic aesthetics. Based on the 
discussion so far, financialisation in Sweden can be expected to be a layered and 
complex set of processes, whose origins must be traced to times predating the onset of 
financialisation. Certainly, the post-war social democratic commitment to full 
employment and de-commodifying welfare should be understood as integral to the 
account of the emergence of financialisation. In particular, the construction of a public 
universal, defined benefit pension system has been a key mediating mechanism in the 
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 Fordist mode of regulation, and must thus play a central role in the reception of a new 
partly financialised system. A historical analysis of subject-formation in the context of 
the accumulation strategies, politics of representation and societal paradigms under 
Swedish Fordism and its crisis must, thus, be pursued in the next chapter. This will 
establish the conditions for a financialisation of the Swedish economy. In other words, 
this will establish how critical the Swedish case actually is not only for the viability of 
social democracy, but also to neoliberalism and finance-led accumulation strategies. 
This, in turn, will enable me more directly to consider the role of the Swedish pension 
reform for the financialisation of the Swedish economy in chapter 5. 
 
More specifically, a number of issues arise from the extension of the analysis of 
financialisation to the, arguably, critical Swedish case. Firstly, do the meanings and 
practices of a partly financialised pension system resonate with the dispositions of 
existing economic aesthetics? As Aitken has shown (2005), there are clear continuities 
in popular appeals of finance, as they draw upon historical politics of representation, 
collective identities and economic imperatives. This seems to be a prerequisite for the 
introduction of such a pension system to be made legitimate. Yet, many of the 
economic ideas and societal paradigm, which underpinned the former pension system 
must have been effectively dismantled and replaced to show the superiority of the 
reform design. With the element of risk-socialisation in the pension system 
considerably reduced and calculating agencies able to manage equity portfolios called 
for, are the meanings and practices of financial investment likely to be widely 
internalised in a social context where risk-socialisation for long has been the norm? Is 
it plausible that the seemingly contradictory ‘notions’ of universalism and 
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 financialisation, as embodied in these hybrid pension systems, can generate the 
necessary social dynamics and legitimacy for a mass investment culture on ‘Third 
Way’ grounds to emerge?  
 
To assess this, it is crucial to address how these appeals are received and responded to 
in the context of the historically, unevenly developed economy. As such, we have to 
consider this with regard to the formation of economic aesthetics, and thus not only 
consider its institutional specificities and cultural constructions, but also its 
contradictions, contingencies and forms of resistance. Without positive answers to 
these questions in chapter 5, it seems unlikely that a partly financialised pension 
system can be accepted as legitimate. The consequence may very well be its popular 
contestation. In turn, this could point to the limits of financialisation in the Swedish 
economy, that a finance-led growth regime is not viable in Sweden. Its democratic 
regulation would be impossible. The finance-led accumulation strategies, which have 
promoted the pension system, in particular, and financialisation, in general, would lose 
its credibility. A new crisis would emerge. These are crucial questions to be posed and 
answered if we are to grasp the contingencies, complexities and contradictions of 
financialisation. The financialisation literature has, as I have shown above, yet to 
seriously account for these. These questions can, however, only be answered through a 
historical analysis of the foundations for the financialisation of the Swedish economy 
and economic aesthetics therein. 
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 V Conclusion 
By way of conclusion of this chapter, but also the development of the conceptual 
framework for this thesis, I will briefly outline the remaining task of this piece of 
work. The remaining analysis must engage in a historically concrete study of subject-
formation in Sweden ending in the assessment of the impact of the new, partly 
financialised pension system on economic aesthetics. Based on the discussion so far, 
financialisation in Sweden can be expected to be a layered and complex set of 
processes, whose origins must be traced to times predating the onset of 
financialisation. Certainly, the post-war social democratic commitment to full 
employment and de-commodifying welfare should be understood as integral to the 
account of the emergence of financialisation. In particular, the construction of a public 
universal, defined benefit pension system has been a key mediating mechanism in the 
Fordist mode of regulation, and must thus play a central role in the reception of a new 
partly financialised system. A historical analysis of subject-formation in the context of 
the accumulation strategies, politics of representation and societal paradigms under 
Swedish Fordism and its crisis must, thus, be pursued in the next chapter. This will 
establish the conditions for a financialisation of the Swedish economy. In other words, 
this will establish how critical the Swedish case actually is not only for the viability of 
social democracy, but also to neoliberalism and finance-led accumulation strategies. 
This, in turn, will enable me to more directly consider the role of the Swedish pension 
reform for the financialisation of the Swedish economy in chapter 5. 
 
More specifically, a number of issues arise from the extension of the analysis of 
financialisation to the, arguably, critical Swedish case. Firstly, do the meanings and 
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 practices of a partly financialised pension system resonate with the dispositions of 
existing economic aesthetics? As Aitken has shown (2005), there are clear continuities 
in popular appeals of finance, as they draw upon historical politics of representation, 
collective identities and economic imperatives. This seems to be a prerequisite for the 
introduction of such a pension system to be made legitimate. Yet, many of the 
economic ideas and societal paradigm, which underpinned the former pension system, 
must have been effectively dismantled and replaced to show the superiority of the 
reform design. With the element of risk-socialisation in the pension system 
considerably reduced and calculating agencies able to manage equity portfolios called 
for, are the meanings and practices of financial investment likely to be widely 
internalised in a social context where risk-socialisation for long has been the norm? Is 
it plausible that the seemingly contradictory ‘notions’ of universalism and 
financialisation, as embodied in these hybrid pension systems, can generate the 
necessary social dynamics and legitimacy for a mass investment culture on ‘Third 
Way’ grounds to emerge?  
 
To assess this, it is crucial to address how these appeals are received and responded to 
in the context of the historically, unevenly developed economy. As such, we have to 
consider this with regard to the formation of economic aesthetics, and thus not only 
consider its institutional specificities and cultural constructions, but also its 
contradictions, contingencies and forms of resistance. Without positive answers to 
these questions in chapter 5, it seems unlikely that a partly financialised pension 
system can be accepted as legitimate. The consequence may very well be its popular 
contestation. In turn, this could point to the limits of financialisation in the Swedish 
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 economy, that a finance-led growth regime is not viable in Sweden. Its democratic 
regulation would be impossible. The finance-led accumulation strategies, which have 
promoted the pension system, in particular, and financialisation, in general, would lose 
its credibility. A new crisis would emerge. These are crucial questions to be posed and 
answered if we are to grasp the contingencies, complexities and contradictions of 
financialisation. The financialisation literature has, as I have shown above, yet to 
seriously account for these. These questions can, however, only be answered through a 
historical analysis of the foundations for the financialisation of the Swedish economy 
and economic aesthetics therein. 
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 Chapter 4 – Neoliberal Restructuring, Financialisation and the Swedish Pension 
Reform 
 
I Introduction 
The conceptual framework developed in chapters 2 and 3 allows for the consideration 
of macro- and micro-processes in the context of financialisation. By thus taking the 
microfoundations of this set of processes seriously, it is possible to grasp the 
tendencies and countertendencies in, and the stability or fragility of, financialisation. 
This is so because financialisation relies upon the formation of economic aesthetics, 
which are capable of supporting such a development. As such, it depends upon the 
complex formation of particular subjectivities at the busy crossroads of accumulation 
strategies and societal paradigms in a variegated capitalist development. Thus, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, it seeks to understand how and to what degree 
financialising meanings and practices are embedded in the variegated economy, 
consciously and unconsciously, because such constructions need to overcome 
potentially resistant logics in the Swedish economy. Yet, as was also argued in the 
previous chapter, processes of financialisation must not merely overcome conflicting 
logics; they build and draw upon such logics and processes, which may thus very well 
be intended to counter such a development in the first place. Out of the traumas and 
desires, which transpire from variegated capitalism, financialisation may, however 
fragile, establish itself in the economy. To understand its potential to do so, an analysis 
of variegated capitalist development in the Swedish economy over time is required. 
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 Nevertheless, to provide a thorough, in-depth analysis of such a complex history in this 
one chapter is, of course, an insurmountable challenge. The following analysis is thus 
at best selective, inevitably biased and unmistakably incomplete. However, I will 
present a historical narrative including key developments in the formation of Swedish 
capitalism leading up to the second face of the design of the Swedish pension reform 
starting in 1991. It will consistently be related to processes of subject-formation in 
daily life, as contextualised by and shaped in the 20th Century Swedish economy. 
Particular attention will be paid to the strugglesome formation, the unfolding and the 
crises of accumulation strategies, societal paradigms, modes of regulation and 
transnational developments. In particular, it will consider the emergence of norms, 
meanings and practices in relation to forming (tendential) institutional hierarchies 
within the economy and the discursive construction of the compatibility of these 
institutional matrices. In the Swedish context, as I will show, pensions inevitably play 
a key role to these processes. The theorisation of subject-formation, developed in 
chapter 3, will thus be incorporated into the Regulationist SSIP approach 
conceptualised, in chapter 2. 
 
This historical account has a rather natural starting point in the formation of Swedish 
Fordism during the interwar period and immediately following the 2nd World War. 
Without the formation of Swedish Fordism, capitalist modernity could not intensify 
and consumption could not become interpreted in daily life as the bearer of 
emancipatory potential. As such, this is a crucial period to understand both 
developments in the economy and subsequent processes of subject-formation.  
Secondly, a protruding milestone in the regulation of Swedish Fordism was the 
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 introduction of the ATP pension system in 1958, which promised continued 
consumption in retirement. Thirdly, the analysis of the multi-phased and multi-
dimensional crisis of Swedish Fordism will be commenced in the third section. Three 
stages can be differentiated here. The first crisis unfolded in the late 1960s and early 
1970s as critical discourses were constructed, primarily as intra-paradigmatic 
challenges to social democratic Swedish Fordism, with the radicalisation of labour. 
These were followed by a reactionary contra-paradigmatic challenge from the “New 
Right” in the 1970s and early 1980s in relation to the LO-SAP project of 
democratising the economy. However, a substantial first phase of neoliberal 
restructuring in the Swedish economy was carried out by the ‘third way’ SAP in the 
1980s. The foundations of a finance-led economy were thereby being constructed. 
However, the incomplete nature of these processes generated a major crisis of 
legitimacy for the labour movement, contributing to the recession in the early 1990s 
under neoliberal rule. Nevertheless, during this period, the general design of the new 
‘third way’ risk-privatising pension system was formulated. Discussions of the ensuing 
turn of the SAP to “compensatory neoliberalism”, and the period of fragile 
stabilisation in the 1990s (Ryner 2002), set the stage for the analysis of the third crisis 
in relation to the new pension system in chapter 5. I will conclude by pointing to the 
combination of processes that led to this moment, many of which emerged out of the 
inherent contradictions of Swedish Fordism. This will, in turn, enable the assessment 
of the new pension system’s ability to regulate the emerging finance-led economy in 
the next chapter. 
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 II The Formation of Swedish Fordism 
The struggle for a universalist and decommodifying defined benefit pension system in 
post-war Sweden was one of the formative moments of Swedish Fordism, and key to 
the securing of stability in the economy. In the terms of the Regulationist-SSIP 
approach developed in chapters 2 and 3, the resulting ATP  Pension system is 
understood as fundamental to generating institutional compatibility within the Swedish 
Fordist economy. As such, it is here conceived as positioned at the top of its 
institutional hierarchy. However, the formation of Swedish Fordism was not the 
product of an already hegemonic labour movement (cf. e.g. Esping-Andersen 1985), 
but rather a trial-and-error process, to which the labour movement contributed 
strongly, not least the umbrella organisation of the Swedish trade unions 
(Landsorganisationen)(LO) (e.g. Stråth 1998: ch. 1). The ATP pension system, 
decided upon in 1958, stipulated to reward loyal and diligent labour, whilst enabling 
sustained consumption in retirement, as part of Swedish social citizenship. Thus, the 
labour movement’s formulation of the ATP pension system was crucial to the shaping 
of a hegemonic accumulation strategy complemented by a hegemonic societal 
paradigm. This cannot be understood without reference to the rise of solidaristic State-
led Fordism in Sweden, rapid post-war industrialisation and the emergence of mass 
consumption. This I turn to next.  
 
(a) The Origins of Swedish Capitalist Modernity 
In the 19th Century (and still in the beginning of the 20th Century), Sweden was 
characterised by “a triangular power struggle” between the king, the gentry and the 
people (folk) (Stråth 2004: 6). The king prevailed on the grounds of a nationalist 
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 “popular royalism”, by mobilising the large freeholder peasantry and the urban middle 
classes against the gentry and around the external threat of Russia (ibid.). The result 
was the strong State, which was instrumental to the brutal transformation of agrarian 
societies, which was implied by the first wave of rapid industrialisation starting in the 
1880s, led by iron ore mining and timber logging for export to the British empire. This 
process also resulted in the emergence of the labour movement along with the 
revivalist and the temperance movement, collectively known as the ‘People’s 
Movements’ (Folkrörelserna) (Ryner 2002: 58). These movements, resting in no small 
part on Scandinavian Lutheranism, can be seen as critical to Swedish modernity and 
formative of a whole host of different tendencies in Swedish society (ibid.: 11-12). 
These included the attribution of great importance to education, thrift, diligence 
(particularly relating to work) in daily life and individuality in terms of emotional life 
and experiences (rather than individualism), co-existing with a deep respect for 
political hierarchies and social order. Combined with turn-of-the-century progressive 
social liberalism and middle class concerns, it “was full of contradictions between rural 
and urban interests, as well as between Christian puritanistic and dogmatic moralism 
and atheistic value relativism” (Stråth 2004: 12). 
 
This is the context through which the growing labour movement’s multifaceted 
concerns and struggles were formulated. These were coordinated by the growing trade 
unions, but could not be meaningfully politically processed until Suffrage was 
extended to the whole of the working class by the king in the midst of fears of 
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 revolution in 1917 (Ryner 2002: 65).37 The initially rather radical Social Democratic 
Party (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet) (SAP) emerged out of the labour 
movement and in a complex manner channelled their concerns and struggles.38 
Swedish conservatives had at the turn of the Century built a unifying socio-political 
strategy of ‘national socialism’ around the notion of ‘the People’s Home’ 
(Folkhemmet). This was strategically posited against intensifying class-struggles and 
the surging SAP as well as in consideration of the strong and potentially revolting 
Swedish peasantry. This strategy drew upon the notion of folk to mean the organisation 
of society as a family, afforded with responsibilities to uphold national welfare and 
security (Stråth 2004: 7-8). Thus, it stood in some contrast to the non-authoritarian 
socialist understanding of Germans Mosse and Landauer of the notion of volk meaning 
“a democratic community of equals”, which could be argued to catch the dominant 
sentiment in Sweden at the time and arguably subsequently (ibid.: 7).39  
 
In the 1930s, the SAP dropped its radical socialist agenda and accepted the liberal-
democratic State, inspired by the 2nd International. Through discursive struggle, in 
which the Conservative Party (Högerpartiet) was accused of advocating a “fortified 
poor-house”, the Social Democrats appropriated and reconstructed the notion of the 
‘People’s Home’, drawing on Mosse and Landauer, to imply the securing of the 
happiness, in a more inclusive manner, of the lower classes, “of which the working 
class was just one part” (Stråth 2004: 8). If nothing else, this was due to the limited 
37 Suffrage was limited to ‘the three estates’ prior to the “Enclosure Movement” in the 19th Century, 
through which the peasantry attained voting rights as these were based on the ownership of land. Yet, of 
course, suffrage was a male exclusivity. 1917 signified the extension of the right to vote also to women. 
38 Yet, a significant urban working class did not emerge until after the 2nd World War with the rise of 
advanced technology manufacturing. See the below critique of Korpi’s ‘power mobilisation theory’. 
39 The particular national socialism of these Swedish social conservatives should be seen as different 
from the Nazi interpretation of völkisch (Stråth 2004: 7-8). 
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 size of the working class, the ‘logical supporter of Social Democracy’, and the 
continued numerical domination of the freeholder peasantry. However, this came with 
the duty of contributing to the building of the folkhem. Thus, “[f]olk and folkhem as 
expressions of traditional values were mobilized” (ibid.) and reconstructed so as to 
support a social democratic project of battling poverty, or “poor Sweden” 
(Fattigsverige), and promoting inclusive democracy. As such, it is conceivable that it 
functioned as a Sorelian ‘social myth’ by providing a collective meaning to bridge 
present practices with future utopia (Laclau 1990: 231). 
 
The social democratic myth of folkhem sought to construct an inclusive sense of 
belonging - a collective identity of the large majority of Swedish society around “more 
universal conceptions of fairness” (Ryner 2002: 66) and democracy. This was 
strengthened further during the 2nd World War under the ‘father-like’ leadership of 
Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson (Stråth 1998: 17). Yet, this would not have been 
possible without the support from the large Agrarian Party (Landsbygdspartiet) 
(although a cross-block coalitional government was formed during the War). Through 
the 1933 so-called “Cow Deal”, the SAP secured the support from the Agrarian Party 
for their social and economic policies. The SAP, by withdrawing their support for the 
free trade in agricultural products for the purpose of food security, thus attained a 
coalitional ally in the Agrarian Party. However, this deal also involved the very active 
involvement of LO and the employers’ organisation SAF (Svenska 
Arbetsgivareföreningen), as we will see further below.  
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 (b) The Work Principle and Solidaristic Wage-Policy 
Supported by the Agrarian Party, the SAP came to power in 1932, at the height of the 
1930s depression, and held office until 1976. The SAP took office on a socialist reform 
agenda, in which substantial welfare legislation featured prominently. In the inter-war 
period, it sought to replace the liberal principle of ‘help to self-help’, as part of the 
overall liberal separation of public and private, economy and politics, which had 
characterised welfare programmes in the early 20th Century, with a more generous and 
universalist system. However, at the core of their politics, at this point, was ‘the 
principle of work’, which, given the dominance of the ‘male breadwinner model’, was 
highly gendered (Jenson and Mahon 1993). This principle was primarily expressed in a 
commitment to ensure employment through an active labour market policy40, but 
decommodifying policies such as increasing unemployment benefits and expanding 
the eligibility to and coverage of the People’s Pension system (Folkpensionen) were 
also introduced. Established in 1913 largely as a result of the middle classes’ concern 
with the securing of income and standard of living (Stråth 1998: 18), the People’s 
Pension had two components: one almost universal, but extremely limited, insurance-
based pension and another means-tested pension, which did not meaningfully relieve 
poverty (Lundberg and Åmark 2001: 158). Sweden was the first country to introduce a 
(nearly) universal pension system. Moreover, a new family policy, containing gender 
emancipatory elements for the purpose of raising the birth rate, was also introduced. 
(ibid.: 157-164). 
 
40 As Åmark points out, labour market policies had existed during liberal rule too, however, these were 
means-tested and involved harsh policies of ‘relief work’ requiring the unemployed to take up work far 
from their families under rather ascetic conditions (1993: ch. 5). 
 158 
                                                 
 The objective was two-fold. In the first instance, the depression had increased 
unemployment rates considerably, as demand for Swedish products both domestically 
and internationally sunk drastically. In the absence of substantial welfare provision, 
therefore, poverty was spreading rapidly. Hence, a commitment to employment at this 
particular juncture was understood as critical to alleviate poverty. In the second 
instance, the battle against poverty had a more principled background: to establish 
citizens’ rights to a dignified life freed from poverty and the stigmatised ‘poor relief’. 
Although significant differences existed between the political parties, the Social 
democratic project generally succeeded in bridging these objectives through the 
Swedish parliamentarian tradition of consensus and compromise (ibid.: 160). Stråth 
puts this eloquently: “[t]here was a communicative proximity between the various 
political factions, who all spoke for modernity, and a high degree of continuity in the 
emphasis of the role of the state” (2003: 480). Thus, although the People’s Home came 
to be largely embraced by all political parties as they all had an affinity to it, it could 
be argued to have given a particularly strong “direction and cohesion to the labour 
movement, [enabling] it to project its political concepts beyond itself to…civil society 
at large” (Ryner 2002: 66).  
 
In accordance with Myrdal’s idea of ‘productive social policy’, and in contrast to the 
liberal understanding of social policy as ‘a cost’, the social democrats conceived of 
social policy as a progressive investment. As such, social democratic politics did not 
separate the economic from the political. Indeed, bolstering socio-economic security 
was intended to increase the Swedish economy’s productivity (Andersson 2001: 12-
15). By combining a commitment to employment, welfare and growth, the SAP 
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 formulated an accumulation strategy, which sought compatibility with a socio-political 
project based primarily on increased wealth and ability to consume. 
 
Nevertheless, the story so far ignores capital-labour relations to a problematic degree 
and from this point on these relations become increasingly important to developments, 
as capitalism becomes deeply embedded in the Swedish economy. Much literature, 
particularly that which draws upon the ‘power-mobilisation thesis’ (e.g.; Korpi 1978, 
1983; Stephens 1979; Esping-Andersen 1985), tends to make a direct link between the 
supposed material interests of the different actors in the formation of Swedish 
Fordism. Problematically, this highly materialist approach understands the social 
democratic working class as a rational actor, having a pre-given “identity, interest and 
ideology” (Ryner 2002: 60) derived from its “essential location in the social relations 
of production” (ibid.: 59). Of course, Stuart Hall has effectively demonstrated that the 
relationship between consciousness and material practice can neither be derived from 
such a location nor be causally assumed (1988, 1996). This in turn results in the 
reading of the growth of the Swedish universalist and de-commodifying welfare state 
as a ‘natural’ objective and outcome of the politics of the labour movement. It also 
leads to the assumption that the SAP was its natural ally in government, sharing both 
interests and conditions of action. This, as Ryner points out, ignores, in the former 
case, the potentially pacifying impact of de-commodification on the labour movement, 
and, in the latter case, the ‘imperative’ in power  
to sustain capital accumulation through a coherent mode of socio-economic regulation. The 
tension between accumulation and legitimation imperatives renders the relationship between 
social democratic state policy and labour representation much more complex and 
contradictory than power-mobilisation theory suggests (referring to Pontusson 1984 in Ryner 
2002: 60).  
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 To this should be added two points. Firstly, as Stråth argues, the SAP to a large extent 
was engaged in a difficult and prolonged process of problem-solving and compromise, 
having only been in a parliamentary majority position once (1968) during the 1932-
1976 period (1998: 22-3). SAP politics, to a very large degree, was about expanding its 
electoral base through compromise and new inclusive politics of representation. This 
also involved taking advantage of particular moments in party politics to secure greater 
electoral support, which could be against its normal commitment to unity and 
solidarity between different social forces. Secondly, as Swenson argues (2002), the LO 
and the SAF developed a close working relationship to ensure a smooth running of the 
labour market and income developments. This frequently expressed itself in political 
moves, which would seem counterintuitive to a ‘power-mobilisation theorist’. 
However, the relationship between the LO and SAF should not, in contrast to 
Swenson, be understood in terms of a ‘cross-class alliance’ but class compromise 
(Howell 2002: 25fn. 41).  
 
Whilst employers, organised in the SAF, had been highly sceptical and indeed 
oppositional to the rise of the SAP and its policies, their approach started changing 
with the SAP’s acceptance of the liberal democratic State, and, counterintuitively from 
a resource-mobilisation perspective, the latter’s increasing commitment to ‘solidaristic 
wage-setting’. This principle had become central to the LO through the famous 1925 
‘Skromberga Bakers’ conflict (see Swenson 2002: 108). Wage differentials between 
the relatively high-paid sheltered, domestic sectors (e.g. food production and 
construction) and the low-paid export sectors (e.g. mining, steel, timber and paper 
pulp) had become understood as constituting a structural weakness in the wage-
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 negotiations of LO. Shortly afterwards, the SAP government’s Gustaf Möller 
reinforced the message by criticising the striking sectors’ “crass selfishness and guild 
mentality” (ibid.). Thus, both the LO and SAP sought to destroy the old pre-
industrialisation social structures and institutions and replace them with solidaristic 
wages and centralised wage-bargaining. To the LO, from then on centralising wage-
bargaining and the adoption of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ became 
critical guiding torches.  
 
Similarly, the subsequent 1933 Cow Deal had first and foremost sought to alleviate the 
poverty-striking depression through a massive labour market programme, but it also 
involved overcoming the builders’ union’s relatively speaking excessive wage-
demands. The crisis programme implied the creation of a very large number of jobs 
through the contracting out of construction contracts worth around 100 million 
Swedish Crowns as well as spending significant sums on the creation of ‘emergency’ 
and ‘reserve’ jobs. However, as these new jobs, however menial, would be paid for at 
union wages, this would reinforce the wage differentials between the ‘greedy’ building 
workers and workers in other sectors, particularly those in the export-oriented sectors. 
This would thus further undermine LO’s ability to ensure solidaristic wages through 
centralised wage-bargaining. LO’s interest in renegotiating new wage agreements in 
the building sector was thus tangible, and its irritation over SAP initiatives in the 
labour market rife. The Building Industry Association (Byggnadsindustriförbundet) 
also feared the crisis programme as it would effectively prevent the use of the labour 
market weapon of lockouts as the substantial funding would undermine the loyalty of 
some contractors. In addition, the crisis programme would also cause rampant inter-
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 sectoral competition over workers and hence increased wages. This would in turn 
weaken SAF’s ability to employ multi-sectoral lockouts to discipline workers across 
the labour market. Employers warned that the implementation of the programme 
would increase unemployment rather than lower it as rising wages would reduce the 
competitiveness of the export-sectors.  
 
However, as the SAP government assured, if LO and SAF could not agree upon a 
labour market solution to this problem, arbitration legislation would settle the 
programme to their disadvantage (ibid.: 109-111). Indeed, LO’s and SAF’s interests 
corresponded at this juncture, as indicated by SAF’s executive director Gustaf 
Söderlund’s official response to the government: the programme would “cause private 
industry increased difficulties in their efforts to bring about the necessary levelling of 
the different wages” (ibid.: 112). Ensuring SAP’s consideration of these concerns was 
the Agrarian Party’s conditional support. Yet, given the strong sense of social 
liberalism among employers, this statement should not be understood as indicative of 
the forging of a “class alliance”, as enforced by circumstances beyond the SAP’s reach 
(cf. ibid.). Instead, through the Cow Deal SAF, LO and the SAP enhanced their 
communication, which in turn enabled this interwar class compromise, which in itself 
was not such a major move by the different actors involved (Stråth 2003: 480). 
 
(c) The Role of Swedish Capital 
The emerging dominance of the SAP and its still tendentially radical economic and 
social policies were however not popular among leading Swedish capitalists. The first 
wave of industrialisation in Sweden had been largely financed by “a handful of 
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 relatively discrete ‘spheres’ through investment banks/holding companies, through 
cross-ownership, and cross-membership of management and executive boards”. These 
were controlled by 15 dynastic families emerging out of trading houses mediating the 
Swedish commodity trade in the mid-19th Century (Ryner 2002: 70). Their substantial 
banking activities had resulted in the accumulation of significant funds through 
capitalising on interest differentials between foreign and Swedish credit. Through the 
absorption of shares in the 1921-22 recession as well as during the so-called 1931 
‘Krüger crash’, these financial spheres had acquired large equity posts, which turned 
out profitable in a low-interest rate environment in the 1930s.  
 
As the SAP government sought to clamp down on risky shareholding following the 
1931 crash, the financial spheres created family-managed holding companies in order 
to retain their equity investments and influence over large parts of the Swedish 
economy. Counterintuitively in a heavily regulated environment, these spheres were 
allowed to retain an absolute discretion over investment decisions in the Swedish 
economy (Ryner 2002: 70-71). As Steinmo shows, the taxation of Swedish capital 
favoured large and profitable corporations, while punishing smaller and unprofitable 
corporations (1993). The structure of the Swedish economy and the structure of 
Swedish capital were largely mutually complementary during the heyday of Swedish 
Fordism. However, as I will show further below, once this equilibrium was unsettled, 
not least discursively, Swedish Fordism was becoming undermined. 
 
Four financial spheres were particularly significant to this ‘equilibrium’. The 
Wallenberg sphere, governing the Stockholms Enskilda Bank/Investor (SEB), was 
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 considerably larger in managed capital than the smaller Skandinaviska/Custos sphere, 
also family-run, and the smallest Handelsbanken-Industrivärden (SHB), which 
operated more like an institutional investor in the absence of tight family control 
(Ryner 2002: 71). The consumer cooperative (KF) with over half a million members 
already in 1932 and over one million members in 1952 was another large owner of 
Swedish capital (www.kf.se).  
 
The heavy regulation of capital flows under the Bretton Woods system helped to 
sustain the domestic and long-term outlook of these spheres. Yet, much of this impetus 
was derived directly from the latter’s maintaining of close relations with Swedish 
corporations in the role of ‘house-banks’ and through managerial steering, particularly 
in the case of the Wallenberg sphere (Ryner 2002: 221-222fn. 13). As such, Zysman’s 
‘culturally inflected’ understanding of a bank-mediated economy as tending towards a 
convergence between the consciousness of creditors and industrialists is applicable to 
understanding the Swedish economy, particularly during the formative decades of 
Swedish Fordism. Ryner argues that the Swedish bank-, or rather sphere-, mediated 
economic system provided the centralised conditions for “a more long-term view in 
finance and investment decisions, with particular emphasis on the prospects of the 
development of the productive (Fordist) system” (Ryner 2002: 71). Nevertheless, the 
interests of these financial spheres should not necessarily be understood as 
synonymous with that of SAF, although SAF’s members were to a very large extent 
owned and to some extent steered by the spheres. It is thus possible to distinguish 
between the existence of a tendential accumulation strategy of SAF, as it was 
disciplined, but also potentially taken over by the financial spheres, and a more long-
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 term accumulation strategy of the latter. SAF’s running accumulation strategy was not 
based on the mobilisation of “an ideology of ‘national popular leadership’”, but rather 
to seek to “influence policy by providing ‘technical advice’ through participation in 
public commissions, tripartite boards, and through the creation and financing of 
research institutes” (Ryner 2002: 70). With regards to the financial spheres, as long as 
the overall arrangement was profitable, they accepted LO’s solidaristic wage policy 
and approved of SAF’s adoption of centralised wage-bargaining (ibid.). As I will 
demonstrate later in this chapter, this could also explain their approval of SAP’s policy 
of corporate taxation and their later policy of radical economic restructuring. 
 
Yet, at the time of the 1936 elections, the dominant Wallenberg sphere had not seen 
the full potential of this emerging economic model and was unsympathetic to the re-
election of the SAP government. The SAP victory in these elections marked a 
significant strengthening of the party. Yet, the critical standpoint of the Wallenberg 
sphere was relaxed and Swedish Fordism took a great leap forward with the conclusion 
of a drawn-out negotiation between LO and SAF resulting in the 1938 Saltsjöbaden 
Agreement (Huvudavtalet) (Ryner 2002: 72). The negotiation processes sought forms 
of regulation of continuing hostilities on the labour market. In particular, this 
negotiation should be understood against the background of over a decade of tough 
labour market conflict and vanishing trust between workers and employers, reaching 
an early peak with the 1931 tragedy at Ådalen where hostilities had resulted in the 
calling in of the military to quash a minor labour revolt with several deaths as a 
consequence (Johansson 2001). However, the SAP’s role in this process was limited to 
pushing for legislative action with this regard. Both SAF and LO were keen on 
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 avoiding legislation as this would threaten to cement hostilities rather than appease 
them, hence undermining both the antagonists’ main weapons in bargaining. The 
agreement reinforced the employers’ absolute right to manage the workplace with a 
minor concession with regards to the process of firing workers (Swenson 2002: 113). 
Moreover, albeit gradually, the aggressive employment of labour market weapons such 
as strikes and lock-outs were reduced. More fundamentally, the agreement served 
considerably to strengthen the working relations between SAF and LO, and render the 
negotiating road the preferred one over legislation. 
 
Emerging out of this relative cease-fire on the labour market, the SAP’s increasing 
understanding of its potential role in relation to the economy and capital’s acceptance 
of the nascent State-‘sponsored’ tripartism was a “discourse of ‘rationalisation’”, 
which implied the “transition from stagnant firms and sectors to expanding and 
dynamic ones” (Ryner 2002: 137). This offset potential antagonisms not only between 
the different actors in the management of the economy in the 1950s and 1960s (Ryner 
2002: 73), but tendentially also between different social groups included in and 
benefiting from Swedish Fordism. This ‘interpellative hegemony’ (Laclau 1977) 
should however not be overstated, as it was relying upon the centralised management 
of multiple demarcation lines related to social ordering and mobility (Stråth 2004: 16) 
in the context of a highly significant contrast in the experience of the problems of the 
crisis years of the 1930s to that of the strong growth and full employment following 
the 2nd World War (Stråth 1998: 21). 
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 (d) Swedish ‘Disarticulated’ Fordism  
The stimulation of demand for Swedish commodities in the post-war period, under the 
Bretton Woods-system of “embedded liberalism” and US credit for European 
reconstruction, resulted in a second wave of rapid industrialisation in the Swedish 
economy. Swedish Fordism emerged out of the product and process innovation, as 
well as expanding scales of production, in the timber and iron industries flourishing in 
the late 19th Century (Edquist and Lundvall in Ryner 2002: 69). The outcome was that 
manufacturing overtook both the production of semi-processed goods (steel, pulp and 
paper) and raw materials (iron ore and timber) in Swedish exports. The engineering 
input industry (Asea, Ericson, AGA), the production of electrical-engineering and 
mechanical-engineering goods (SKF, Sandvik, Atlas-Copco, Boliden), shipping 
(Kockums, Götaverken) and the agricultural processing industry (Alfa-Laval, Tetra-
Pak) led this development, yet the Swedish second wave of industrialisation also 
involved diversification through the emergence of industries in consumer durables like 
automobiles/trucks (Volvo, SAAB, Scania) and household equipment (Electrolux, 
IKEA). The defence, telecommunication and pharmaceutical industries later developed 
into important industries as well (Ryner 2002: 69).  
 
This generated enormous growth, even in relation to the leader of the world economy. 
In fact, as Swenson points out, from 1950 to 1973 Sweden consistently closed the 
productivity gap with the United States, and out of the few countries (also Norway and 
Switzerland) that succeeded with this feat Sweden did so at the highest rate (2002: 
136). The application of Fordist-Taylorist norms of mass production enabled 
increasing productivity through intensified exploitation and expanding scales of 
 168 
 production. Such productivity growth made Swedish industry potentially 
internationally competitive and enabled full employment.  
 
Although, the domestic economy grew in significance and provided an important base, 
in terms of production, consumption and investment during the 1950s and 1960s, 
foreign markets remained critical to these industries. Equally, as we shall see further 
below, goods for mass consumption were primarily imported (Erixon 1997). Indeed, 
“Swedish mass production and consumption was mediated by the world market” 
(Ryner 2002: 69).  
 
Yet, despite diversification, the Swedish economy never developed an encompassing 
productive system, which made the exporting industries crucial to the balancing of the 
economy’s external accounts by earning foreign exchange (Mjöset 1987: 410). Thus, 
the exposure to foreign demand was high, which in turn potentially put the economy in 
a relationship of dependency upon world markets. According to dependency theorist 
Amin, however, this situation in the core need not result in dependency, in contrast to 
peripheral economies; ‘disarticulated Fordism’ was possible given certain regulatory 
moves. As Ryner shows, tendencies of overproduction and underconsumption had to 
be regulated through the stimulation of “domestic consumption in a manner which 
simultaneously counteracts the tendency of the organic composition of capital to 
increase”. Hence, the growth in productivity and consumption had to be made 
synchronous (Ryner 2002: 68). Through the development of a highly innovative 
macro-economic model, the Swedish labour movement successfully ensured this 
synchronicity.  
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This model, which can be positioned in between Keynesianism and Monetarism 
(Erixon 200: 1), was developed by two LO economists, Gösta Rehn and Rudolf 
Meidner, and became official LO policy in 1951.41 Crudely put, their model can be 
characterised as a recommendation of a fairly strict financial policy over business 
cycles in the medium-term, but broke with the expansionary policies of Keynesianism, 
as they argued for the use of deflationary policies as opposed to the inflationary 
policies of Keynesianism (Erixon 2002: 4). Moreover,  this was combined with a 
selective labour market policy, which would enable intersectoral labour mobility and 
full employment in times of recession (Ibid.: 8). Yet, they argued for a strictly 
solidaristic wage policy through central wage-bargaining in combination with taxes on 
corporate profits in order to avoid wage drift (Martin 1984: 205-8). This sped up the 
structural transformation of the economy in favour of firms that could be 
internationally competitive whilst paying for ‘solidaristic’ wages in firms in the less 
competitive, sheltered industries and the public sector. However, the navigation 
between the Scylla of unemployment and the Charybdis of wage drift required 
considerable capacities of counter-cyclical management, and powers over exchange- 
and interest-rate setting. Hence, the Rehn-Meidner model depended on strict capital 
controls domestically, as well as internationally, as facilitated by the Bretton Woods 
system (Ryner, 2002: 82-91, 95-98). As such, the model sought to “combine full 
employment and growth with price stability and equity through the use of extensive 
selective employment programs, a tight fiscal policy and a wage policy of solidarity” 
(Erixon 2000: 1). 
41 This model originates from the work of economist Knut Wicksell of the Stockholm School, which 
included both Gunnar Myrdal and Bertil Ohlin (see Ryner 2002: 75-6). Nevertheless, these were 
modified in the Rehn-Meidner model. 
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The adoption of the model in 1955 enabled the SAP government to actively integrate 
Myrdal’s ideas of combining productivity growth with socio-economic security in the 
resolution of these tensions.42 At this juncture, LO’s powerful politico-economic ideas 
were constructed by the SAP government seeking to impart Swedish political life with 
a reformist paradigm “at once pragmatic and ideological, adaptable and moralistic” 
(Heclo and Madsen 1987: 27). The SAP positioned itself at its centre with LO’s 
constituents as its primary electoral base, but stretching out to the middle classes. 
Thus, “[t]he labour movement had found a paradigm that allowed it to ensure that its 
internal terms of legitimacy corresponded to the terms of capital accumulation and the 
historic compromise” with capital (Ryner 2002: 84). This paradigmatic shift also 
provides the backdrop to the introduction of increasing welfare provisions in the 1950s 
and particularly the ATP pension system in 1958. 
 
III The Swedish Welfare State, the ATP Pension Reform and Mass Consumption 
Welfare reform had been on top of the SAP agenda since their 1936 electoral victory. 
A struggle between SAP minister Gustav Möller, on the one hand, and the Social 
Welfare Committee and LO, on the other hand, over the basic principle of social 
insurance had extended over 15 years between 1937 and 1951. Möller, supported by 
the SAP, advocated flat-rate benefits while the Committee had stubbornly argued for 
benefits being linked to income in order to “uphold the standard of living as far as 
possible” (in Lundberg and Åmark 2001: 165). The LO agreed with the latter in order 
to uphold its principle of ‘equal work, equal wage’. Former LO representative Gunnar 
42 However, the SAP policy application of the Rehn-Meidner model should not be overstated (Erixon 
2000: 4). 
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 Sträng replaced Möller in 1951 and immediately embarked on coordinating a system 
of sickness, work accident and unemployment insurance on the grounds of the 
principle of income security, which also made social insurance interesting to white-
collar workers. Following an unproblematic legislative process, all social insurance 
systems in Sweden thus became subject to the principle of income security in the first 
half of the 1950s (Lundberg and Åmark 2001: 165-168). A de-commodifying welfare 
system (Esping-Andersen 1985), which was capable of sustaining consumption levels 
throughout life without a strong reliance upon cyclical market performance, was in the 
making.  
 
Yet, for substantial de-commodification to be achieved and mass consumption 
sustained under these high-growth conditions, two immediate objectives had to be met: 
full employment over the business cycle and high income replacing pensions. 
Reaching the objective of full employment was facilitated by the creation of a 
manpower policy and a labour market board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen) in 1948. In 
1957, this was expanded upon in order to alleviate cyclical unemployment (Martin 
1984: 217; Pontusson 1992: 64-5). The expansion of the labour market policy 
(additional funding given to Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen) did not become politically 
controversial as it was made prior to an expected minor recession in 1956-1957 and 
was expected to be partly reduced once the recession had passed.  
 
With regards to pensions, the 1944 reform of the “People’s Pension” was still made on 
the grounds of Möllerian universalism. A flat-rate system replaced the average 
industrial worker’s wage by about 20% in retirement. This was sufficient, according to 
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 Palme, to survive on, without having to rely upon poor relief (1990). However, it 
hardly sustained consumption in the booming 1950s and 1960s. Although this 
constituted a considerable improvement to blue-collar workers and farmers, white-
collar workers frequently already had pension schemes, albeit limited, provided by 
their employers. Indeed, LO disagreed not only with the universalism of the reformed 
scheme, but with the continued inequalities in retirement income between blue-collar 
and white-collar workers as well as between workers in the export-oriented and the 
sheltered industries. Company pensions were not provided by a majority of SAF’s 
member firms to blue-collar workers, whilst the larger ones provided meagre pensions. 
In fact, there had been a veritable freeze on these pensions among SAF members, as a 
means to avoid competition for labour on the grounds of pensions (Swenson 2002: 
283-4). Thus, pensions were both low and of varying levels among blue-collar 
workers. Despite the 1944 reform, the SAP had right away motioned to put together a 
commission to look into the pension issue. The resulting 1950 report proposed the 
legislative introduction of obligatory supplementary pensions accumulated in pension 
funds (Stråth 1998: 35).  
 
The 1951 LO congress supported this idea and set up a LO committee to study 
possible designs of a supplementary system and political strategies of its 
implementation (Stråth 1998: 32). While there was a near consensus in the committee 
on the design of the supplementary system, there were significant disagreements over 
whether to seek a legislative solution or a bargain with SAF to the issue. Also SAF 
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 was divided on the issue (ibid.: 33; Swenson 2002: 284-290). Like the centre-right 
parties, SAF was critical of the funding form of the pensions (ibid.: 285).43  
 
Despite the ambivalence of the labour market forces, supplementary pensions became 
an issue of highest strategic importance to Swedish politics. Neither the contours nor 
the supposed functionality of a policy model resembling the Rehn-Meidner model had 
been popularly established, so the field still laid open for struggle over the general 
direction of economic development. This struggle resulted in a referendum, a 
government break-down, the securing of an unrivalled degree of de-commodification 
and finally the deep empowerment of the labour movement as a whole at the expense 
of the Right. The political centre-right had since the 1948 elections been on the rise. 
The liberal People’s Party’s (Folkpartiet) had received around 20% of the vote in 
1948, 1952 and 1956, while the Conservative Party had risen from the low 12.3% vote 
in the 1948 elections to 14.4% in 1952 and 17.1% in 1956.  
 
As Stråth argues, the Conservative Party’s rise could be explained with reference to a 
new leadership propagating a liberal conservatism, as opposed to the social 
conservatism discussed earlier in this chapter (1998: 40). It put the individual citizen’s 
opportunities to ‘become his own’ and to more freely consume the fruits of her or his 
labour in the spotlight. Advocated was an ‘owner democracy’ populated by household 
shareholders (Folkhemskapitalism), which was described as democracy in daily life, a 
society characterised by team spirit, individual freedom and responsibility (Ljunggren 
43 Much of SAF had already conceded that legislation on supplementary pensions was going to be 
brought through the Riksdag. In fact, obligatory and substantial pensions would even out pension 
contributions and hence increase labour mobility in the economy, which SAF had sought since the 
1930s (Swenson 2002: 288-289).  
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 1992: 126). Although both State and society, here understood as the big corporations, 
should take a step back, the State was granted a significant role in the economy. The 
new conservative leadership saw the State as an important guarantor of basic social 
welfare, of full employment, as ultimately responsible for the functioning of the 
market and progress. Yet, importantly, welfare policies should be promoted as paid for 
by the citizen, not as a benefit from the State ‘above’ (ibid.: 129-131). Drawing upon 
particular emotional and identity structures in the notion of the People’s Home, like 
thrift, diligence, ownership and locality, the new Conservative Party thus adopted a 
socio-political strategy seeking to establish a political space adjacent to social 
democracy to which voters could move, rather than a wall over which they would 
struggle to climb (Stråth 1998: 40-41).44  
 
Due to the potential of this socio-political strategy and the electoral progress already 
made by the centre-right, the social democrats were careful in their formulation of a 
strategy over the issue of supplementary pensions. Indeed, the rising Right had 
targeted the Social Democratic dominance over the State as an obstacle to the 
opportunities of the people to express their free will (Stråth 1998: 43). In recognition 
of this threatening discourse, the SAP accepted the centre-right’s idea of a 
constitutional amendment stating the right of a minority opposition to call for a 
referendum on particular pieces of legislation. While the centre-right wanted such 
referenda to be determining of legislation, the SAP government accepted only an 
advisory role for such referenda. Following the first referendum in 1955, on the shift to 
right-sided from left-sided traffic, which had attracted about half of the eligible voters 
44 As we will see in a later section of this chapter, this liberal conservatism is strikingly similar to the 
‘compensatory neoliberalism’ of the SAP in the 1990s. 
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 to the polls, motions were put forward by parliamentarians from the liberal People’s 
Party and the Agrarian Party for a referendum on supplementary pensions. 
 
After much politico-strategic deliberation, three different proposals were presented: 
1. SAP-LO: retaining the People’s Pension and complementing it with a large and 
obligatory PAYGO DB system, guaranteed by the State (Stråth 1998: 45-46); 
2. The Center Farmers’ Party (Centerpartiet Bondeförbundet)45: an improved 
People’s Pension and voluntary supplementary pensions based on the premium 
reserve principle; and 
3. The Conservative and People’s Parties-SAF: an improved People’s Pension 
complemented by a voluntary system of supplementary pensions, based on the 
premium reserve principle, through collective agreements (Lundberg and 
Åmark 2001: 167). 
 
Yet, the SAP-LO proposal was not only attractive to blue-collar workers. White-collar 
workers were also affected by the employers’ varying commitment to company 
pensions. With Fordist Taylorism also affecting this group of workers, its status had 
dropped rendering the distinction between blue- and white-collar workers increasingly 
hard to make (Stråth 1998: 34). The Center Farmers’ Party’s proposal sought to appeal 
to “self-employed persons, such as the farmers” (Lundberg and Åmark 2001: 167). 
The third proposal sought to play the organisation of pensions into the hands of 
employers and capitalists.  
 
45 The former Agrarian Party had changed its name prior to the referendum. 
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 A particularly divisive issue between the SAP-LO proposal, on the one hand, and the 
two centre-right proposals, on the other hand, was the issue of funding (cf. Pontusson 
1984: 14). Rehn, the LO economist, had played an active part in the formulation of the 
proposal and had advocated the accumulation of large pension funds through 
employers’ pension contributions, so-called AP-Funds (Allmänna Pensionsfonderna), 
as buffers in a future PAYGO DB system. In its initial phase, this was to function as a 
mechanism to squeeze profits and hence prevent wage-drift. The AP funds were, in 
this initial stage, also supposed to provide the credit market with investment capital for 
selected sectors and firms, and would as such contribute to the rationalisation of the 
economy (Pontusson 1984). Rehn and his co-designers feared that pensions organised 
according to the 2nd and 3rd proposals’ premium reserve principle, similar to that of the 
Chilean pension system, were going to lead to the flooding of credit markets and thus 
render the realisation of positive rates of return on pension fund-capital impossible 
(ibid.: 101fn.12). The design, in accordance with the Rehn-Meidner model, was thus 
financially restrictive in order to contain inflation (Erixon 2002: 9), while promoting 
rationalisation as well as growth (Ryner 2002: 90). In Regulationist terms, the LO-SAP 
proposal could be seen as a key element of an accumulation strategy seeking to 
strategically coordinate the crisis-prone moments of social relations within the circuit 
of capital (see chapter 2). In response to this, the propagators of the 2nd and 3rd 
proposals “warned that centralised government control of pension fund capital was a 
step on the way to socialism” (Swenson 2002: 282). Indeed, the struggle over 
supplementary pensions was a critical moment for the outcome in the struggle between 
accumulation strategies. 
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 Stråth (1998: 48) describes the mobilisation campaign within the labour movement: 
In a call every member of the labour unions were encouraged to support the SAP-LO proposal 
in the referendum, the legislative option. An intensive information drive on workplaces and in 
homes would follow, in which central union boards, union districts, local unions and members 
actively must get involved. The call was the start of a mobilisation of the labour movement 
around a political issue at a scale rarely seen before. (my transl.) 
 
The referendum, attracting 72.4% of the electorate with 3.9% polling blank, was 
inconclusive: 
• Proposal 1: 45.8% 
• Proposal 2: 21.5% 
• Proposal 3: 35.3% 
The labour movement claimed victory due to its proposal receiving the highest vote, 
while the centre-right parties claimed that in sum their proposals had received a 
majority vote. Prime Minister Erlander had, prior to the referendum, stated that if the 
first legislative proposal would receive over 40%, this was going to be considered a 
firm grounding for a formal legislative proposal to be made (Stråth 1998: 57).  
 
As a consequence of the outcome of the referendum, the start of the legislative process 
was proclaimed, which, in turn, made the Centre Farmers’ Party leave the coalition 
government and the SAP chose to form a temporary minority government. However, 
this was far from the end of the battle over supplementary pensions. Following the 
1956 elections, there was a majority in the Riksdag’s legislating second chamber 
against the legislative proposal, which was consequently voted down. The minority 
SAP government had no option but to call for new elections, in which the issue of 
supplementary pensions was bound to continue to be central. Yet, the SAP and LO’s 
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 spirits were high following the successful mobilisation of the labour movement (ibid.: 
59).  
 
The result of the elections presented the SAP together with the Communist Party 
(Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna) with a peculiar situation, not the least with regard to 
the pensions issue. The SAP and the Communist Party together had reproduced the 
same electoral outcome as in the previous elections, while the new coalition of the 
People’s Party, the Conservative Party and the Centre Party46 lost a little of their total 
vote. The SAP-Communist coalition now received 116 seats in the second chamber, 
while the centre-right coalition got 115 seats, however, in legislative votes, the Social 
Democratic Speaker of the chamber (Talmannen) may not vote. Thus, a dead heat 
could be the expected outcome of a vote. However, the SAP trump card was a People’s 
Party parliamentarian, who was also a member of LO. The parliamentarian abstained 
from voting and the SAP-LO PAYGO DB proposal was legislated. The Conservative 
party, aggrieved by the narrow loss, vowed to continue the struggle, but SAF backed 
down, turning to support the new system to the great surprise and dismay of the centre-
right parties (Swenson 2002: 282). After the SAP victory in the 1960 election, the ATP 
system was not going to be seriously challenged until the 1980s. The Right’s concept 
of owner democracy had been thoroughly delegitimised and the labour movement, as a 
whole, consolidated (Stråth 1998: 63). 
 
 
 
46 The former Centre Farmers’ Party had again changed name, in order to seek to represent a more 
white-collar clientele. 
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 (a) The Regulatory Role of the ATP Pension System 
Out of this extended struggle over supplementary pensions, the ATP pension system 
was born. ATP was financed through employers’ and self-employed contributions, and 
was initially managed by three tripartite ‘AP-funds’ (Pontusson 1984). Given a 
working life of 30 years, it was designed to reward employees with a pension roughly 
equivalent to 60 percent of their 15 highest salaried working years (the 30/15 principle) 
(Palme 2005: p. 43). The system was gradually introduced as it was built up, and the 
‘ATP-pensioners’ of 1979 were the first to receive full benefits. In addition, the 
People’s Pension brought income replacement to 65% (Swenson 2002: 281). 
Moreover, following a series of increases and streamlining of company pensions, 90% 
of wage-earners could expect a sizeable addition to these 65% (Sweden. SOU, 2005: 
54). Such a highly de-commodifying system, built on the basis of income replacement, 
was not the least attractive to the white-collar, middle classes.  
 
According to this logic, the ATP system has however been described as redistributing 
from blue-collar workers to higher income earners, but also as leaving women 
disfavoured (Kruse and Ståhlberg 1977; Ståhlberg 1990). This, however, seems to 
warrant an analysis as it would have potentially undermined the legitimacy of the LO-
SAP proposal.47 On the one hand, the 30/15 principle could be seen as 
disadvantageous to blue-collar workers, as their careers would not see great pay rises. 
On the other hand, their shorter working careers, due to frequently physically 
demanding jobs, seem to have been well catered for by the system. Still, it could 
certainly be seen as discriminatory of women, who, despite an increasingly gender-
47 However, pension systems are highly complex designs and can thus not necessarily be expected to be 
well understood in daily life. Yet, to conceive of the voters in the referendum as well as in the ensuing 
elections as uncritically internalising the messages of the campaigners is highly problematic. 
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 conscious labour movement, were frequently consigned to by the system uncredited 
household labour. Yet, the active promotion of female participation in the labour 
market as well as gender-sensitive child-rearing policies may have offset such an 
injustice, at least partly (Mahon 2007; Hoem 2005). The pension system itself, bar the 
absence of crediting for household labour and child-rearing, did not seem to have 
contributed to persisting gender inequality in Sweden, rather the opposite (e.g. Stark 
and Regnér 2001; Stark 2005; Hobson 1997: 202-203; Sainsbury and Nordgren 1997: 
11-17). Nevertheless, with the prevailing male gender-bias in the labour movement, 
any such effects were largely coincidental. In the 1950s, women were primarily 
understood as “gainfully employed housewi[ves]” (Hirdman in Jenson and Mahon 
1993: 85). 
 
Still, the SAP captured a substantial, new constituency of white-collar workers through 
the pension struggle, which allowed the party to sustain its power position without the 
support of the Centre Party. Jenson and Mahon claim that about 40% of white-collar 
votes consistently went to the SAP in the subsequent elections (1993: 85; Esping-
Andersen 1985: 161-165). Yet, the ATP system became the symbol for labour’s 
increasingly unified struggle and power, and may be characterised as a breakthrough 
for Swedish Social Democracy (Pontusson: 1992: 79). In his memoirs, Tage Erlander 
pointed to the failure of 
the bourgeois strategists’…to anticipate how the pension struggle would weld together the 
trade union and political labour movement as never before. To him, it was an incredible 
experience to witness all over the country the enthusiasm and will to win that suffused the 
trade union people’s efforts. The pension struggle was their struggle. (in Martin 1983: 217) 
 
But, the Swedish labour movement succeeded through the discursive struggles in the 
pension debates in constructing a more inclusive, national collective identity, related to 
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 the notion of the People’s Home. As Heclo and Madsen argue, “[s]ocial 
democrats…captured the idea of the nation – they…successfully interpreted the 
national identity as one of an ever-reforming welfare state (1987: 27). Still, of course, 
challenges were made, but they were primarily of the infra-paradigmatic type. As 
Jenson and Mahon (1993: 79) argue,  
[t]here are times when there is a relative societal consensus about the names of actors, their 
interests, and the political spaces they inhabit. Debates still occur but the voices heard are 
those that speak the hegemonic language, even if in their own ‘dialect’.  
 
A hegemonic social democratic societal paradigm was being established around a 
project of modernisation and growth, which was to guide subject-formation during the 
‘golden age’ of ‘Swedish disarticulated Fordism’. 
 
This hegemonic societal paradigm was, however, complementary to the LO-SAP 
accumulation strategy, which had become hegemonic too with the introduction of the 
ATP system. Pekkarinen argues with regard to the effect of the LO-SAP economic 
policy model on political discourse that:  
the boundaries of the economic policy agenda, that is to say, what can and cannot be 
accomplished by economic policy, and consequently what are seen as legitimate claims on 
policy, remain relatively fixed. Different groups tend to rationalize their adherence to the 
policy model in their own specific way . . . .The national policy model is consequently 
sustained by several “satellite” models, through which it is communicated to groups with 
diverse interests. (in ibid.: 79fn. 12) 
 
The crucial stumbling block for the LO-SAP proposal had been the accumulation of 
pension capital in the AP Funds. However, by LO and SAP moving to assign the 
economically rationalising investment decisions of the AP Funds to tripartite boards, 
SAF had been convinced of the ATP system and following the unsuccessful 1960 
elections, also the centre-right parties turned towards acceptance of the creation (and 
growth) of the AP-funds. They became “a natural [and normal] component of the 
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 mixed economy” (Pontusson 1984: 10). Although previously opposed to the ATP 
system, these forces and their activites, at least temporarily, became incorporated into 
the structures of the hegemonic LO-SAP accumulation strategy. As such, they operated 
to the benefit of the sustainability of the latter. This was, however, facilitated by the 
labour movement’s recognition of the free market as “the most efficient mechanism to 
allocate capital within the private sector”, and the value of business collaboration in 
order to transform AP fund “pension savings into productive investments” (ibid.: 94). 
 
The ATP system would play a crucial function in the establishment of the labour 
movement’s accumulation strategy. It served to support the growth model by 
enhancing the regulatory capacities of the credit system. In particular, the AP-funds 
eased policy conflicts within the Rehn-Meidner model: there was no guarantee that its 
two chief objectives – ensuring adequate investments for full employment and profits 
squeeze to counter wage drift (or promote wage equality and union cohesion) – could 
be achieved at the same general level of wage agreements. Macroeconomic policy was 
supposed to reduce the tension between these objectives. But this required favourable 
structural conditions that eroded as the Fordist growth trajectory was progressively 
exhausted. 
 
To reduce this tension, the bank-centred credit system was strictly regulated to 
minimise the cost of credit for productive capital at the same time as facilitating 
capacities to pursue effective macroeconomic policy (Pontusson 1992: 70-83). These 
regulations included foreign exchange and credit controls, with penalty rates for 
excessive borrowing from the Central Bank. It also included the ‘Investment Funds’ 
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 whereby corporations could avoid corporate taxation on profit, and enjoy favourable 
depreciation allowances, through deposits with the Central Bank. Liquidity could be 
regulated that way without resorting to high and variable interest rates, and assets held 
in the Investment Funds were released to the corporations in recessions in accordance 
with counter-cyclical principles. 
 
As the ATP-system was built up, the AP-funds came to play an increasingly important 
role. Since they were financed through employers’ contributions, set so as to generate 
surpluses, they contributed to the profit squeeze that counteracted wage drift. 
Simultaneously, they made credit available for private as well as public investments. 
Significantly, the three AP-funds were only allowed to invest in bonds and could not 
purchase shares in corporations (though corporations could re-borrow 50 percent of the 
fees that they paid into the system, provided that a commercial bank took the risk of 
these ‘retroverse loans’).  
 
This reflected converging interests between the welfare-state complex in having ample 
access to cheap credit for public investments and the Swedish financial spheres, which 
did not want to see a competing centre of corporate control emerging under labour 
inclusive tripartite auspices. As Tore Browaldh (1980: 178-79), the CEO of 
Handelsbanken and business representative on the Public Commission behind the 
design of ATP, makes clear: it was his priority to ensure that the AP-funds could only 
invest in bonds, “because there was no need for another credit institute…and because 
in an economic crisis, this might mean that a number of corporations must be taken 
over by the AP funds”. At the same time, he expresses total satisfaction with how 
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 Central Bank Governor Per Åsbrink chaired the Commission and its agenda, which 
was compatible with Browaldh’s objectives. Browaldh also underlines that there was 
little cause for concern that other Committee members would advocate, for him, 
unacceptable solutions. The proceedings of the Committee, which included Rudolf 
Meidner as LO’s representative, were harmonious and resembled an economics 
seminar. The ATP-system was very much a product of the ‘Saltsjöbaden Spirit’. 
 
As I argued in chapter 2, in relation to a discursively constructed growth model 
constituted by complementary mediating institutional mechanisms, the hegemony of a 
social bloc becomes apparent if its constituent and reproducing consensus revolve 
around economic interests. Indeed, the economic interests of the model’s most likely 
opponents came to coincide with the implementation of the model. A growth regime 
was emerging and the ATP pension system played an absolutely central role in its 
regulation. I argue that the new pension system served to suspend the ‘Malthusian 
imperative’ of saving for old-age. As such, it regulated Swedish disarticulated Fordism 
by enabling mass consumption, which had been a key objective for the labour 
movement since the 1930s. The ATP pension system was thus, according to the 
Regulationist-SSIP approach developed in chapter 2, at the top of the institutional 
hierarchy and strongly contributed to the complementarity of the ‘Swedish model’. 
 
(b) Mass Consumption 
The wide-ranging and substantial de-commodifying welfare reforms, with the ATP 
system at the forefront, as well as the policy application of the Rehn-Meidner Model, 
were resulting in productivity growth and increasing welfare towards the late 1950s 
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 and the 1960s. As Michael Taussig argues, this resulted in something akin to a “state 
fetishism” - a fascination with the institutions and symbols of the State (1992, 1997). 
However, primarily, it enabled the spread of mass consumption. This early mass 
consumption can be seen as the popular expression of the success of what has become 
known as the “Swedish model” (Childs 1947). Indeed, it became central to subject-
formation for large parts of the Swedish economy. The social democratic construction 
of the People’s Home had now sufficiently evolved to allow for indulgence in 
consumption and all its accessories. Strong and consistent growth had resulted in the 
“strong society” (det starka samhället) (Andersson 2003: 32-45) with “competitive 
consumers” (my transl., ibid.: 52). However, its development had been and continued 
to be far from gentle or even. 
 
Rationalisation and active labour market policies accelerated the diversification of the 
Swedish economy into manufacturing, where Fordist-Taylorist production processes of 
cognitive and bodily exploitation were the norm. The traditional exporting sectors, 
related to iron ore and timber, and primarily located in the northern parts of Sweden, 
underwent heavy rationalisation and mechanisation under competitive pressures. This 
caused unemployment and “retardation” of the northern regions, as labour was 
replaced by machines (Khakee 2005: 73). Much of the relieved labour was actively 
channelled to the booming manufacturing industries, which, given horizontal 
integrative requirements, predominantly came to be located in urban areas. Yet, some 
“endemic unemployment” remained in many northern regions (Westerlund 1998). 
These processes of economic restructuring, regional depopulation and retardation, 
urbanisation and mechanisation of production are hard not to describe as brutal, despite 
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 the labour movement’s commitment to smoothing them. Indeed human experience 
under Swedish disarticulated Fordism involved trauma, dislocation, relocation and the 
formation of new desires through the intensification of capitalism. Yet, from afar, what 
emerged in daily life was  
a new scope for consumption and leisure, shorter working hours, more pay, longer 
holidays…The nation was on the move and the blueprints of the welfare state were now - at 
last - turned into practice at full speed. (Löfgren 2000: 3) 
 
These new opportunities created scope for a new individualism developing out of the 
sense of individuality, which had been a significant element in the early moments of 
Swedish modernity. As I will show later in this chapter, this new individualism came 
to contribute to the undermining, in a contingent manner, of the strong notion of the 
People’s Home as well as the labour movement’s 1970s efforts to democratise the 
economy. 
 
In the modern capitalist urban spaces of Sweden, where both employment and welfare 
were largely secured, the intensification of phantasmagorias of commodities, projected 
by increasingly advanced media, became rife. As a promise of modern utopia, dreams 
of consumption became commonplace in these spaces (e.g. Husz 2004), spurring the 
gradual divorce of daily consciousness from the ego. Fordist economic aesthetics were 
being shaped, particularly in urban areas. Yet, these were particularly Swedish. These 
economic aesthetics had a strong foundation in the strong, de-commodifying welfare 
state as well as in the popular norm of ‘being modern’ (Löfgren 2000: 2-3).  
 
The disarticulated nature of Swedish Fordism seems likely to have contributed to the 
popular association of the modern with ‘the international’. Consumerist dreams were 
often developed, although far from unambiguously, in relation to American products 
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 of mass consumption. These had made their entry into Swedish daily life with growing 
purchasing power and the consolidation of Pax Americana following the 2nd World 
War. On the one hand, nothing was more modern than ‘America’. Sweden became 
increasingly “talked about as the most Americanized nation in the world" (Löfgren 
2000: 3). On the other hand, American mass consumerism was understood as vulgarly 
materialist and American mass products were perceived as ‘cheap stuff’. 
‘Americanisation’ was associated with over-consumption. Thus, “America represented 
both utopia and dystopia” (ibid.). Retaining a strong sense of, what had come to be, 
‘Swedishness’, Swedes adopted American lifestyle with ambivalence and in an 
extremely Swedish way (O’Dell 1997). In fact, 
[t]he new patterns of consumption turned out not only to open up for international influences 
but also had a nationalizing effect: people could dream about an American refrigerator, a sub-
scription to Reader's Digest, a glass of ice-cold Coca-Cola or a meeting with the Cartwright 
Brothers from the TV western Bonanza, but the end result was rather an increased 
homogenization of Swedish lifestyles. (Löfgren 2000: 4) 
 
This ambiguous desire of American modernity undermined the power of class-based 
and local life-styles, opening up a new space in search for change and reorganisation of 
daily life. Yet, this turn to mass consumption and the quest for individual forms of 
expression were curiously mediated by the Swedish State. Löfgren (2000) illustrates 
this particular development with reference to ‘motorized citizens’.  
 
During this period, a car society emerged with a significant symbolic and material 
power. The car and motoring were central elements of the Swedish-style American 
dream. The car enabled mobility, new leisure opportunities and the belief in the 
gaining sight of utopia. Moreover, it liberated the individual from the clasps of the 
State, in terms of publicly organised mass transportation. The car came to symbolise 
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 “individual freedom and capitalist spirit…[with its] roads, gas stations and car dealer 
strips [smelling] of free enterprise” (italics in original, ibid.: 4). This American 
aesthetic of motoring with its logos and architecture reached some of the most desolate 
areas of Sweden. Still, large-scale infrastructural projects had created an extensive and 
mass-utilised railway network decorated with national symbols and with state-
managed temporalities. 
 
The contradictions between the role and function of the State and the craving for free 
enterprise in daily life subject-formation surfaced, however, eventually in motoring. 
The State was called upon to provide ‘a car-friendly society’: 
Children must be educated about traffic problems, cities must be planned for mass auto traf-
fic…More and more Swedes [came to share] the experience of road-sign drills in schools, 
driving tests as a rite de passage to adulthood, nationally controlled radio programmes for 
drivers, mandatory check-ups for driving safety, confrontations with traffic wardens and 
police. (Löfgren 2000: 5) 
 
Rather than engendering a ‘liberated’ experience of ‘the international’, motoring in 
Sweden became a fragile vehicle for the creation of a motorised citizenship, 
disciplined through roadsigns, rules and penalties. Indeed, the relations between the 
individual and the State were tightened, reconstituted, gendered and rendered fragile 
through motoring: “[g]oing for a drive could both foster the feeling of free-wheeling 
individualism and the experience of responsible or restraining citizenship” (ibid.). In a 
subtle, yet material way, State-regulation of motoring “often had a stronger integrative 
effect than the traditional rhetoric of national unity” (ibid.).  
 
Referring back to Lipietz in chapter 2, State-regulated mass consumption contributed 
to the coming of hegemony of the ‘social bloc’ of the labour movement by providing 
for and moulding the interests of the nation as a whole, marginalising but a few. Yet, 
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 as I argued in chapter 2 with reference to Aglietta, consumerist Fordism shaped an 
individualism of considerable strength. In the next section, I will return to the 
contingent consequences of this development. Moreover, the development of Swedish 
disarticulated Fordism generated new politics of representation targeting new 
inequalities in the economy and in society more generally. The ‘disarticulation’ of 
Swedish Fordism in combination with changing conditions in the world economy also 
added significant new pressures to this situation. These developments resulted in two 
crises of the economic aesthetics formed under social democratic capitalist 
modernisation. The first crisis unfolded in the late 1960s and 1970s. The second crisis 
emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s through the neoliberalisation of social 
democracy. In the next section, the first crisis will be discussed. 
 
III The First Crisis of Swedish Disarticulated Fordism 
This section considers a series of developments in the late 1960s and 1970s, which 
shook the labour movement to its very foundations. Economic aesthetics underwent a 
radical transformation originating largely from the inherent contradictions of Swedish 
disarticulated Fordism, but also from processes beyond the regulatory realm of the 
labour movement. More specifically, the radicalisation of the labour movement 
combined with increasing competitive pressures from the world market to force the 
radical re-orientation of the labour movement’s accumulation strategy as well as 
politics of representation in the direction of the notion of ‘industrial democracy’. 
Although rather unsuccessful, this, in turn, engendered a neoliberal counter-offensive 
in the second half of the 1970s, which significantly came to impact upon processes of 
subject-formation. Yet, as will be considered in section four, the SAP returned to 
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 power in 1982 facing both a structural crisis in the economy as well as a crisis of 
legitimacy. 
 
(a) The Radicalisation of the Labour Movement 
The 1968 elections gave the SAP a unique single-party majority. Almost the whole of 
the 1960s had been characterised by a relatively content SAP government continuing 
to be able to present strong evidence of “exceptionally favourable growth and 
productivity development” (Ryner 2002: 126), as well as the highest budget surpluses 
in the OECD (along with Norway) (Glyn 1995: 114). However, towards the late 1960s, 
and particularly with the relative downturn during 1967-1968, concerns about the 
sustainability of the international, US-sustained growth in demand of Swedish 
products emerged (Mjöset 1987: 419). Nevertheless, LO-SAP confidence in its 
policies remained high. The poor remaining were claimed to be leftovers from “poor 
Sweden”, which the labour movement had nearly gobbled up during the construction 
of the ‘strong society’.  
 
However, under the surface, tensions in the labour market to some extent persisted and 
came to grow from the margins, and, shortly after these elections, radical discontent 
broke out. In December 1969, workers at the state-owned LKAB mine in Leveäniemi 
in the very North of Sweden started a so-called ‘wildcat’ strike, that is without the 
permission of LO. A whole series of wildcat strikes ensued in 1970 at different LKAB 
mines in the North of Sweden, but this sentiment also spread to other corporations 
such as Volvo in Gothenburg. A second wave of wildcat strikes followed in 1974 
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 (Ryner 2002: 127). Not only were these strikes targeting the conditions of 
employment, and thus the wage relation, but also LO itself. 
 
Their supposed union representatives, along with the SAP, were accused of neglecting 
the toils, struggles and ‘weaknesses’ of workers by being preoccupied with capital-
friendly growth and full employment. With regards to wages, there was a growing 
sentiment of injustice in relation to white-collar workers. The number of white-collar 
workers in the economy had grown markedly and the formation of white-collar unions 
had resulted in wage-drift as these unions bargained separately from LO with SAF 
over wages. This, of course, weakened the negotiating power of LO, but at the same 
time led to more wage competition between employers. Hence, SAF was concerned 
with this development too (Martin 1975: 435-436). This growth in white-collar 
workers originated from two processes. Firstly, the increasing mechanisation and 
Taylorisation of production had resulted in greater needs for office-based, low-skilled 
workers. Secondly, large numbers of women had entered the labour market as 
“[r]eproductive work was increasingly moved from the family to the state” (Baude in 
Ryner 2002: 130). It was frequently these women who took the new office-based, low-
skilled jobs. A clear majority of this new stratum of white-collar workers, represented 
by the Central Organization of Salaried Employees (Tjänstemännens 
Centralorganisation (TCO)), were neither well-paid nor had the high status of their 
older colleagues.  
 
Yet, merely increased and just wages were not necessarily the primary objective of 
these striking workers. More fundamental issues were at stake. LO and SAP were no 
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 longer considered an offensive and radical force. LO’s double loyalty to capital and 
labour, established with the Saltsjöbaden Agreement, was becoming an electoral 
problem (Stråth 1998: 122). The new stratum of white-collar wage-earners had not 
been captured by SAP and were organised outside LO making them attractive to the 
liberal People’s Party and the Centre Party. Yet, these workers shared many of the 
concerns of blue-collar workers. Instead, a liberal offensive in the 1960s over 
corporate democracy, individuality in the workplace, decentralisation, locality, 
environment and, last but not the least, wage-earner funds sought to capture this 
constituency, and was indeed becoming a threat to the labour movement’s top 
organisations (ibid.: 107-111, 118-120). 
 
Yet, more profound, ideological issues had also surfaced and the wildcat strikes, or the 
threat of such, were becoming the labour expression of these. These rather new 
concerns were derived from developments in the Cold War: 
 
[t]he anticommunist consensus of the Cold War had dissolved under the influence of the 
struggle of Black Americans in the Civil Rights Movement, the independence of Cuba and 
Algeria as well as the revolutions and wars of independence in Asia. The rebellions in the 
periphery of the world economy shook its core and rendered the internal contradictions of 
capitalism visible and contestable. Youth were working the streets and squares for donations 
to the struggle of the FNL, and among the miners and their followers there was a growing 
consciousness that wage policy, rationalisation and labour market policies, and the Vietnam 
War were somehow connected. (Nyberg 2001: 120, my transl.) 
 
As Ryner argues, these wildcat strikes were “[i]ndicators of a legitimacy deficit in 
existing procedures of social representation” (2002: 127). The historical compromise 
between capital and labour, and the social democratic approach of “socially 
engineering” the Swedish model, were thus being challenged from below (Nyberg 
2001: 119). Rationalisation and active labour market policies typified these skewed 
considerations, but also the continued democratic deficit and unequal gender relations 
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 in the workplace resulting in inadequate working conditions (Stråth 1998: 85-104). 
Critical discourses were being formed and secure employment, as enabling mass 
consumption, was understood as no longer sufficient to satisfy these workers. 
 
This legitimacy deficit had since prior to the elections been building up also within the 
labour movement’s “cadres”, the managerial stratum tasked to ensure ‘societalisation’ 
in the face of the disintegrative processes of capitalist commodification  (in the sense 
of Vergesellschaftung)48 (van der Pijl 1998: 14-30, 138-143). In a series of reports and 
publications from within the labour movement, the ‘strong society’ was fundamentally 
questioned. The construction of the ‘strong society’, on the basis of full employment 
and rapid growth, had not succeeded in gobbling up poverty. Instead, as social 
medicine scholars Gunnar and Maj Inghe argued in a 1967 publication, the 
construction of the welfare state was far from finished (Andersson 2003: 46).  
 
Most problematic of these internal challenges came from the LO Low Income Survey 
(Låginkomstutredningen), which had been producing several publications during the 
second half of the 1960s and early 1970s, with LO economist Rudolf Meidner at the 
rudder from 1967. This survey showed that there were severe income differences 
remaining in the economy and that these differences had profound effects on a large 
number of aspects of wage-earners’ standard of living. The survey found that 
considerable parts of Swedish society were suffering from serious welfare insecurity in 
several regards, which prevented them from fully participating in the economy. Worse 
48 This Marxian term of Vergesellschaftung, or societalisation, should not be understood as the opposite 
of commodification, rather its dialectical counterpart. Hence, the cadres are not responsible for de-
commodification, but rather the relative unity of capitalist society. As such, cadres existed both within 
the labour movement and e.g. SAF. 
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 still, the economic policies of LO-SAP were claimed to reproduce the class society, 
whose eradication they originally had claimed to seek, by benefiting a clear majority of 
well-off wage-earners, whilst marginalising low income-earners (in ibid.: 50-52).   
 
The public “Long Term Survey” (Långtidsutredningen) of 1970 expressed concerns 
over these internal challenges to the negative effects of its growth policies, however its 
solution, particularly in consideration of a worsening balance of payments, was to 
concentrate harder on growth and to reduce the consumption of the public sector (ibid.: 
53). In this context, SAF cadres had taken the initiative in 1967, in the context of the 
growing worries about the international competitiveness of the economy, to secure the 
previously so profitable dialogue with LO and particularly the practice of central 
wage-bargaining.  
 
Economists from TCO, LO and SAF had agreed upon a new conception of the 
economy, the so-called EFO model, which divided the economy into “sheltered” (S) 
and “competitive” (C) sectors, with the former capable of significantly less 
productivity growth than the latter. The ‘S’-sector was the domestic sector, which to a 
large extent was constituted by the growing public sector, whilst the ‘C’-sector was 
directly exposed to competition in the world markets.49 Established forms of 
negotiating solidaristic wage policy were understood as a pre-requisite for 
competitiveness by these economists, and the SAF initiative eventually led, in the 
1970s, to an agreement between TCO and LO on solidaristic wage policy (Ryner 2002: 
49 It is worthwhile pointing out here that this distinction was fundamental to the Baumolian conception 
discussed in chapter 3, but also signified a break with the Myrdalian conception of productive social 
services, provided by the public sector. 
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 130-1). However, the politics of the organisation of these investments emerged as the 
first stumbling block to the negotiating cadres (ibid.: 135-6). 
 
Given the profit squeeze requirement for solidaristic wage policy, LO’s growing 
preference with regard to investment was to work along the principles of the Rehn-
Meidner model, and here the sustaining and expansion of the role of the supposedly 
temporary AP Funds, created with the ATP pension system, constituted the obvious 
solution. These funds had already started to play a significant role in the urbanising 
economy by funding large parts of the mass housing programme (Miljonprogrammet) 
started in 1965, as well as lending to the corporate economy. However, SAF strongly 
disagreed with such public forms of saving to fund private business research and 
development (Martin 1984: 246), and were concerned with their growing centrality for 
the provision of credit in the economy. The lending of the AP Funds had come to 
crowd out private investments to such an extent, according to a SAF economist, that 
“the lending market beside the (pension) fund will not be large enough that anybody 
can depend on it, and dare pursue corporate policies contrary to the intentions of the 
(pension) fund” (in Pontusson 1984: 16). However, to LO and SAP, private investment 
was increasingly seen as anti-thetical to the need to “make international 
competitiveness compatible with the principles of equality, social security and 
solidarity, and the need to counter concentration of ownership” (Ryner 2002: 138). For 
this to be possible, it was understood that capital’s claimed absolute right to manage 
the workplace, consolidated in the Saltsjöbaden Agreement, had to be challenged and 
that required the abandonment of the negotiation route in favour of legislation (Stråth 
1998: 128-9). With the radicalisation of labour, this became an imperative for LO and 
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 SAP, if they were to uphold the legitimacy upon which they relied, and the ATP 
pension system and their AP Funds were to play a significant role in this project. 
 
(b) Democratising the Economy 
Rendering international competitiveness compatible with the welfare state and the 
commitment to full employment, however, started to constitute a serious dilemma for 
the labour movement. It pushed the labour movement to search for new radical 
solutions. Yet, this must be understood against the backdrop of the Swedish economy’s 
relationship to the world economy, which was becoming increasingly difficult.  
 
The fears of the late 1960s of a slowing world economy and its impact on Swedish 
disarticulated Fordism were surpassed by reality. Indeed, the world economy of the 
1970s was characterised by a series of crises deriving from the maturity of US Fordism 
and the uneven development that its tendential diffusion had caused, as well as the 
decline of Pax Americana. Mjöset (1987: 419) summarises this ‘external’ situation 
perceptively: 
the United States faced sluggish growth of productivity, structural problems in the 
manufacturing sector, and a continuing loss of export shares. These problems spilled over into 
the monetary sphere, where a potential loss of confidence threatened the dollar. President 
Richard Nixon's new economic policies in 1971 demonstrated the increasing incompatibility 
of U.S. growth and Western European growth and the United States' temptation to export 
adjustment costs. Furthermore, the United States also faced hegemonic setbacks in the Third 
World; in particular, the Vietnam War reflected the problems of policing the Western sphere 
of interest. As these internal U.S. problems interacted with world economic uneven 
developments, international monetary relations and price levels were destabilized. Finally, a 
general crisis affecting demand and production in the First World economy followed in 1974-
75…First, external pressure surfaced as the international monetary crises of the late 1960s. In 
1971, the dollar became inconvertible, and with floating exchange rates from 1973 the dollar 
was devalued until 1980…Second, raw materials prices boomed significantly. The first OPEC 
oil shock of 1973 was the most visible example, but most other raw materials prices also rose 
dramatically…Third, there were difficulties in the international credit system: balance-of-
payments disequilibria; the problem of recycling petro-dollars; and problems of controlling the 
new, strongly internationalized financial markets, particularly the Eurodollar market. Interest 
rates increased 1974-75, but heavy inflation caused real interest rates to become negative for 
several years…These developments coincided with internal Western European problems, 
particularly a tendency towards profit-squeeze in the late 1960s. First World business cycles 
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 had synchronized due to denser trade networks, particularly a growth of intra-industry trade. 
The U.S./European technology gap had diminished. Interest rates rose, raw materials prices 
soared, and a simultaneous drop of demand followed in all markets in 1974-75. The effect was 
that the profit-squeeze could no longer be contained. A drop in production and stagflation 
resulted, with increased unemployment and simultaneous high inflation. 
 
These emerging conditions in the world economy of course had very serious 
consequences for a small, open and export-oriented economy like the Swedish one. In 
the first place, they strongly contributed to fluctuations in the economy and new 
troubles and traumas for workers. The labour movement faced a complex task. In order 
to secure legitimacy in the context of the radicalisation of labour, LO and SAP sought 
to re-orient its accumulation strategy and to transform its politics of representation.  
 
This quest was considerably substantiated at the 1971 LO congress, which came to be 
pre-occupied with the notion of ‘industrial democracy’. This became the start of a 
rapid succession of legislative moves. Supported by LO but also TCO, which forced 
the centre parties to collaborate, the SAP government introduced a series of legal 
motions between 1971 and 1976 with regard to the regulation of health and safety in 
the workplace (the Work Safety Law), employment security (the Security of 
Employment Act) and the representation of labour on company boards (the Co-
Determination Act) (Stråth 1998: 105; Ryner 2002: 134). These legislative moves by 
the SAP government were central parts of the new politics of representation, which 
sought to construct a new hegemonic societal paradigm. Thus, the SAP government 
endeavoured to reintegrate the challenging discourses and growing segments of labour. 
However, they were also intended to offset the discursive liberal offensive of the 1960s 
by reformulating the concepts of business democracy, co-determination, 
decentralisation, locality and environment. Some of these concerns had nevertheless 
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 been deliberated within the LO for some time already. Yet, they had not been seriously 
considered, or rather avoided, as their full implementation were expected to bring LO 
and SAP into conflict with capital.  
 
Similarly, the shift of focus to ‘industrial democracy’ also involved a re-orientation of 
the labour movement’s accumulation strategy. Mass consumption of foreign goods had 
led to a deficit in the balance of payments, but rather than seeking to reduce 
consumption, large volumes of investment capital had to be channelled to the export 
industry (Stråth 1998: 137). Moreover, the combination of the SAP government’s 
stringent macroeconomic policy and LO’s successful round of wage-bargaining in 
1970 had resulted in a severe profit squeeze. This threatened to cause a shortage of 
equity investment capital in the economy, which, in contrast to the beliefs 
underbinning the design of the ATP system, had been accepted as significant to 
sustained productivity growth by the 1970 Long Term Survey (Pontusson 1984: 92).50 
Here, a dilemma emerged in the context of increasingly competitive world markets.  
 
Against the backdrop of safeguarding the welfare state and countering the 
concentration of ownership, the dilemma consisted of balancing the need to increase 
the rationalisation of national capital and policies of squeezing profit rates with the 
securing of investment capital, when the latter seemed to become increasingly 
internationally mobile. Drawing upon a 1961 LO report, the solution proposed by the 
metalworkers’ union (Metall) was to further collectivise savings as a source of public 
investment capital. The 1961 report had advocated strengthened competition with the 
50 The Survey claimed that if corporations depended upon borrowed capital, this would lead to risk 
aversion and hence moderate the forces of economic restructuring, or rationalisation (Pontusson 1984: 
92). 
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 SHB and SEB spheres on the credit market as well as enhancing the channelling of 
investment capital to firms, which were expanding and innovative, through bipartite 
‘branch rationalisation funds’. Metall proposed a twofold strategy. Firstly, in order to 
increase equity investment capital and competition on the credit market, it called for 
the AP Funds to be allowed to invest in the shares of long-term planning and 
productive firms. Secondly, branch rationalisation funds should be set up in order to 
promote rationalisation. In the pot lay the offer to capital of further wage-restraint. The 
SAP government picked up on the first suggestion by enabling the 4th AP Fund to 
invest in shares, but not exceeding 5% of firm equity capital. This was later increased 
to 10%. Rudolf Meidner was approached to lead a committee, which also included 
Anna Hedborg to whom I will return in chapter 5, to work on the formulation of a 
possible plan for the second suggestion, to be presented at the 1976 LO congress 
(Ryner 2002: 137-139).  
 
The Meidner committee presented its findings under the title “Wage-Earner Funds” 
(Löntagarfonder) in 1975:  
[t]wenty percent of corporate profits should be set aside for the wage-earners in the form of 
stocks. By dividing the value of the corporation into more shares, ownership would gradually 
be shifted to the wage-earner funds [up to 49% of firms’ equity stock]. The funds were to be 
managed by representatives of the local union organisations, the central unions as well as 
representatives of society. It was emphasised that this was not a question of replacing one 
power bloc by another, but rather a matter of democratising ownership. (Stråth 1998: 164-165)  
 
Connected to solidaristic wage policy, the absorption of 20% of corporate profits 
would further penalise firms’ with low productivity, yet reward those showing high 
productivity and innovation. Arguably, this seemed like a reasonable policy in the 
context of what was labelled ‘surplus profits’ (övervinster) generated by the Swedish 
wood and metal industries with the escalation of prices on raw materials during 1972-
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 1974, ensuing wage explosion between 1975-1976 and the delayed economic 
downturn in 1975-1976 (Mjöset 1987: 422). Nevertheless, this initiative was a struggle 
against private business, but also evidence of labour power over business. However, 
the LO initiative did not aim at the termination of the market economy. Through 
dialogue, it was important to make employers realise that public opinion and the 
political situation required the elimination of tensions within the labour movement. 
Fundamentally, it was argued, this initiative, along with the previous ones of the 
1970s, had as the objective to render the economy even more efficient; wage policy 
worked well already (Stråth 1998: 166-7). 
 
Despite the radicalisation of labour and the events in the world economy, the Meidner 
Plan was far from unequivocally embraced by the labour movement. Although the 
proposal was extremely radical and provocative towards capital, the tensions 
remaining from LO’s and SAP’s brutal rationalisation and solidaristic wage-policies 
were still rife. The societal paradigm constructed had not become hegemonic and could 
not substantially support the accumulation strategy revolving around the AP and wage-
earner funds. Although this was presented as the proposal of the ensuing 
parliamentarian commission, the Meidner proposal was far from the only formulation 
of the wage-earner solution. Several other suggestions were made on a so-far non-
unified Centre-Right. Indeed, the Centre-Right, centred on SAF was hesitant to adopt a 
strong front. Given union tensions and SAP internal fragmentation, this was the case 
also within the labour movement. Whilst LO came forward with a proposal adopted at 
the 1976 LO Congress, which they, for strategic reasons, expressed their full 
conviction of, to publicly overshadow their internal struggles, the SAP was more 
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 cautious. The struggle over public opinion revolved around two perspectives of the 
consequences of the wage-earner initiative on the distribution of power: the LO 
perspective and the employers’ perspective. LO contrasted private concentration of 
power with a decentralised wage-earner influence, whereas SAF characterised the 
Meidner plan as concentrating power in the hands of the unions and union confiscation 
of private property and against individual ownership and dividend income (ibid.: 156-
166).  
 
(c) The Neoliberal Counter-offensive 
The 1976 elections result was that the SAP had to leave government for the first time 
since 1932. The economic downturn in 1975-1976 significantly contributed to the 
electoral loss. However the support from LO-members had steadily declined since the 
1968 electoral success, from 81% to 66%. The brutal economic policies of LO-SAP 
and the ideological turn since these elections had had considerable effects on their 
legitimacy. Many of these votes had been picked up by the parties now in government 
(Petersson 1977).  
 
Following the elections, a parliamentary committee was put together to evaluate 
different proposals. The divisions within the committee were considerable, particularly 
in relation to the Centre and Moderate Parties, and LO and SAP had to try to construct 
an alliance with the liberal People’s Party and TCO. However, the People’s Party, after 
internal debates between the social liberal strand and the more market-oriented strand, 
opted out of any form of cooperation with LO and SAP during 1979-1980. Their 
preference for individual accounts organised under the AP Funds as well as their 
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 aversion against any form of concentration of power made an alliance on the topic 
difficult (Stråth 1998: 170). While TCO had been initially supportive, their 
membership was politically neutralised over the course of the debate over the wage-
earner funds. In 1979-1980, TCO retreated to a nonaligned position, as it stood clear 
that their membership was against the initiative (Pontusson 1993: 557). 
 
The decline of the public support for the Meidner Plan, even in its later revised, less 
radical versions, was strongly related to the power of the campaign against the Plan. 
Pontusson argues,  
[c]learly, the [wage-earner fund] initiative challenged the interests of current owners of 
Swedish business. Current owners did not stand to lose any of their wealth, but they [stood] to 
lose some of their claim to future profits, and some – in the distant future, all – of their control 
over corporate decisions. The mobilization against the…initiative was aided not only by the 
political weaknesses of the…initiative itself, but also by political power resources mobilized 
by capital. (ibid.: 558-9) 
 
After the 1976 elections, capital, in the form of the liberal Wallenberg sphere51, had 
become politicised (Ryner 2002: 144). It used SAF as a vehicle to move public opinion 
away from the radicalising labour movement.52 The wage-earner fund initiative 
provided SAF with the ideal symbol around which it sought to unify not only business, 
large as small, but also the bourgeoisie at large (Stråth 1998: 173). Abstaining from 
providing an immediate alternative to the LO-SAP initiative, it engrossed itself in a 
large-scale propaganda campaign of delegitimisation. Think tanks were set up, a 
publishing house was created, “a permanent infrastructure for organising seminars and 
workshops” was constructed (Ryner 2002: 145) and prolific members of academia, 
51 The Wallenberg sphere had gained additional power by acquiring the Skandinaviska Bank and 
merging it with the Stockholms Enskilda Bank in 1972 (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB)) (Ryner 
2002: 71). 
52 As Boréus (1994: 111) shows, SAF’s counteroffensive started already in 1969, but it gained 
considerable strength with the Wallenberg sphere’s active involvement and support. 
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 supposedly close to the labour movement, were mobilised (Grassman 1985: 59-67). 
The language used in the campaign was, in Stråth’s words “often offensive and vulgar” 
(my transl., Stråth 1998: 174).  
 
A popular discursive strategy was to attack the notion of industrial, or economic 
democracy as being reminiscent of Eastern European communism and as subjecting 
the economy completely to the politics of the labour movement. The leading Swedish 
economist and still, at this time, SAP member Assar Lindbeck argued after the 1976 
LO Congress that 
[w]hat is stated by the proposers…is in fact just as destructive for the economic system as the 
socializations arising in Eastern Europe after the Second World War, however with the 
difference that a “private” organization, the trade union movement, should take the place of 
the Government as the owner and employers organization – at the same time as the same 
organization claims to represent the employees also in future…I believe that not many of us 
would like to live in the society that would be the probable result of Meidner’s trade union 
funds. There is, in my opinion, no more important task in Swedish political debate today than 
to warn the Swedish people of Meidner’s and the LO-Congress proposal. (in Olsen 1991: 135) 
 
Building upon such attacks, SAF sought to challenge the labour movement’s 
‘discursive ownership’ of the concept of democracy, since the 1920s. As a 
foundational idea, there was a return to the old notions of thrift and diligent 
entrepreneurialism, to which an individual-centred notion of democracy was attached. 
The LO-SAP proposal was accused of excluding large parts of society, which were not 
wage-earners, in its understanding of democracy. Consequently, the LO-SAP proposal 
was accused of breaking the supposedly fundamental democratic principle of ‘one man 
– one vote’ (Stråth 1998: 174-175).  
 
Following the initial ‘vulgar’ offensive, SAF constructed an extreme neoliberal 
discourse of ‘pure’ market economics around a series of arguments: 
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 • Wage-earner funds were unnecessary to ensure adequate capital formation, if 
profits were restored to ‘normal’ levels, i.e. to those which had been characterised 
by the labour movement as ‘surplus’ levels in the first half of the 1970s. ‘Normal’ 
profit levels were constructed as deriving from the free market economy, in which 
free enterprise and private savings were the norm. 
• Such an economy was ‘healthy’. However, a healthy economy required a fiscal 
policy, which did not reduce the incentive of profitability. Therefore, employers’ 
fees had to be altogether removed. 
• People did not want public funds, but individual equity. Despite the Meidner 
committee’s adherence to the market economy, SAF claimed that the committee’s 
proposal led to ‘fund socialism’. The fund economy was, in stark contrast to the 
market economy, incapable of sustaining efficiency and competitiveness (ibid.: 
175-176). 
 
Against these arguments, the labour movement struggled to show that they indeed 
were wrong and why. The labour movement’s project of synthesising the best of the 
plan economy with the market economy had no precedent, from which it could provide 
evidence. In the end, the Swedish labour movement was itself leading the way towards 
a harmonious synthesis of these two models. To convince an already traumatised 
electorate of its virtues was thus a matter of constructing a belief in a system, which 
was constructed, by a SAF with the wind in its back, as the very cause of these 
traumas. The social democratic notion of income and welfare security was being 
hollowed out. As Stråth argues, this is the background against which the labour 
movement’s abstract notions of solidarity, equality and justice were becoming 
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 undermined to the benefit of a new embodied language celebrating individual strength, 
freedom and competitiveness. The State and the ‘strong society’ were depicted as 
constraining, suffocating and, at best, artificially conditioning the fulfilment of such 
ideals (ibid.: 177-178). 
 
The consequences of the neoliberal counteroffensive were disastrous to the labour 
movement.  The SAP lost the elections again in 1979, and the wage-earner fund issue 
had become a political liability to the party, despite the submission of a de-radicalised 
proposal in 1978, which “scaled down the scope of profit-sharing, and stipulated that 
wage-earner funds should partly be built up through payroll taxes” (Pontusson 1993: 
555). The voters’ opinion of the wage-earner fund initiative remained unchanged, as 
lukewarm (Holmberg 1984: 170, 186). Another, even more watered-down version was 
presented in 1981, prior to the 1982 elections. This stipulated the setting up of 
regionally based wage-earner funds which, through the purchasing of corporate equity, 
would contribute to the ATP system (Pontusson 1993: 555). The SAP managed to 
return to power through these elections. However, this was not thanks to this new twist 
in the wage-earner fund struggle, but despite it (Lewin in ibid.). Rather, their electoral 
success was the result of the failures of the centre-right governments of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. 
  
A long structural crisis had hit the Swedish economy between 1975 and 1979, the 
consequences of which were now carried over to the SAP government chosen in the 
1982 elections. As Mjöset shows, the factor behind this crisis was not, although 
frequently argued by both leading economists and the centre-right parties in power, 
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 legacies of solidaristic wage policy and the commitment to full employment, but rather 
mark-up pricing by the large corporations “as pricing became competitive in their 
sectors” (1987: 437-438). These corporations demonstrated both inertia and flexibility 
in that they failed to adopt offensive production strategies, while succeeding in 
expanding their market shares in the US economy (ibid.: 439). Indeed, Sweden’s 
“industrial performance was actually among the weakest in the OECD” (ibid.: 437). 
This was not the least due to SAF’s move, as part of its free enterprise campaign, to 
reject the EFO model as redundant, and thereby central wage-bargaining, in order to 
fragment LO (Blyth 2002: 212). This, as I argued in chapter 3, initiated the 
disconnection of productivity growth from ‘real’ wages, and thus the undermining of 
Swedish disarticulated Fordism. Moreover, a growing budget deficit, partly due to the 
application of a set of, arguably, insufficiently expansionary Keynesian policies by the 
first centre-right government, was covered by foreign credit, which merely served to 
compound this deficit in the context of the second oil crisis in 1979-1980 and resulting 
hiking interest rates. The 1979 government, strongly supported by SAF and led by the 
neoliberalised Moderate Party (Ljunggren 1992: 393-400), initially continued this 
“policy fumbling”, but soon controversially adopted austerity measures, embarked 
upon the retrenchment of the pension system and devalued the currency in order to 
tackle the growing deficit, but thus came into conflict with the labour unions over 
growing unemployment, wage and welfare policy (Mjöset 1987: 448). The lack of 
investment capital had not either been tackled.  
 
What the SAP government faced at their return was thus the legacy of the policy 
fumbling, a failing austerity programme and an export sector reluctant to rationalise. 
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 More fundamentally, however, they faced a crisis of legitimacy as the economic 
aesthetics formed under the golden age of the Swedish model had been shaken to its 
very foundations through the economic policies of rationalising structural 
transformation and the radicalisation of labour in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the shift to ‘Third Way’ politics in the 1980s furthered individualism and 
transformed the perception of the welfare State in daily life. This constitutes the 
second crisis of Swedish social democratic capitalist modernity. 
 
IV The Second Crisis of Swedish Disarticulated Fordism 
Back in government, the SAP thus faced a legacy of crisis inherited from the centre-
right governments 1976-1981. However, the labour movement as a whole was 
suffering from a deep legitimacy crisis and had primarily returned to power due to its 
adversaries’ failures to tackle the crisis. Indeed, “[t]he crisis was our greatest asset” 
(my transl., Jan Wallander opening quotation in Grassman 1986). There was a clear 
understanding within the dominant elements within the SAP that a new path had to be 
sought, which renewed the labour movement’s position of power in Sweden. 
 
(a) The Swedish ‘Third Way’ 
Released before the elections and leading up to the elections in 1982, two documents 
can be seen as foundational for the new ‘Third Way’ orientation of the Swedish social 
democrats. Firstly, a group of social democratic economists had at the end of the 1970s 
turned towards the adoption of monetarist Neo-classical Economics. These had been 
influenced inter alia by changes in business accumulation strategies, perceived changes 
of structural constraints and cumulative socialisation effects caused by decades of 
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 capitalist state management (Ryner 2004). Over a short period of time, there had been 
a rapid shift within the Swedish economics community towards Neo-classical 
Economics, and conformity was effectively policed through the channelling of 
research funding (Grassman 1986: 59-67; Sverenius 1999). Inflation and budgetary 
deficits were the greatest enemies of the economy. These economists quickly became 
highly influential within the SAP and strongly contributed to the “changing of mind” 
(Steinmo 1988) of social democratic economic state managers.  
 
In February 1981, six of these economists published a famous article in a social 
democratic journal called “Here is the bitter medicine” (my transl.).53 They argued that 
the right-centre government had not done enough to deal with the crisis and now 
budget deficits were at a record high, which in turn led to rising inflation. 
Consumption, public as well as private, was crowding out profit-driven investment 
into productivity and hence the competitiveness of the export-driven economy was 
seriously affected. The public sector had been allowed to expand excessively and the 
welfare State was automatically growing out of hand: “this means in explicit terms, 
unfortunately, that cuts have to be made in the rate of expansion of health services, 
childcare and education as well as significant cuts in some of the larger transfer 
systems” (my transl. Eklund et al. 1981: 2). Moreover, high marginal tax rates had 
enabled the middle class property owners to take high interest loans to fuel their 
swelling consumption. Hence, interest rates had to be raised in order to make 
borrowing more expensive. Private consumption was propped up by a social 
democracy, which now had to tackle the situation head on and accept necessary 
53 In Swedish the title was “Här är hästkuren”. 
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 adjustments. Thus, in contrast with the traditional profit-squeezing policies of the SAP 
and LO, increased corporate profits were now considered necessary to boost 
productivity and competitiveness, and this “the labour movement of today has to 
accept!”, if full employment and equity were to be reinstated (my transl. ibid.: 1). If 
LO would politically accept this situation and use its traditional channels of reaching 
out with the information, the Swedish citizenry would certainly accept the necessity of 
these adjustments (ibid.: 3). 
 
Eklund et al. called upon the SAP-convened ‘Crisis Group’, which was due to present 
its report at the 1981 party congress, to not shy away from ‘this reality’. The Crisis 
Group did not disappoint. Its “A Future for Sweden” (Framtid för Sverige) was 
formulated as a veritable manifesto for a Swedish ‘Third Way’. The text, frequently 
vague and abstract, reformulated traditional social democratic values and principles in 
a neoliberal direction, yet was still framed within a traditional Social Democratic 
discourse. ‘The future’ involved the balancing of pressures for continued 
improvements in the standard of living with necessary budgetary restraint. Not only 
was it deemed necessary that everyone had to contribute to pulling Sweden out of the 
economic crisis, but the Swedish ‘Third Way’ sought to bring the future back to the 
present, to people’s daily lives. Echoing the SAP economists’ argument, albeit in more 
politically acceptable terms, that a wealth transfer from wage-earners to corporations 
had to take place, the road to economic stabilisation and private investment lay in 
elaborate austerity measures and budget cuts (SAP 1981). Thus, indeed, Swedes’ daily 
lives could be expected to be immediately affected by the ‘Third Way’. In the ensuing 
electoral campaign, the imagery of crisis was critical to both illustrate the failures of 
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 the preceding centre-right governments, but also to justify the new ‘Third Way’ policy 
direction. As soon-to-be finance minister Feldt admits, “[w]e tried our very hardest to 
instigate a consciousness of crisis” (my transl., opening quotation in Grassman 1986). 
The contingent was rendered necessary. 
 
However, the project of these SAP ‘reformists’ was not met with open arms. As 
Lundberg argues, [t]he third way resulted in tensions within the [labour movement, 
within the] party’s leadership,…between union and party and in between different 
ministries” (2003: 234). More specifically, the reformists, with Feldt in the forefront, 
advocated an ‘economically realist’ policy package with continued austerity measures 
and one final devaluation of the Swedish Krona, in order to give the export industry 
the foundation for a new phase of growth and to reduce the budget deficit (Feldt 1991: 
30-98). Feldt spoke about concrete solutions to the unprecedently difficult situation 
rather than sticking to an unrealistic adherence to social democratic ideology. Posts 
based on historical compromises in the state budget were questioned, which were 
deemed untouchable to the SAP ‘old guard’. Regaining control over the national 
economy was argued to imply a fundamental probing into such long-standing 
commitments such as indexations and traditional expenditure posts.  
 
Nevertheless, inflation was on aggregate far from exceeding the OECD average. 
Moreover, as Grassman has emphatically shown, the idea of a threatening budgetary 
deficit was largely a political spin inflated by unscrupulous politicians and 
unknowledgeable media (1986: 85). These disagreements and thus seemingly 
politically motivated constructions added fuel to the fire within the labour movement 
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 and, as Lundberg claims, [m]uch speaks for that the issue of pensions was positioned 
at the centre of this over-arching discussion and that it expanded an already existing 
fissure within” the movement (2003: 234).  
 
In the midst of cutbacks, austerity measures and overall language of ‘economic 
realism’, the symbolic significance of the ATP system was demonstrated as the SAP 
vowed to restore the value guarantee of pensions in order to ensure the support of the 
rank-and-file social democratic voter. As Lundberg points out, it is in this context 
extraordinary to find the retained, if not strengthened, commitment to the values 
underpinning the ATP-system. The bourgeois government’s removal of the value 
guarantee was framed as a clear assault on the principle of de-commodification. The 
ATP-system was referred to, at a special session on social insurance and pension 
provisions at the 1981 party congress, by Sven Aspling, top member of the SAP, as our 
time’s greatest institution of social security, ‘the jewel in the crown’ of the Swedish 
system of redistribution (Lundberg 2003: 118). While other supposedly costly 
historical commitments were to be profoundly questioned in the name of economic 
realism in order to clean out the state budget, pension provisions were to be guaranteed 
at any cost. The cost of restoring the ATP-system was considered independently from 
the threats and the fears expressed in the context of the precarious economic situation. 
Undeniably, “at the congress pensions were made into a kind of yardstick for the 
party’s continued adherence to Social Democracy” (my transl., ibid.: 120). Yet, in the 
context of the sizeable devaluation of the Krona immediately after the elections, 
restoring the value guarantee was a slender compensation. 
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 This can be seen as a strategic move by the SAP. Still, economic aesthetics in daily life 
revolved, to a significant degree, around consumption, income security and the welfare 
State. As Svallfors argues, the welfare State, funded by high taxes, was an 
unchallenged and significant part of Swedish daily life (1989). Had it not been for the 
SAP’s credibility in restoring income and pension security after the elections, it would 
have struggled to return to power in 1982. The LO-SAP watered-down wage-earner 
proposal had certainly not provided the SAP with any electoral gains, rather the 
opposite (Pontusson 1993: 555). Yet, already in 1984 a parliamentary commission was 
set up by the SAP government to review the ATP system following the identification 
of another burgeoning threat to the welfare State – inverted Malthusianism. This will 
be discussed further below. 
 
However, the ATP system was losing its significance as a mediating mechanism in the 
economy, particularly in relation to the supply of investment capital. As wages were 
failing to keep up with price developments, the credit provided by the AP Funds to the 
economy was shrinking relative to other sources of investment capital (Pontusson 
1984: 64-65). The market for bonds through which the AP Funds was issuing this 
credit had become less significant with the growth of other financial markets, and with 
the defeat in the wage-earner fund struggle collectively owned equity had been 
effectively ruled out as a policy option. The SAP government’s reply to the call for 
increased private equity savings was the launching of the tax-exempted Public Savings 
Scheme (PSS) campaign (Allemanssparandet), following the elections. The right-
centre government had, in the previous year, sought to increase private equity savings 
through the Tax Fund (Skattefond) initiative. Prior to these initiatives, Swedish 
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 households held such savings to a relatively limited degree (Klevmarken 2006). 
Combined, however, they led to a mass popularisation of private saving forms, which 
continued in the 1990s (Grip 2001). While these different initiatives were part of the 
political struggle between the SAP and the neoliberal alliance, together they 
represented the burial of any meaningful wage-earner fund initiative. This can also be 
seen as the point from which LO became increasingly marginalised from the processes 
of economic policy-making. The neoliberal Tax Fund initiative was a weapon against 
LO, whereas the SAP’s PSS campaign symbolised a break in the relationship between 
SAP and LO (Lounsbury and Jonsson 2004: 27-35). After having lost both the 1976 
and 1979 elections partly due to its continued support of the wage-earner fund 
campaign, the encouragement of household equity savings through the Public Savings 
Scheme marked the neoliberalising SAP’s estrangement from the radical elements 
within the labour movement and a distancing from the idea of wage-earner funds when 
returning to power in 1982 (Feldt 1991). Furthermore, the boom in private retirement 
savings was even causing worries about the ability of the ATP pension system to 
survive the competition (Dagens Nyheter 30/12/1982). By encouraging private equity 
savings, an even larger part of the wage-bill was transferred to corporations. 
 
Yet, this transfer was the underpinning implication of the ‘Third Way’. It meant the 
tendential replacement of the Rehn-Meidner model’s combination of efficiency and 
equity with a neo-classical outlook emphasising the dual commitment to price stability 
and efficiency. However, this could not be achieved without the cooperation of LO in 
single-handedly restraining wages, following SAF’s move to stop central wage-
bargaining (Blyth 2002: 221-2). Hence, SAP put pressure on LO to restrain wages, 
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 however its much weakened control over wage-setting54 rendered LO incapable of 
preventing wage-drift meaningfully. Consequently, LO took “a less cooperative stance 
with the state” (ibid.: 221). As the 1982 devaluation turned out unnecessarily sizeable, 
import inflation added to the “distributional anxieties” of an increasingly isolated LO:  
[i]n such a situation, when the state was seen by labor to be abrogating its commitment to 
equality and universalism through its new distribution policy, when the burden of the 
solidarity wage and increased import costs fell all the more heavily on the unions, and when 
business was seen to be reaping profits from what LO perceived as a zero-sum redistribution, 
the unions themselves started to turn against the third way. (ibid.: 222) 
 
This resulted in the so-called ‘War of the Roses’ (Rosornas Krig) between the SAP 
government and LO. As Ryner argues, “[b]y the mid-1980s, neo-liberal norms had 
also permeated social democratic state-management circles, especially in the Ministry 
of Finance and the Central Bank” (Ryner 2002: 114). The new constitutionalist 
policies of the SAP party had resulted in a serious rift between the two axis powers of 
the Swedish labour movement (Goldthorpe 2001). The SAP party had moved towards 
the political centre and emerged now more distant from LO and closer to the centre, 
and the neoliberal ideas of the centre-right parties. The ‘Third Way’ had become 
“deliberately compensatory neo-liberal” (Ryner 2002: 126).  
 
Yet, given SAP fears of worker disaffection leading up to the 1985 elections, finance 
minister Feldt nevertheless reluctantly went ahead with a compensation to pensioners 
for the reduction in pensions that the excessive devaluation had caused (Svensson 
2001: 55). Again, the SAP commitment to the ATP pension system helped to re-elect 
the SAP. The processes of financial deregulation of the 1980s were going to lead to 
even further fragmentation of the labour movement. 
54 Metall and engineering workers had opted out of central wage-bargaining by 1983. 
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(b) Financial Deregulation in the Swedish ‘Third Way’ 
The SAP government’s deregulation of finance in the 1980s was almost wholesale, 
and driven by a small elite having the resources and the skills to construct a discourse 
of necessity to incorporate effectively the higher echelons of the Swedish economy and 
at the same time paralysing opposition (Blyth 2002: 219; Boréus 1994). It should also 
be understood against the background of substantial transformations in the world 
economy with its consequences for labour. Technological advances facilitated the 
intensity and extensity of capitalism and re-organised production processes away from 
the Fordist-Taylorist production process and towards transnationalised patterns of 
post-Fordist production, as accompanied and enabled by innovation in the financial 
markets, in turn facilitated by the suspension of the Bretton Woods system and 
offshorisation. In Sweden, financial intermediaries, generally created by the large 
commercial banks and operating beyond the organised credit market, emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s for the purpose of circumventing the regulations of the Central Bank. 
However, also high-profit engineering firms like ASEA, Alfa-Laval and Volvo had 
turned to the creation of financial subsidiaries in order to reduce their dependency 
upon their ‘house banks’ (Olsen 1991: 128). As I argued in chapter 3, labour union 
power was weakened by these processes and thus had less capacity to provide the ‘life 
insurance’ required for the financial institutions of the ‘Swedish model’ to be 
sustained. Now, with the SAP government forced to deregulate the financial system, as 
expanded regulation seemed pointless (ibid.), remaining labour union control over 
investments was largely eradicated. In this context, the financial lobby emerged as 
highly influential in the policy process (Svensson 2001: 254-270). 
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Liquidity quotas were abolished (whereby banks and financial institutions such as the 
AP-fund were required to invest ‘excess liquidity’ in government bonds) and the 
Central Bank started to finance its debt through open operations on the bond market, 
which became increasingly ‘deep’ through the emission of a number of bond types. In 
1985, the entire range of emission controls, borrowing ceilings, penalty rates, and 
administratively set interest rates were abolished, resulting in market-determined 
interest rates. There was a ‘big bang’ on the bond and stock markets. The annual 
turnover on the Swedish stock exchange increased rapidly from about SEK 5 billion in 
1980 to 160 billion already in 1985.  
 
A credit-induced real estate bubble emerged as banks and financial intermediaries 
rushed to capture ‘good debt’, taking the ‘poor debt’ as a necessary evil. Meanwhile, 
“the tax reform of the century” had been introduced by Feldt leading to the further 
boosting of private consumption and lending (Blyth 2002: 225). The deregulation of 
banking and credit markets had allowed the growing financial sector to offer 
households new forms of savings on the basis of tax breaks, particularly after the tax 
reform, and integrated services across the politico-historically separated spheres of 
banking and insurance in the Swedish economy (Berg and Grip 1992).Yet, as 
exchange controls had not yet been lifted to ventilate the bubble, “asset prices and 
commercial real estate prices skyrocketed” (ibid.: 224). The abolishment of foreign 
exchange controls in 1990 (Svensson 2001: 80-88; Reiter 2003: 109-11), however, 
only served to further inflate the bubble as even more speculative capital took forward 
price positions in the markets. Behind the removal of foreign exchange controls lay 
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 interests representative of both Swedish transnational corporations and the financial 
sector, which had become eager to expand into new markets and increase exit 
opportunities (Bieler 1999: 28-9). In addition, in 1985 the government introduced a 
‘norms based’ monetary policy (normpolitik), with the aim of ‘sterilising’ financial 
flows. In short, a total U-turn had been completed, whereby financialising market 
discipline was significantly intensified in the mould of disciplinary neo-liberalism 
(Ryner 2002: 148-53; 2004). 
 
The reforms initially resulted in institutional incomplementarity of economic policies, 
with massively destabilising pro-cyclical macroeconomic effects. In the long upturn 
1983-1990, investment rates did, as desired, increase, full employment was 
maintained, and budget balances were restored without significant welfare cutbacks. 
However, productivity rates did not increase, wage drift became rampant; high and 
variable interest rates and asset price inflation added momentum to wage drift. 
Unionisation rates remained high, and compensatory wage bargaining exacerbated 
inflation and overheating. The consequence of the policy mix was that the full 
employment commitment had to be abandoned amidst runs on the currency in 1990.  
 
Although largely successful for much of the 1980s, the disillusionment with SAP 
economic policies had with these changes become inescapable for the government by 
1991: “underlying tensions manifested themselves dramatically in the form of strikes, 
leap-frog wage-bargaining and capital flights, and a plummeting of support for SAP” 
both in Sweden and beyond (ibid.).  
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 (c) The 1990s Consolidation of Compensatory Neoliberalism 
The economic downturn that followed between 1991 and 1994 was severe, and 
exposed weaknesses in the financial system. Massive loan defaults resulting from a 
quick increase in unemployment and a sudden switch to high real interest rates led to a 
virtual meltdown of the bank system in 1992. Overnight lending rates were increased 
to 500 percent to defend the exchange rate against speculation as the budget deficit 
skyrocketed due to bank bailouts, interest-, and unemployment insurance payments, as 
well as, importantly, a failing normpolitik tying the Krona to the ECU (Blyth 2002: 
229-230). Interestingly, in the dying days of the social democratic administration of 
1991, the SAP had met the long standing demand of LO by removing the restrictions 
on the AP Funds to invest in shares. This was, however, not, in any sense, a socialist 
move. The AP Funds no longer had the same impact on markets characterised by a 
much higher degree of capitalisation. In the new context, AP Funds also faced risks 
and incentives that compelled them to operate just like any other institutional investor. 
Subsequently, the AP Funds played a highly significant role in speculating against the 
Krona during the 1992 run. Also, at this juncture, Swedish corporations abandoned 
corporatist arrangements in efforts of defensive consolidation (Sandberg 1995). 
 
The centre-right government of 1991-94, led by the neoliberal Moderate Party’s Bildt 
and strongly supported by SAF, sought to further neoliberal restructuring. This 
neoliberal ‘social bloc’ openly targeted what remained of the ‘Swedish model’. Again, 
a discourse of ‘no alternative’ was constructed. Union interference with the economy, 
the welfare State and the politically dependent central bank were blamed for the crisis 
(Blyth 2002: 229-230). Two immediate solutions were identified. Firstly, business was 
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 called upon to exit indefinitely tripartite cooperative forms (Blyth 2002: 228). 
Secondly, SAF drew up “a detailed plan for the complete privatization of the welfare 
state by the turn of the century” (Pestoff 1991: 153). These were justified on the 
grounds of market efficiency and consumer choice, resulting in the establishment of a 
public-private mix. As private solutions were primarily made accessible to the affluent, 
a two-tier system of welfare provision was in the making (Blomqvist 2004).  
 
Yet, a strong discursive undermining of welfare state institutions dated back to 1988, 
and SAF’s intensified campaign in targeting these for privatisation. This had the 
desired effect of increasing private savings rate (Pettersson 1993: 26), raising equity 
ownership to 60% by 1994 (Fondbolagens Förening 2004). This in turn served to 
undermine the role of these systems. Thus, now, also the processes of financialisation 
of daily life were underway, but had to be cemented in the face of potential resistance. 
Two interlinked initiatives of cementation stand out after 1990: membership in the EU 
and pension reform.  
 
EC membership had become attractive to SAP finance minister Feldt in 1988, and the 
bourgeois parties saw it as enabling the locking-in of anti-inflationary policies. Joining 
the single European market had been pushed for by transnationalised Swedish capital 
and the financial sector, but also export-oriented unions, although for conflicting 
reasons (Fioretos 1997: 295-7; Bieler 2003: 394). Much of the labour movement 
supported it too, as they saw it “as an arena for countering transnational capital and for 
combating unemployment at a broader level” (Bieler 1999: 40). The SAP government 
had announced in late 1990, without involving the LO, that in dealing with the 
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 growing cost crisis, there was no alternative to applying for EC membership and to 
adopt “its neo-liberal economic policy embodied in the Internal Market and the 
convergence criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)” (ibid.: 22). The 
new neoliberal government came to see the Maastricht convergence criteria as the key 
to attaining changes in the investment system revolving around the AP funds, as well 
as in the tax and credit systems. The investment politics of Swedish social democracy 
were, nicely put, considered ‘sub-optimal’, and a threat to the competitiveness of the 
Swedish economy. By joining the EU, a strong degree of neo-liberal ‘path-
dependency’ would be secured, as an external disciplinary environment would be 
imposed on economic and monetary policy-making (Blyth 2002: 231-4). The 1995 
accession to the EU practically dismantled the investment politics of the ‘Swedish 
Model’. The 1993 informal decision to make the Central Bank (Riksbanken) 
independent made accession largely inconsequential for monetary policy (Lindvall 
2004: 127).55  
 
The Swedish welfare state entered into crisis in the early 1990s, partly as a 
consequence of the deployment of the discourse of inverted Malthusianism. A key 
target was the ATP pension system, which already in the mid-1980s had become 
regarded as a stumbling block to the “international process of deregulation and 
increased financial sophistication” (Konjunkturrådet 1986: 73), by neoliberal forces. 
Pension reform was understood as critical for the deepening of financialisation and the 
discursive construction of inverted Malthusianism became absolutely fundamental to 
the achievement of this objective. SAF, enthusiastically supported by the financial 
55 The Central Bank was rendered formally independent in 1999. 
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 lobby, paid considerable attention to driving home the seriousness of these threats, 
resulting in politicised debates in the ATP Review Commission launched in 1984 
(interview 1, 2005). During these, suggestions of parametric reform, implying an 
extension of the so-called 15/30 principle to a 20/40 alternative, were dispensed with 
(Lundberg 2003: 157).56  
 
Instead, the ATP pension system became increasingly framed as the bearer of 
“systemic risk” (e.g. Lindbeck 1998). The frequent political interventions into the 
institutional structures of the system were portrayed as the causes and evidence of 
opacity, instability and systemic inflexibility (see Kruse 2003). Systemic risk was 
conceived as an undoubtedly negative notion exposing the individual to undeserved, 
uncontrollable financial risks. This de-collectivisation of the Swedish economy was 
frequently reflected in large-scale advertisement campaigns deployed by the financial 
industry inciting fears of substantially lowered levels of consumption in retirement. 
These campaigns promoted financial services providing individualised, market-based, 
solutions (e.g. Banco Privatpension 1992-3). Thus, individual financial risk with 
regard to pension savings became presented as positive and associated with the 
“autonomisation”, freedom and “responsibilisation” of the self (Rose 1999: 154), 
pushing for the appreciation of market efficiency and individual risk-taking. These 
processes combined to make fears of systemic breakdown widespread, which in turn 
strongly contributed to bringing the percentage of household savings in mutual funds 
to the 70% mark in the late 1990s (Fondbolagens Förening 2004; Grip 2001).57  
56 The 15/30 principle implied that in order to receive pension benefits based on the 15 best income 
years, wages had to be earned for at least 30 years. 
57 It should be noted that the ATP system had an in-built ceiling for pension entitlements. Income over 
this ceiling did not generate pension rights. As this ceiling was not adjusted for inflation and wage 
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Following the election in 1991, the neoliberal centre-right government called together 
a parliamentary Pension Reform Commission to reform the ATP pension system. The 
1984 committee had failed to produce any proposal due to its politicisation. This time, 
politics was not going to be allowed to stand in the way for reform. The Commission 
had been given the unofficial mandate of designing a structural reform. Yet, given the 
political significance of the ATP system, such radical innovations had to be presented 
as parametric ‘reform’, not structural novelty. The strong public interest in the reform 
made the radical reform process vulnerable to politicisation and external influences. 
The membership of the Commission was therefore selected to ensure cohesion, or the 
‘economics seminar’ spirit, which had characterised the commission tasked with 
designing the ATP system in 1959. The Commission also moved to minimise the 
direct involvement of labour unions and business. Thus, the Commission worked in 
relative isolation from external pressures and with a strong emphasis on a consensual 
process of problem-solving. The members of the Commission that opposed this 
method were soon marginalised. The elites of the core political parties, consisting of 
the centre-right parties in government and the SAP, stood behind the work of the 
Commission, however the latter lacked a solid grounding in the mass party 
organisation. Instead of inspiring to public debate, the Commission, once the reform 
proposal was presented in early 1994, cut the debate as short as possible. The proposal 
encountered plenty of resistance, particularly from within the labour movement but 
also from a smaller number of journalists, intellectuals and state technocrats. The 
increases, supplementary and private pension arrangements grew more popular among the affluent 
middle-classes, and the ATP system was gradually reduced in significance (see Lundberg 2003).  
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 introduction of the PRS proved particularly agitating and neoliberal.58 Protesters in the 
labour movement, frequently representing areas outside the urban cores, identified 
increased financial risks, the de-collectivisation of risk and unevenly possessed levels 
of financial literacy as particularly unfair with regard to their participation in this 
system. However, voices of resistance were soon silenced by the elites of the reform-
sponsoring parties (Lundberg 2003: 247-278), as well as by the responsible state 
officials. The SAP top organisation went so far as ignoring an extremely large number 
of protests at the ensuing party congress as well as from various representatives from 
the labour unions. Indeed, it would be tenuous to claim that the pension reform process 
had a firm grounding in public opinion.  
 
Nevertheless, and actually particularly for this reason, much of the international 
community of pension experts embraced the reform process as exemplary, as I argued 
in chapter 1. The looming conflicts within the Swedish economy over the pension 
reform were thus effectively pre-empted by avoiding public debate and reaching a 
party-political consensus across the left-right divide (Lundberg 2003). This conflict 
pre-emption served to further fragment the labour movement and additionally distance 
the SAP from LO. 
 
58 The representative of the former Communist Party (Vänsterpartiet) Ulla Hoffman has been highly 
critical of the pension reform, both in terms of design and process (e.g. 2005). With regard to the latter 
two groups of opponents, some were more vocal than others, for instance the former head of the 
Swedish Social Insurance Administration (Riksförsäkringsverket), KG Scherman (e.g. 2000; 2003), 
political journalists Johan Ehrenberg (2000), Anna-Karin Bratt (2000) and Dan Josefsson (2003), author 
and professor of literature Sven Lindqvist (2000, as well as a series of newspaper articles and other) and 
Agneta Stark (1993; 1994; Lindqvist and Stark 1996). Also noteworthy are Jan Hagberg and Ellis 
Wohlner’s contributions (2002; 2004). Notable is also the manifestation against the introduction of the 
PRS on the 31st of October, 2000, when a number of demonstrators symbolically burnt the information 
they had received from the PPM encouraging pension savers to make active choices between the 
accredited fund managers (www.geocities.com/lyckligmedborgare). 
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 These arguably undemocratic moves may not be so surprising given that the new 
system was intended to ‘retrench the system for pension provision in Sweden, 
undermining a return to a defined-benefit system and exposing the individual to a 
greater range of risks in relation to the economy (Hacker 2004). Nevertheless, the turn 
to the hybrid, risk-privatising pension system, as discussed in chapter 1, was presented 
by the SAP as providing substantial and universalist pensions in the traditional 
language of social democracy. According to Cichon’s argument presented in chapter 1, 
the Swedish ‘Third Way’ reform is not “a new type of pension formula”, but rather “a 
novel pension policy instrument”, designed to obscure the shift in underpinning values 
and norms from tendentially oppositional elements in the electoral base, particularly 
labour and pensioners’ organisations (1999: 1). Re-commodification through state-
sponsored financialisation was accordingly either obscured as marginal or presented in 
positive and necessary terms, as drawing upon the growing tradition of private equity 
savings since the early 1980s and as generating greater cost-efficiency and individual 
consumer choice. The risk-socialising ATP system was being replaced by a risk-
privatising system, yet nothing was going to change. I will, of course, return to a 
discussion of this shift in the next chapter. At this point, however, I want to make the 
claim that this pension reform amounts to a key component in a project, which could 
be labelled ‘subversive neoliberalism’. Under adverse political conditions, subversive 
neoliberalism aims to construct the financialisation of daily life gradually as ‘normal’. 
Thus, the cultivation of a mass investment culture is sought. As such, this pension 
reform can be seen as a crucial element in a new accumulation strategy striving 
towards the formation of a Swedish coupon pool capitalism, the foundations of which 
were laid in the mid-1980s with financial deregulation. 
 225 
  
Despite this strategy of locking-in neoliberalisation, paradoxically, neoliberalisation 
itself was, at least in the short-term halted in this period. The combination of high 
unemployment and devaluation effects, gave incentives to both labour and business to 
conclude coordinated mesocorporatist deals, resembling the German model (Pontusson 
1997). Such coordination now became subject to market discipline to a greater extent 
than before and it resulted in wage segmentation. Replacement rates in social insurance 
were also reduced to stabilize the budget.  
 
The social democrats returned to office in 1994 drawing on traditional social 
democratic imagery. The UK Guardian reported that SAP’s return to power was 
“interpreted in Sweden as…a fierce determination among the voters to protect the 
extensive welfare system, which came under sustained attack during Bildt’s tenure” (in 
Blyth 2002: 236). This SAP government administered fiscal consolidation and its 
tenure coincided with a rather impressive economic recovery. The SAP government 
also came to embrace a move by the neoliberal 1991-1994 government to inject a 
relative flexibilisation of the labour market, inspired by European developments. The 
services provided by the public labour market board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen 
(AMS)), strongly linked to LO and TCO interests, were complemented by the 
invitation of private recruitment firms (Manpower, Proffice, etc.) to generate further 
flexibility on the labour market. Yet, the activities of private recruitment firms were 
circumscribed in order to avoid labour market segregation (Svensson 2001: 128-9).59 
Moreover, unemployment compensation was reduced by 10% and rules and conditions 
59 Svensson states that in 1998, 0.5% of the labour force was employed by these private recruitment 
firms (2001: 129). 
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 for compensation were sharpened between 1992 and 1998 to generate further 
incentives for the unemployed to seek re-employment. Supposed potential moral 
hazards created by unemployment benefits were thus targeted. The result was that very 
few reached the maximum income replacement level of 80%, which engendered a 
system of compensation possible to characterise as basic. Consequently, 
“unemployment was made more threatening and risky to the individual” (my transl., 
Svensson 2001: 140). These developments represent a partial recommodification, a 
process which a weakened LO ‘on the defensive’ came to embrace (Nyberg 2001: 311-
326). Nevertheless, welfare universalism remains, and in comparative terms social 
expenditure levels are still high. Moreover, the popular support for these cornerstones 
of the ‘Swedish model’ continued to be substantial (Svallfors 2001). This is despite the 
fact that the everyday became bombarded with neoliberal discourses undermining the 
public sector and the welfare system on the grounds of inefficiency, lack of consumer 
choice, anti-state paternalism (see Boréus 1994) and inverted Malthusianism. The 
economic aesthetics shaped during social democratic capitalist modernisation seemed, 
at least on the surface, to stay intact despite this extended period of crisis in social 
democratic subject-formation. However, the impact of the 1999 pension reform on 
these economic aesthetics remains uncertain and is thus the subject of the next chapter. 
 
V Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide a highly selective, yet hopefully illustrative, 
account of economic restructuring and subject-formation in the Swedish economy up 
to the introduction of the new pension system in 1999. More specifically, I have 
discussed the emergence of Swedish social democratic capitalist modernity through the 
formation of Swedish disarticulated Fordism in the post-war period. A hegemonic 
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 societal paradigm complemented a hegemonic accumulation strategy in the 1950s and 
1960, a unique condition for which the 1958 ATP pension reform was absolutely 
critical. Indeed, Swedish disarticulated Fordism received its institutional 
complementarity through the ATP pension system, which thus can be seen as at the top 
of the institutional hierarchy. During this period of capitalist intensification, economic 
aesthetics became dislocated, which brought mass consumption to the fore of Swedish 
daily life. However, the social democratic management of Swedish disarticulated 
Fordism involved brutal socio-economic processes, which finally caught up with the 
labour movement during the late 1960s and 1970s. Labour was radicalised under the 
influence of Cold War politics and challenged the SAP and LO to push for the 
democratisation of the economy. This constituted the first crisis of Social Democracy 
in Sweden. The response from SAF and the centre-right parties was strong and 
increasingly neoliberal. The SAP of the 1980s sought a political space further to the 
centre in order to challenge the centre-right, which had won consecutive elections at 
the end of the 1970s. The ‘Third Way’, nevertheless, estranged the SAP from LO as it 
embraced neoliberal ideas of financial deregulation at the expense of the Rehn-
Meidner model. The 1990s were characterised by a further shift towards neoliberalism, 
its consolidation and a seeming consensus around the formulation of a subversive 
neoliberal project aiming at the financialisation of Swedish daily life through the 
design of a new pension system. Still, Swedish economic aesthetics are strongly in 
tune with a risk-socialising welfare system, which secures consumption. 
 
Blyth (2002: 246) asks: “[t]he key question for Sweden is, will the lack of public 
support for these new [neoliberal] ideas and the policies they augur prevent their 
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 consolidation, or will such an order be constructed despite the wishes of the majority?” 
This particular formulation of the ‘Swedish question’, however, seems dangerously to 
overemphasise the power of political elites and to neglect the power of daily life. Had 
it not been for the fears of the political elites with regard to pension reform, there 
would have been limited reason behind a subversive approach to it.  
 
Yet, is it not possible that ‘the majority’ can be ‘convinced’ of that risk-privatisation 
and financialisation are, if not immediately desireable, necessary? Cannot an imposed 
regularisation of risk-oriented practices in daily life contribute to a shift in economic 
aesthetics towards the acceptance of risk-privatisation? In particular relation to 
inverted Malthusianism, as Offe (1987) argues, such a ‘necessitarian’ discourse could 
very well become self-fulfilling. As Hay argues, there is a tendency, since the rise of 
neoliberalism, that the assumptions of Neo-classical Economics increasingly have 
become internalised by human agents as normal (2004). As I showed in chapter 1 and 
will continue to show in the next chapter, the new pension system, as the embodiment 
of the project of subversive neoliberalism, entails a considerable challenge to the 
stability of social democratic economic aesthetics in Sweden. If the new risk-
privatising pension system becomes considered a legitimate and normal element of the 
economy, what remains, in terms of a breeding ground for social democracy in 
Sweden, promises to be substantially diluted. Moreover, if financialisation of daily life 
occurs, the ‘Swedish model’ may be replaced by a Swedish ‘coupon pool capitalism’ 
in the matter of two decades. The next chapter therefore assesses, building upon the 
questions posed at the end of chapter 3, the success of the new pension system to 
contribute to the normalisation of neoliberalism and the financialisation of daily life in 
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 the Swedish economy. Its success would imply the third, and potentially final, crisis of 
Swedish social democracy with its adherent consequences for social democratic 
politics in Europe and beyond. 
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 Chapter 5: An Assessment of the New Pension System and Its Capacity to 
Generate A Mass Investment Culture in Sweden  
 
I Introduction  
As I argued in chapter 4, the de-commodifying ‘Swedish model’ had been largely 
dismantled by the late 1990s. What remained on the level of formal economic 
institutions was a rather rigidly regulated labour market and substantial welfare 
provisions. Support for these ‘leftovers’ continued to be high in daily life, also across 
different social divides, on the basis of retained norms of solidarity and secure mass 
consumption. The 1999 pension reform, however subversively presented, promised the 
introduction of a new Zeitgeist in the Swedish economy, as the new risk-privatising, 
hybrid system, discussed in chapter 1, was consistent with the neoliberal ethic of 
individualizing costs and limiting the redistribution of resources. The new system 
considerably increases the exposure of daily life to financial market discipline. It 
should thus constitute a critical case study for the project of subversive neoliberalism’s 
ability to transform Swedish daily life into a mass investment society, which is capable 
of supporting a neoliberal accumulation strategy of creating a Swedish coupon pool 
capitalism. It seems as if the new neoliberal Zeitgeist has to be accepted and 
internalised for this to occur in a social context that still harbours a strong adherence to 
traditional social democratic values, norms and practices. This chapter therefore 
assesses the reception of the new Swedish pension system in order to develop an 
understanding for the depth of social democratic economic aesthetics in Sweden at this 
critical juncture for social democracy in Europe.  
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 Firstly, however, the chapter briefly discusses the state of the Swedish economy in 
terms of financialisation and market exposure at the Millenium. Against this 
background, the new pension system is reintroduced (following the outline in chapter 
1) and the project of popularising the new pension system is analysed. Subsequently, 
the method of assessment, in light of the Regulationist-SSIP approach developed in 
chapters 2 and 3, is presented. Thirdly, tendencies and divisions, as related to 
variegated economic aesthetics, in the popular reception of the system are identified 
through the evaluation of six criteria. This brings the chapter to a preliminary 
conclusion of the thesis, in which the introduction of the pension system is discussed 
as a potentially powerful, yet so far failing attempt to effectively expose daily life to 
financial market discipline. Echoing Watson’s (2008) sceptical assessment of the 
viability of a finance-led growth regime, I point to the inherent contradictions of 
accumulation strategies seeking to implement such an economic model, particularly in 
the Swedish case. 
 
II The State of Financialisation at the Millenium 
With the ‘big bang’ financial deregulation of the second half of the 1980s, the Swedish 
economy became increasingly exposed to financial markets. However, one should take 
care not to assume a linear development towards financialisation from this point. 
Rather, as I argued in chapters 2 and 3, this process is contingent upon politics on 
several levels of the economy.  
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 (a) The Tendential Anglo-Saxification of the Economy 
Henreksson and Jakobsson argue that there has been a “general adaptation to Anglo-
Saxon policies” in the corporate economy (2003: 98). Financial deregulation has 
enabled an awesome growth of the Stockholm stock exchange since the mid-1980s. 
The massive growth of the equity ownership of domestic and foreign institutional 
investors has resulted in that ownership becoming increasingly diffuse and corporate 
control more anonymous. As Reiter shows, this diffusion of ownership and control has 
been significantly boosted by the abandonment of specific voting rights granted by the 
ownership of the so-called ‘golden shares’, which enabled the Swedish financial 
spheres to exercise corporate control during the post-war period (2003).60 Firstly, the 
promotion of private equity savings has been highly successful. By the late 1990s, 
70% of Swedish households owned equity. Symptomatic of this interest in 
shareholding is the rise in membership of the Swedish shareholders’ Association from 
30,000 in 1980 to 141,500 in 2000 (Aktiespararna 2000). The most common reason for 
shareholding is to save for retirement. Secondly, foreign ownership of Swedish firms 
has increased from 8% in 1990 to 43% in 2001. The transnationalisation of large 
Swedish corporations, which started in the late 1970s, has been dramatic (see figure 
below).  
 
60 The reason for these large owners’ concession of these special voting rights, originates from the 
undermining of financial regulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the diversification of their 
portfolios, according to Reither (2003). However, the case can certainly be made that the financial 
spheres’ continued support, and particularly that of the Wallenberg sphere, of SAF’s and the Moderate 
Party’s ideological campaigns starting in the 1970s, eventually came to strove towards an economic 
development, in which these spheres took on a different, more free, role in relation to the Swedish 
economy. 
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Figure 6: Number of employees in foreign-owned firms in Sweden and their share of all 
employees in the Swedish business sector 1980-2001 (taken from Henreksson and 
Jakobsson 2003: 93). 
 
Also, inward foreign direct investment, enabled by the removal of exchange controls in 
the late 1980s, increased markedly during the second half of the 1990s to around 55% 
of total gross investment, which could be interestingly compared with the 31% of the 
‘Irish Tiger’ during the same time period (ibid.: 94; for the Irish case, see Smith 2005). 
What attracts these investments is, however, not only an untapped market, previously 
protected from inward investments, as Henreksson and Jakobsson seem to suggest (see 
ibid.: 94). As Hay shows (2004), the data is pointing towards a different scenario. 
Socially democratic economies in Northern Europe have shown to be the most 
attractive to research and development-intense firms world-wide. This is supported by 
Amable and Petit (2001: 25-26), who argue that the social democratic SSIPs, 
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 exemplified by Sweden and Finland, are “characterised by their production system’s 
high level of technological intensity…[and] by their international competitiveness”. 
 
Thus, ownership restructuring in the Swedish economy had clearly surpassed much of 
that of the rest of corporatist Europe. Swedish corporate governance structures have 
become increasingly similar to those in the US economy, according to Henreksson and 
Jakobsson (2003: 96).  
 
De Geer et al. (2003) study the expected clashes between Swedish norms and values of 
solidarity and conflict-avoidance and the US-style of corporate governance of 
individualism and confrontation within a traditional engineering firm taken over by a 
US giant corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange. They conclude that 
“there are small signs of a new Anglo-Saxon shareholder oriented model that is 
gaining ground at the expense of a more traditional Scandinavian stakeholder model” 
(188). Interestingly, they show that the cultural distance between the two corporate 
cultures is surprisingly limited (ibid.). Supporting this finding, attitudes towards 
individual entrepreneurship and free business have changed drastically since the late 
1970s. Among young men and women, such attitudes have gone from critical to very 
positive, with men slightly more positive than women (Henreksson and Jakobsson 
2003: 90-91). 
 
The financialisation of the corporate economy certainly concurs with the objectives of 
the campaigns of SAF and the neoliberal Moderate Party from the late 1970s. 
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 (b) The Partial Re-Commodification of Labour 
These tendencies towards the Anglo-Saxification of the corporate economy are, 
however, paralleled only to a limited degree with regards to the re-commodification of 
labour. Labour market regulation remains fairly strong. The flexibilisation of labour, 
through the rapid growth of the private recruitment industry, has undermined 
employment security and unemployment benefits have been significantly reduced 
during the 1990s. The welfare State underwent significant changes during the 1990s 
resulting from the invitation of private providers and the provision of welfare 
consumer choice. A growing segmentation of the citizenry could be identified between 
affluent and urban private consumers and less affluent public consumers on the 
margins of the economy. Nevertheless, as Blomqvist argues, by the late 1990s 
tendencies towards convergence with respect to the organization of the welfare services sector 
remain as yet marginal. The relative share of private providers is still no bigger than 5–15 
per cent in Sweden, which is significantly lower than in most other parts of Europe. However, 
there are reasons for believing that their share, as well as the share of private financing, might 
increase in years to come. (2004: 151) 
 
With regards to pensions, Swedes had increased their participation in private pension 
plans significantly from, in 1980, 6% of men and 4% of women to 31% of men and 
40% of women, in 2001 (Andersson et al. 2004: 80). Grip (2001) claims that women 
have since the early 1980s used private savings schemes to a considerably greater 
degree than men due to wage inequalities and the smaller percentage of women being 
covered by corporatist pension agreements.  
 
This massive increase in combination with the emergence of mass equity ownership 
can be seen as an ‘objective’ realisation of a weakened welfare State by the Millenium, 
but should also be understood as a result of large-scale opinion-making campaigns 
targeting the welfare State and increased individual shareholding. Certainly, in line 
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 with financialisation, it significantly exposes consumption/investment decisions in 
daily life to the performance of financial markets. Yet, it is clear that a large portion of 
the Swedish population was not directly exposed to financialisation. Returning to 
Froud et al.’s qualification of the preconditions of financialisation in chapter 3, it is 
perceivable that these are not fully met in the Swedish economy. The institutional 
conditions were not sufficiently there, financialisation is not capable of suspending the 
macro and monetary effects of employment relations and income distribution and it 
seems as if the meaning and practices of financial investment are not well-spread. 
However, this cannot be said even of the US economy, where substantial shareholding 
is limited to the affluent middle classes.  
 
The Swedish approach to further inject this dimension to daily life was typically 
universalist Swedish. The new hybrid, ‘Third Way’ pension system intentionally 
brought consumption insecurity to the ‘People’s Home’ and further incentives to 
engage with financial market investment (Hagberg and Wohlner 2002). Consumption 
seemed to be perceived as reserved for those who had successfully (albeit often 
temporarily) secured their financial margins. As such, the new pension system serves 
the purpose of containing inflation through economic stratification. The main pillar, 
the ‘Income Pension’ (Inkomstpensionen), is designed to reward “each Krona 
contributed…[with] one Krona of pension credit” (PPM 2002: 29-30). However, 
pension credits can be accumulated through e.g. higher education, military service and 
parenting. Still, redistribution is highly limited within this system. As such, it is 
considered to be based on what the National Strategy Report on the future of pension 
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 systems calls “actuarial solidarity”, rather than on traditional social democratic 
egalitarian solidarity: 
[w]hat is meant by egalitarian solidarity is that the pension system in the broad sense of the 
terms, evens out income differentials among those covered, both within and between cohorts. 
What is meant by actuarial solidarity is that the relationship between current value of pension 
contributions and pensions received is constant for all individuals and cohorts. (in Lundberg 
2003: 348fn.65) 
 
The Income Pension does not guarantee a ‘normal’ standard of living in old age 
(Forslund, 2004). It is, generally speaking, generating lower pension levels than the 
ATP pension system and is automatically adjusted, that is without formal political 
intervention, to changes in the economy’s age structure as well as the growth-
performance of the economy (the so-called Bromsen).61 As such, it is intended to 
provide incentives to endeavour to pay attention to the market opportunities presented 
in the PRS system and privately.  
 
The funded PRS system, although just absorbing a limited percentage of annual 
pension contributions (13.5%), combined with the financialisation of all corporatist 
pension schemes since the early 1990s produce extremely unequal pensions (Svenska 
Dagbladet 03/08/2007). The principle of ‘equal work, equal pay’ is thus effectively 
made redundant and replaced with the imperative of acquiring financial literacy in 
order to be able to take individual responsibility for ones pension. Financial literacy is 
closely associated with the effective evaluation of financial risk.  
 
61 Unless an increase in annual wages of 1.6% occurs, the real value of pensions decreases. Settergren 
shows that between 1960 and 2001, this occurred 17 times (2003: 3). As Forslund (2005: 7fn.7) points 
to, the National Social Insurance Board (Riksförsäkringsverket) calculates that the average yearly 
increase of the income index was 1.2 per cent for the period 1960-1995. 
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 In the extreme ‘pro choice’ environment created with the PRS, in accordance with 
orthodox neo-classical theory and neoliberal ideas of ‘consumer choice’, effective 
evaluation of financial risk was presented as critical to success in the individual’s 
saving for retirement. PPM, the state apparatus assigned with explicit socialisation 
functions (Sweden. SOU, 1998: 87; Sweden. Ministry of Finance, 2005a; PPM, 2006), 
actively discouraged the choice of letting the index-tracking public pension fund 
(ironically, the 7th AP Fund) manage pensions. Instead, PPM pushed for the embrace 
of active and frequent investment practices in the choice of 5 between almost 800 
privately managed ‘unit trust’ funds. This is in agreement, consciously or not, with an 
accumulation strategy favouring short-term shareholder value strategies over more 
long-term, productivist growth strategies. Nevertheless, the PPM authority is, in 
recognition of heterodox, new institutionalist economics, assigned to cultivate norms 
of equity investment by regularly providing pension savers with information about 
financial markets. According to Thaler and Sunstein, the role of the PPM can be 
described in terms of “libertarian paternalism”. Largely financially illiterate 
participants are accordingly “gently guided in a manner that is intended to make them 
better off”, while allowing more sophisticated participants to make their investment 
decisions freely (in Cronqvist and Thaler 2007: 424-425). As such, it is in its very 
approach assuming inequality of capability and outcome.  
 
As privatised risk and financial investment remained a rather novel condition to large 
parts of Swedish daily life, PPM commissioned a mass campaign to spread the 
meaning of financial risk and popularise practices of financial investment. A private 
advertisement agency – SJWE – was tasked with the organisation and 
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 operationalisation of this mass campaign (PPM 1999). Subsequently, PPM would 
continue this work itself, but on a smaller scale once a market-friendly meaning of 
financial risks had become internalised and practices of financial investment 
normalised.  
 
We must, however, grasp the size of the challenge faced by the PPM and the SJWE 
advertisement agency in this project to popularise financial risk and investment 
practices across the class, gender, educational, income and geographical (urban-rural) 
divides (PPM 1999), which had been shaped by the rationalising economic policies of 
the labour movement and the subsequent neoliberalisation of the economy. This was 
fundamentally a project of preference-harmonisation, or the reconstitution of economic 
aesthetics. This was, of course, no small task.  
 
Hodgson’s (2002) study of the role of advertising in the processes of neoliberal 
restructuring and financialisation in the context of the United Kingdom is instructive 
for this task. Hodgson claims that  
marketing draws largely on the disciplines of sociology and psychology, as it integrates large-
scale demographic/economic surveys and focused motivational/attitudinal research to achieve 
a social mapping of desire. A key element in this process is the segmentation of the population 
on the basis of their patterns of consumption.” (2002: 322) 
 
On these grounds, marketing proceeds by not merely responding to identified needs, 
but also by constituting and modifying them, and thereby allowing “us to construct, 
sustain and remodel the self” (Knights and Sturdy 1997 cited in ibid.). Hodgson (ibid.) 
goes on to argue that  
marketing technologies aim to construct objective categories summarising in a quantifiable 
and calculable way differences between consumer groups producing forms of knowledge 
which enable both the formulation of business strategy and the manipulation of these groups 
through a variety of marketing techniques. 
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Such techniques, he claims, are wide-ranging, but nowadays frequently involve a 
heavy usage of information technology.  
 
Interestingly enough, this is nearly a blueprint copy of the marketing strategy 
employed by the SJWE advertisement agency when attempting to project the notion of 
risk onto Swedish daily life. A ‘social mapping of risk appreciation’ was constructed 
by the agency, outlining what was considered to be the existing sources of 
segmentation. On this basis, the mass campaign was built employing a wide range of 
techniques and media to reach out to society, and particularly to those who were 
identified as having economic aesthetics, which were considered to be inconducive to 
adopting understandings of risk and practices of risk calculation in their daily lives. 
This social mapping of risk appreciation identified a segmentation of the Swedish 
economy into three groups of almost equal size (Interview 3, 2006). A Managing 
Director of AMF Pension – the indisputably most successful of the large pension fund 
managers, which is offering its services within the regulatory space of the PRS – 
confirms this mapping. This Fund Manager Director labels these groups according to 
the likelihood of them being swayed by the marketing drives of AMF Pension to 
purchase their financial services: “the willing investors”, “the hesitant, yet potentially 
persuadable” and “the hopeless”. He states that these divides refer to social class, 
income, education, gender and habitat (urban-rural) (Interview 2006), some of the 
most central factors in the continuous construction of the economic aesthetic.  
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 In its communiqué to the SJWE, the PPM made clear that the expectation of public, 
basic financial literacy, participation and awareness of the PRS as a result of the mass 
campaign was significantly beyond what the SJWE considered to be a plausible result 
(PPM 1999): 
A. At least 50% of the pension savers should make conscious decisions, i.e. making active decision in 
the PPM system. 
B. PPM should be a well-known concept/brand to 60% of those who can make these choices. 
C. 60% of those who have been in contact with PPM, the organisation, should perceive this institution as 
competent, easy to access and a clear partner throughout working life until the whole of the PPM 
pension has been paid out. 
D. At least 75% of the pension savers should have understood that they can make a decision about how 
the PPM pension capital can be invested. 
 
Several centre-right members of the commissions, tasked with the design of the new 
system, have confirmed that this expectation is in line with their objectives of fostering 
significantly improved levels of financial literacy and increased rates of active 
participation in the PRS across the divides of the Swedish economy (Interview 1, 
2006, Interview 2, 2005).  
 
The strategy used in the campaign included the employment of popular public figures 
to playfully explain the meaning of financial risk and practices of financial investment 
(e.g. in DVDs enclosed with the information packages sent out to pension savers). 
Moreover, following the strategy of the SAP’s 1982 Public Savings Scheme initiative, 
the advertisement agency sought to utilise labour unions and the people’s movements 
for reaching relatively non-financialised segments of the population. This was to be 
done through community meetings and discussion groups. That is, channels 
traditionally used to spread social democratic norms and values. In this endeavour, it 
encountered meanings and practices reflective of radically different economic 
aesthetics: 
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 There is a certain respect held for people from the big city/representatives of the State in the 
countryside, yet there is often a considerable distance in terms of shared values, norms and 
language, whereas in the big city there is a greater reticence to listen, although the audience is 
closer mentally. (Interview 3, 2006) 
 
This indicates that the potentials to re-socialise the population through advertisement 
and corporatist channels were constrained by economic aesthetics. Attitudes to 
financial services and financial markets seem to be possible to relate to the pervasive, 
yet uneven, transformations of the Swedish economy. Whilst media-intense processes 
of financialisation have been central to the ongoing constitution of the relationship 
between the pension saver and financial markets since the 1980s, receptivity to the 
campaign seemed linked to the uneven everyday exposure to different types of 
information about financial services and the financial markets. Exposure to financial 
messages, concepts and logics of practice depends largely on access to the financial 
media and the financialised spaces of the urban cores (Leyshon 2004). Also, the daily 
life networks of popular movement culture have eroded further in the big urban centres 
than elsewhere.  
 
However, in order to more closely assess the impact of the introduction, as including 
the mass campaign operationalised by the SJWE advertisement agency and continued 
by PPM, of the new pension system on economic aesthetics, a method of assessment is 
required. 
 
III Method of Assessment 
This assessment seeks to evaluate the success of the new pension system to regulate 
the economy, in the sense of the adopted Regulationist-SSIP approach. Firstly, as part 
of an accumulation strategy emerging out of the ‘big bang’ financial deregulation in 
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 the mid-1980s, the PRS is intended to play an increasingly important role, particularly 
if it is expanded as intended, in a Swedish coupon pool capitalism, in which the 
shareholder value paradigm is playing an increasingly important role. However, for 
this to be possible, the ‘active’ participation of Swedish pension savers is required. 
Indeed, the ‘passive’ choice of the index-tracking 7th AP Fund prevents, in accordance 
with Watson’s (2008) argument, shareholder value strategies from being effective in 
attracting capital. Yet, this active participation requires both receptivity to the ideas 
underpinning ‘active’ investment practices and the rejection of traditional social 
democratic politics of representation, in which equality and risk-sharing are key values 
and norms. An actively participating daily life can be characterised as a mass 
investment culture, particularly if it has the choice of being passive as in the PRS. 
Thus, the emergence of a mass investment culture is required for a Swedish coupon 
pool capitalism to form. 
 
The method devised to facilitate this assessment consists of the evaluation of six 
criteria directly linked to the above argument: 
 
Criterion 1 - Delegitimising Alternatives: A threat/set of threats have to be presented 
and internalised as undeniable and irreversible, so as to constitute a crisis of social 
democratic economic aesthetics, along with undeniable and seemingly persistent 
opportunities presented by financialisation.  
  
This criterion refers to the finance-oriented discursive construction of inverted 
Malthusianism discussed in chapter 1. According to this discourse, a traditional social 
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 democratic economy is not a viable option. Moreover, parametric reforms of PAYGO 
DB pension systems, like the ATP system, or raised taxes are not plausible alternatives 
in dealing with the costs of ageing populations. 
 
Criterion 2 – The Superiority of Financial Investment: It must be beyond popular 
doubt that financial market investment, in the long run, generates superior returns to 
alternative forms of investment. Therefore, mass society must understand financial risk 
as implying calculable uncertainty and thereby a source/measurement of opportunity 
(financial literacy).  
 
PAYGO DB pension systems must thus be understood as generating inferior rates of 
return to pensioners’ savings to that of the Swedish ‘Third Way’ ‘alternative’. In order 
for this to be understood as rational, financial risk must be accepted as a largely 
positive and calculable factor. 
 
Criterion 3 – Replacing Social Citizenship: Financial risk and significantly divergent 
financial outcomes as a consequence of the everyday practice of financial investment 
must be an accepted feature of economic life. This implies a shift from ‘equal work, 
equal pay’ to ‘equal work, unequal pay’.  
 
By accepting financial risk as largely positive and calculable, divergent financial 
outcomes become inevitable. However, divergent outcomes also have to be popularly 
accepted by a sufficiently large fraction of daily life for the system to be politically 
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 sustainable. The social citizenship, upon which the ATP system was based, must thus 
have been largely dismantled. 
 
Criterion 4 – Providing the Infrastructure: The constitutive institutions of the mass 
investment culture must sufficiently embody the ideas, norms and values, which 
encourage mass investment. As meaning and practice cannot be meaningfully 
separated according to the theorisation of economic aesthetics, these institutions must 
provide the infrastructure to enable the practice of investment in daily life.  
 
Accordingly, the PRS must embody the ideas, norms and values, which underpin the 
practices of equity investment conducive to a coupon pool capitalism, so that 
contradictions do not surface, which threaten the reproduction of the mass investment 
culture. 
 
Criteria 5 – Financial Literacy: For high rates of ‘active’ participation to be possible, 
mass society must have the belief that it is sufficiently financially literate to over time 
successfully engage in the everyday practice of financial investment. Naturally, the 
sponsoring elites cannot express serious doubt about popular financial literacy. 
 
If mass society believes itself to be financially illiterate, according to the ‘active’ 
definition of PPM, ‘passive’ choices are likely to be made rather than ‘active’ ones, 
although the financially literate option would be to make a ‘passive’ choice.. 
Consequently, financial literacy, according to the ‘active’ definition of PPM, is crucial 
 246 
 for the system of mass choice not to be undermined, which in turn could result in the 
exit of the participating mutual funds from the system. 
 
Criterion 6 – High ‘Active’ Participation Rates: Sufficiently high ‘active’ 
participation rates in the PRS must be mobilised so as to ensure the production of the 
PRS’s political legitimacy.  
 
Given PPM’s strong discouragement of ‘passive’ investment, ‘active’ participation 
rates must be sufficiently high in order for the system not to be delegitimised. High 
‘active’ participation rates are also necessary to generate the required dynamics for the 
system, as constituted by very large numbers of ‘unit trust’ funds, not to draw too high 
administrative costs. Moreover, the regulation (satisfaction) of the financial sector 
hinges upon this. 
 
IV Assessing the Rise of A Mass Investment Culture 
 
(a) Criterion 1 - Delegitimising Alternatives 
This particular criterion is broadly satisfied. The ATP pension system had started to 
become presented as incompatible with a financially deregulated economy shortly after 
the ‘big bang’ (Konjunkturrådet 1986: 73). Financial deregulation had totally changed 
the context of the AP Funds’ investment activities. The resulting boom on the 
Stockholm stock exchange rendered, as I showed in chapter 4, the AP Funds 
increasingly obsolete as a source of credit. The SAP’s move to change their investment 
criteria in 1992 also fundamentally undermined their ‘socialist’ potential. Moreover, 
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 with the pension reform, much of the capital accumulated in the AP Funds (SEK 
700bn) has been used to smooth the transition to the new system (the so-called ‘double 
payment problem’). Nevertheless, these latter two moves would not have been possible 
had not the ATP system become fundamentally delegitimised through the 
proclamation of inverted Malthusianism by neoliberal think tanks (SNS Konjunkturråd 
1988, 1989), interest groups (Skattebetalarnas Förening 1991; SAF 1992; 
Försäkringsförbundet 1991, 1993) and the financial sector (e.g. Banco Spar 1992-
1993), or the neoliberal shift among SAP elites (Ryner 2004).  
 
In these campaigns and reports, inverted Malthusianism was discursively constructed 
so as to require risk-privatising solutions. Emphasising the growing ‘systemic risks’ of 
the ATP system and the decreasing coverage it provided to higher income earners (due 
to its inbuilt ceilings), a fear of radically reduced consumption levels was being 
produced. The embrace of risk-induced private pension savings was the only offered 
solution. However, practices of financial investment were depicted as ‘good for the 
character’ by enabling the self to acquire more freedom, autonomy and responsibility 
(see Rose 1999: 154). Also, economists and politicians, on all sides, came increasingly 
to emphasise the importance of risk-privatisation for the efficiency of the market. With 
the full employment commitment abandoned and Swedish industry declining in 
competitiveness, the economy was no longer capable of generating the growth required 
to sustain the system. The consolidation of this situation came with the ‘tax reform of 
the century’, which prevented any tax-related solutions to the growing costs of the 
ageing population. The resulting huge increases in private pension plans and equity 
savings (Berg and Bergström 1995) questioned the need for the risk-socialising ATP 
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 system. Nevertheless, the willingness of wage-earners to support the system remained 
high as always (Svallfors 1996).  
 
According to this discourse, a parametric reform of the ATP system was not a 
legitimate solution. However, to introduce an extreme risk-privatising system, like the 
Chilean one would not have been politically feasible given the strong adherence of 
much of the electorate to risk-sharing and substantial pensions. The reformers had to 
construct a ‘Third Way’ alternative, which subversively introduced financialising 
pensions to daily life. 
 
(b) Criterion 2 – The Superiority of Financial Investment 
As I argued in chapter 1, the Swedish ‘Third Way’ pension system is a policy 
instrument designed to obscure the shift in underpinning values and norms from 
potentially oppositional elements. Yet, it also effectively depoliticises pensions as its 
main part, the Income Pension, is automatically adjusted for growth and demographic 
shifts. The Centre Party chairman of the reform commissions, Bo Könberg has 
consequently predicted that the new pension system “will last until the next ice age” 
(Könberg in Lundberg 2005b: 6fn.2). With regard to the PRS, PPM has explicit 
socialisation functions, yet the individual is in a financial relationship with financial 
markets, not the State. The State does not take any responsibility for the performance 
of pension savings in the PRS beyond the information and educational activities 
provided by the PPM. Both of these two pillars are thus consistent with the neoliberal 
ethic of individualizing costs, depoliticisation of pension provision and limiting the 
redistribution of resources.  
 249 
  
Based on the Feldsteinian ideas on the historically superior returns of equity savings in 
a system like the PRS to those generated by a PAYGO DB system, like the ATP 
system, it is assumed that lower pension contributions will be offset by high returns on 
investments in the PRS to create equally high pension levels in the new system. 
According to Pia Nilsson, CEO of the Swedish Mutual Fund Association 
(Fondbolagens Förening), “[a]ll experience shows that stocks, on the average in the 
long run, give higher returns than so called interest-investments” (my transl., 2000: 
11). As Ippolito and Bodie argued in chapter 1, such arguments do not consider 
sufficiently the financial risks in a funded system with a maturing portfolio.  
 
Yet, such concerns were ignored at the time of the launch of the PRS. As the tech-
stock bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000 was about to implode, financial 
investment, through the PRS, was universally introduced to Swedish daily life. 
Financial risks were presented by PPM as largely determinate, knowable and implying 
endless opportunities rather than being dangerous (Forslund 2004). Thus, 
paradoxically, at a time when the calculation of financial risk was at its most complex, 
the construction of risk was at its most positive and assertive.  
 
The overconfidence in the superiority of equity investment, greatly magnified by the 
business media, influenced the behaviour of societal groups, otherwise highly reluctant 
to appreciate financial risk and the everyday practice of finance investment. The 
bubble served to convince such groups to marginalise, or at least temporarily suspend, 
resistant logics and attitudes (Elmbrant 2005). Even the otherwise most financially 
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 inconfident pension saver suddenly saw himself as a ‘speculating yuppie’, confidently 
investing in financial markets (see De Goede 2004: 207). Yet, this confidence was 
replaced with deep suspicion following the bubble’s traumatising implosion (Elmbrant 
2005). 
 
(c) Criterion 3 – Replacing Social Citizenship 
Although the PAYGO DB ATP system was delegitimised in the early 1990s by 
invoking the threat of inverted Malthusianism, pensions as defined by social 
citizenship, has been one of the most central notions to social democratic economic 
aesthetics. Indeed, without the income security derived from defined pensions the 
consumerist quest for truth could not have been pursued. The ATP pension system 
enabled dreams of social mobility, as measured largely by consumption, to be 
nourished over the life cycle. However, these dreams were expressions of individuality 
in a solidaristic social environment, although largely illusionary, as the pension system 
did not substantially support such mobility. The individual autonomy enabled by the 
pension system, particularly to men, as part of the de-commodifying welfare State, was 
hi-jacked by the neoliberal counter-offensive, which sought to inspire individual 
entrepreneurship, risk-privatisation and de-collectivisation. These processes have, 
continued, as Henreksson and Jakobsson show, with an impact upon the legitimacy of 
risk-socialising welfare institutions (2003: 90-91). Just that the welfare state continues 
to be universalist does not necessarily entail that it retains substantial support in the 
increasingly financialised everyday (cf. Steinmo 2003). As Mahon (2007: 83-84) 
claims, on the basis of attitudes among politicians and citizenry, support for the 
substantial and universalist welfare state is being undermined by the growing 
acceptance of the post-industrial trilemma thesis (discussed in chapter 2). Indeed, 
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 politics matters to the prospects of survival for de-commodifying social citizenship. 
Considering the underpinning neoliberal ethic of the new pension system, its reception 
promises to be indicative of Swedish welfare State politics and citizenship. Here, the 
individualisms emerging out of the crises of the ‘Swedish Model’ seem crucial for an 
understanding of the direction of the Swedish economy and the reception of the new 
pension system.  
 
Pettersson and Geyer argue that the new individualists, 
[c]ompared with the less individualistically-inclined,…do not show any stronger interest in 
increasing today’s wage differentials, they do not evidence any greater tendency to view the 
poor with a ‘they-just-have-themselves-to-blame’ attitude, they do not show any stronger 
tendency to regard their fellow beings in less of a spirit of trust and fellowship…They are 
neither the irrepressible entrepreneurs imagined by the Neo-liberals, nor the selfish egoists 
supposed by the Social Democrats. (in Rothstein 2001: 220) 
 
Rothstein suggests that instead of the emergence of a strong ‘egoistic individualism’, 
‘solidaristic individualism’ has stepped forward. Although seemingly contradictory, 
this concept entails that solidarity is not necessarily collectivist, “that is, that people 
have more or less the same values and share the same life-styles and may be interested 
in and engaged in the same organizations”, (such as the ‘People’s Movements’) as 
under the Fordist ‘golden age’ (ibid.). By ‘solidaristic individualism’, Rothstein means 
“that individuals are willing to give support to other individuals but also accept that 
they have other, different values and want to engage themselves for different causes” 
(ibid.). However, this solidaristic inclination is predicated upon the trust in reciprocity, 
which actually increased from 1981 to 1996, and was positively correlated with 
variables such as “education, activity in organizations, and satisfaction with 
democracy” (ibid.: 229). It seems, on the surface, as if these solidaristic individuals are 
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 fairly well, young and educated social liberals, supportive of the universalist welfare 
State rather than suspicious of it. 
 
In July 2006, in the mid-stages of the election campaign, former SAP Prime Minister 
Persson stated, arguably in response to these solidaristic individuals’ support of the 
universalist welfare state and in a book fittingly titled See Yourself in Others: About 
Our Need For Solidarity in Times of Globalisation (my transl.), that the new pension 
system had to be critically revisited in order to address the growing injustices within it. 
Two years earlier, the SAP Finance Minister Pär Nuder had provocatively stated that 
the large “40s generation”62 was going to cause considerable problems to subsequent 
generations given the large pension expenditures expected and the automatic 
adjustment this was going to trigger (Expressen 1/12/2004). Klevmarken et al. (2006) 
as well as a study by the State Statistics Bureau (SCB) (2006) supported Persson’s 
concerns, by stipulating that the pension system as a whole is likely to generate 
significantly lower pension levels in the future than the status quo claims of its 
sponsoring politicians and cadres. 
 
(d) Criterion 4 – Providing the Infrastructure 
If the PRS is supposed to support the emergence of a mass investment culture, 
constituted by active investor subjects, as well as providing the dynamics for a coupon 
pool capitalism, then the system must emulate the choices available outside the system. 
It has done so by offering an ‘active’ choice of 5 between 750-800 ‘unit trust’ funds. It 
must also seek to encourage frequent participation in the system. This was supposed to 
62 The size of which is largely a consequence of SAP welfare and family policies during and after the 
Second World War. 
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 be catered for by allowing free and unlimited swaps of funds. By, in addition, actively 
discouraging the ‘passive’ choice of the index-tracking 7th AP Fund, the neoliberal 
positive as well as normative notion of ‘consumer choice’ is fully embraced.  
 
As suggested above and in chapter 1, however, the PRS embodies two seemingly 
contradictory set of ideas. The abundance of choice puts exceptionally high demands 
on the accessibility and quality of information, as well as the financial literacy of 
pension savers. The freedom of the ‘unit trust’ funds to target competitively pension 
savers with advertisements promises to add to these demands. Consequently, and in 
recognition of the information asymmetries, not only between provider and consumer 
but also between consumers, the PPM has adopted a ‘libertarian paternalist’ stance in 
relation to pension savers (Cronqvist and Thaler 2007: 424-428). Nevertheless, this has 
been shown to be insufficient. As Benartzi and Thaler (2002) as well as Sundén (2004) 
have argued, from a behavioural finance perspective, the choice is simply too large for 
‘rational’ decisions to be possible, even for supposedly financially literate investors 
(see also Froud et al. 2007). Instead, Cronqvist and Thaler (2007: 428) claim that the 
optimal number of funds may be as low as 3. Also, according to orthodox financial 
economics, as pointed to by Watson (see chapter 2), a large choice is not of value in 
itself. According to orthodox financial economics, tracking the index is the optimal 
portfolio strategy. Yet, this would completely neutralise shareholder value strategies, 
which are central to coupon pool capitalism. Thus, with the present system, 
contradictions are bound to express themselves on the level of participation, and if 
‘active’ participation is widespread, this is likely to add to the inequality already 
inscribed into the system. 
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(e) Criterion 5 – Financial Literacy 
PPM’s ‘active’ definition of financial literacy is of crucial significance to the 
legitimacy of the extreme ‘pro choice’ PRS. At the launch of the PRS in 2000, a large 
percentage made ‘active choices’ under the conditions of the tech-stock bubble. Little 
research has been done on the economic aesthetics of those who actually make these 
choices actively and their levels of financial literacy. However, according to Annika 
Sundén, former advisor to the government on pensions, in the first fund selection in 
2000 “[w]omen were somewhat more likely than men to make a choice, and as 
expected, high-income participants were more likely to take an active role than low-
income participants.” However, drawing firm conclusions from this first round of fund 
selection is not possible, according to Sundén. This, she claims, is because since the 
deflation of the tech-stock bubble, the default, index-tracking 7th AP Fund has 
performed significantly better (around 10%) than the average portfolio of the active 
participant in the PRS (until 2004). Moreover, she suggests that “[o]ne explanation 
might be that the PRS received much less attention in more recent enrolment periods: 
advertising fell dramatically, as did private fund manager publicity efforts as compared 
to the initial election period” (Sundén 2004: 14-15). 
 
A ‘passive’ choice, whether strategic or out of ‘real’ passivity, has proven to be a more 
profitable course of action. Moreover, reduced exposure to information about the PRS 
seems to have made first-time choosers less attentive, and hence maybe more passive 
with regard to their pension savings in the PRS. However, not even the default fund 
has given positive returns in the 2000-2003 period, but a 29.9% negative result 
(Cronqvist and Thaler in Sundén 2004). Although the information about this is limited, 
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 it is plausible that the “willing investors”, often high income-earners and women, are 
those who are the most confident and those who make the most ‘active’ choices in the 
PRS. Nevertheless, we can also infer from the work of Klevmarken (2006) and the 
research conducted by Länsförsäkringar/Länsspar (2002, 2005) that this group is 
proportionately poorly represented in the rural areas, most adversely affected by the 
brutal economic policies of the ‘Swedish Model’ and neoliberal restructuring since the 
1980s. According to a 2005 survey, only 6 per cent of pension savers considered 
themselves to be sufficiently financially literate to invest confidently in the PRS, while 
11 per cent claimed to be almost sufficiently financially literate (Sweden. SOU 2005: 
87: 244).  
 
Drawing upon these findings, former SAP Prime Minister Persson claimed that 
Swedish daily life was ‘not ready’ for a shift to financialisation. In vague terms, he 
explained that the meanings and practices of the new pension system “is so remote” 
from prevailing economic aesthetics (my transl., Dagens Industri 18/02/2005). Such a 
critical assessment of the risk-privatising pension system, along with the ones 
presented under criterion 3, may very well have significantly impacted upon the 
legitimacy of the system.  
 
(f) Criterion 6 – High ‘Active’ Participation Rates 
The launch of the PRS seemed a success with regard to the definition of participation 
of PPM. 67% of the first-time fund choosers made an ‘active’ choice in 2000. But with 
the end of the bubble, popular confidence imploded. A mere 8.4% made an active 
choice in early 2003, and just 8.0% in early 2005 (PPM 2003, 2005). Nevertheless, it 
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 should, of course, be recalled that the first-time choosers in 2000 included all age 
groups whereas the subsequent cohorts were more or less all young adults, who 
according to Feldstein’s ‘humped life-cycle’ are significantly less interested in saving 
for their retirement. The extremely low number of active participants in the PRS and 
the seemingly limited “rational” appreciation of the notion of risk and risk calculation, 
even when financial markets again are showing signs of being ‘bull markets’, seems to 
suggest that there is low confidence in the PRS, but also that pension saver confidence 
is strongly related to developments on the Swedish stock exchange. The PRS/PPM has 
thus become a problem for the legitimacy of the sponsoring actors and the continued 
development of a mass investment culture (Benartzi and Thaler 2002; Sundén 2004; 
Forslund 2004), compelling the government to commission large-scale reviews. The 
most high-profile review suggested an improvement of the quality of information 
provided and a reduction of unit trust funds (Sweden. SOU 2005: 87). 
 
The Swedish State Audit (Riksrevisionen) stated in its 2004 review that “PPM cannot 
fully provide the support that is demanded and does not have the capacity to turn 
several million [pension] savers into good managers of capital” (my transl., 2004: 33). 
Consequently, the mandate and objectives to generate a mass investment culture were 
changed. Surprisingly, they were made more ambitious: 
 
In 2007                  Situation 2003 
80 % should know about the opportunities given in the PRS                  42 % 
90 % should be pleased w/ the service & information provided by the PPM                            70 % 
60 % should consider themselves to have sufficient knowledge to manage their PRS savings          49 % 
(Riksrevisionen 2004: 32) 
 
These objectives seem lofty, if not naïve, and are likely to reduce the already limited 
credibility of this political project. Indeed, this naivety on behalf of the PPM may have 
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 contributed to the suggestion by a recent public enquiry that it should be dismantled 
altogether (Sweden. SOU 2006:111). 
 
Moreover, a KPMG report, released in 2005, testified of serious financial imbalances 
in the PRS. Insufficiently ‘active’ pension savers were raising the administrative costs 
of the system. However, the initially high costs related to the launch of the system and 
the large scale information campaigns (Sweden. Ministry of Finance 2005b) are 
expected to be reduced in the medium-term both in real terms, but also in proportion to 
the accumulated capital in the PRS. However, these predictions rely upon increasing 
participation rates among the pension savers, as relatively high fixed costs are 
proportionately lowered in relation to the low running costs.  
 
An interesting part of the system is an anti-monopolistic mechanism, which 
progressively penalises those funds which attract the most pension savers. The greater 
the pension capital the higher are the charges required to be paid to the PPM authority 
(Riksrevisionen 2004: 41-42). In other words, to ensure competition pension savers 
have to pay higher arbitrage fees for the more popular, and often historically the most 
successful, mutual funds. Too great a spread of pension capital, however, over the 
several hundred fund managers generates high running costs for participating funds 
and lowered incomes for the PPM. In order to avoid mutual fund defection from the 
PRS, participation rates must increase. If not, the design of the PRS seems to cause its 
own demise. 
 
We cannot expect pension savers to possess financial literacy, as informed by financial 
economics, which would advice to always opt for an index-tracking portfolio strategy. 
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 Therefore, could their propensity to ‘passively’ choose the index-tracking 7th AP Fund 
be a “common sense strategy”, cyclically following the developments on the (Swedish) 
financial markets? Swedish daily life has otherwise come to show a remarkable risk 
propensity, according to which investment in assets oscillates between the housing 
market and the stock exchange (Berg and Berger 2005). This seems to be reflected to a 
very limited extent in the investment decisions in the PRS. Had this oscillation been 
characteristic also of the PRS system, it would seem logical that the rate of ‘active’ 
choices would have increased rapidly with the return of ‘bull markets’ in 2005. Hence, 
there is good reason to believe that the financialisation of the public pension system 
carries more than a meaning of use value.  
 
Indeed, a number of factors seem to play a role in the determination of ‘active’ choices 
in the PRS. Firstly, the introduction of the PRS implied that a large number of pension 
savers, who previously had not held equity savings, became exposed to the meanings 
and practices of financial investment. With the bursting of the bubble, these 
inexperienced savers became traumatised and have since been reluctant to make 
‘active’ choices. Secondly, following the emergence of a strong segmentation of 
economic aesthetics in the Swedish economy, a clear three-tier division between ‘the 
willing investors’, ‘the unwilling, but persuadable’ and ‘the hopeless’ has formed. It is 
highly conceivable that the 67% who made ‘active’ choices in the first fund selection 
in 2000 correspond with the first two tiers. Subsequently, the second tier has retreated 
to becoming ‘passive’ pension savers. Thirdly, the democratic deficit in the pension 
reform and the neoliberal ethic of the resulting system has alienated the Swedish 
citizenry from the new pension system. This should of course be related to the deep-
seated role the ATP pension system had in traditional social democratic politics of 
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 representation. The emergence of a large segment of young and solidaristic 
individualists with a strong taste for democracy and the welfare State may also have 
contributed to the low rates of ‘active’ participation since the first fund selection in 
2000. To them and other reluctant or marginalised social ‘groups’, the new risk-
privatising pension system symbolises the abandonment of risk-sharing egalitarianism 
in Sweden. Thus, the new system, with its subversive neoliberal origins, meanings and 
practices, is, in agreement with former SAP Prime Minister, remote from dominant 
economic aesthetics. 
 
Nevertheless, capitalism is a powerful force and economic aesthetics are not 
immutable. Despite its unpopularity, the new pension system, with the PRS at the 
forefront of change, may in time, if it is capable of becoming a normal part of the 
increasingly financialised everyday, serve to cultivate a mass investment culture. 
Universalist financialisation, through the new pension system and funded corporatist 
pension arrangements, has made equity ownership a natural part of Swedish daily life. 
By 2006 the following data could be presented by the Swedish Mutual Fund 
Association: 
 
• 94 per cent of the Swedish population between the ages 18-74 save in mutual funds 
• Beyond the PRS, 77 per cent save in mutual funds 
• 71 per cent of all children own mutual funds 
• Shortly after pensions (54%), the most common reason for mutual fund ownership 
is to create a buffer against unexpected expenses. 
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 Considering the changes in the labour contract and the gradual undermining of welfare 
institutions, financialisation is well underway in Sweden, yet the public pension 
system signifies something more than just the provision of pensions. It has a crucial 
regulatory role. With regard to the PRS, coupon pool capitalism cannot meaningfully 
develop in Sweden, at least in the short- to medium-term, without a mass investment 
culture developing out of this system.  
 
V Conclusion 
This chapter has brought the study of subject-formation in the context of the 
restructuring of the Swedish economy up to date. Critical in doing so is of course the 
consideration of the Swedish pension reform. The new hybrid pension system has a 
clear neoliberal ethic, and with the PRS an ambitious state-sponsored project of 
popularising financial investment has been launched. The contrasts between the 
economic aesthetics emerging out of social democratic capitalist modernity and the 
risk-calculating agencies formed under processes of neoliberal restructuring and 
financial deregulation are stark. Yet, there is a degree of continuity in the gradual shift 
from the former to the latter. The analysis in this chapter of this tendential shift took 
the form of an evaluation of a set of six criteria directly linked to the new pension 
system, and particularly the PRS. The results are far from conclusive, merely testifying 
of tendencies towards individualism in subject-formation in daily life. These 
tendencies, however, point to the fact that the public pension system is about more 
than just ‘use value’. It is of great symbolic value and the signs point to that the new 
pension system is not accepted as a normal and legitimate part of the economy. 
Considering its design and process of introduction, the new pension system is at the 
core of a project of subversive neoliberalism, which seeks to subject daily life to 
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 financialising dynamics, which in turn would support the emergence of a coupon pool 
capitalism in the Swedish economy. The partial rejection of this project has been 
picked up by the traditional guarantors of public pensions, the SAP, however, the party 
is still just paying lip-service to a commitment to reform. More fundamentally, it has 
lost most of its credibility for such a conflictual political project.  
 
In the concluding remarks, I will briefly summarise the argument of this thesis and 
speculate about the future, particularly in the light of some recent developments with 
regard to a shift of emphasis in the finance-oriented accumulation strategy in Sweden: 
Finansplats Stockholm. I will also briefly consider the significance of this study for the 
project of European integration, and here especially the case of France. 
 
 262 
 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analysed the 1999 Swedish pension reform as a critical case study for 
the future viability of social democracy in the paradigmatic Swedish economy. Yet, 
interestingly, the particular design of the Swedish reform has come to play a key role 
in international and, more recently, European pension policy debates. As the World 
Bank’s neoliberal and extremely risk-privatising policy agenda in the 1990s and early 
2000s encountered stiff resistance, particularly in ‘social Europe’, the Swedish reform 
presented itself as a blessed ‘third way’.  
 
However, as an ILO economist pointed out, it is just the old wine in a new bottle. The 
Swedish reformers implemented a neoliberal reform under the guise of continuity with 
traditional social democratic values, meanings and practices. With the new system, the 
Swedish neoliberal reformers sought to subversively introduce a new market Zeitgeist 
to a social democratic society still substantially compensated for ‘the ills’ of 
disciplinary financial markets (“compensatory neoliberalism”, Ryner 2002). To make 
Swedish daily life embrace and actively participate in a ‘mass investment culture’, the 
new pension system highlighted the importance of individual risk and savings for 
pensions in particular, and the economy in general. The Swedish variant of the 
‘knowledge-based economy’ was going to benefit from the new pension system’s 
contribution to more efficient financial markets. I understand this accumulation 
strategy as ‘subversively neoliberal’.  
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 With pension reform still being high on the European policy agenda, with powerful 
neoliberal and financial forces pushing for the privatisation of risk and a ‘financialised’ 
European ‘new economy’ and ‘European daily life’ holding onto promises of a ‘social 
Europe’ (Mathers 2007), the Swedish case can also be significant for the future of the 
European project of integration. This is not least the case as Sweden remains a 
paradigmatic reference for social democracy in Europe.  
 
The first chapter sought to show the strong political dimension to the discursive 
construction of ‘Inverted Malthusianism’, the wedding of ‘the problem’ of ageing 
populations to ‘the solution’ of financialisation. These politics develop out of a 
neoliberal agenda promoted not the least by the World Bank, but also the OECD, the 
EU Commission and lobby groups representing transnational capital. This agenda 
relies heavily upon a laggard and selective appropriation of Neo-classical Economics. 
The chapter goes on to critically conceptualise the relationship between neoliberalism, 
transnational finance and Neo-classical Economics, and particularly the latter’s more 
sophisticated ‘Rational Choice’ approach. These all share a superficial, rationalist 
ontology and a problematically parsimonious epistemology. As such, they are 
incapable of understanding complex processes of subject-formation in the everyday, 
and thus how ‘financialisation’ unfolds in different spatial, social and historical 
contexts. Nevertheless, they may still have the impact of socialising subjectivities into 
conformity with the discipline of financial markets. Rationalist discourses and policies 
have a tendency, at this historical juncture, to reproduce themselves in everyday life. 
However, this tendency can only be assessed through critical-theoretical engagement.   
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 Chapter two, therefore, develops a critical Regulationist-SSIP perspective, which, in 
contrast to rationalist discourses, understands the economy as fundamentally social and 
necessitating the reproduction of legitimacy in daily life in order to avoid crisis. It 
proceeds by critically engaging with the rational choice-inflected, dominant 
‘institutionalist’ literature to show the need for such an approach. It thus points to the 
centrality of ‘regularisation’ of meanings and practices in the economy.  
 
Chapter three explores this notion of ‘regularisation’ through the development of the 
concept of ‘financialisation’, as a historically continuous and spatially specific set of 
processes promoting the privatisation and regulation of risk in the everyday. However, 
the strategic constitution of investor subjects is not smooth, but a fragile set of 
processes, which produce unintended outcomes. Out of financialisation, different 
forms of resistance may thus emerge along the divisions and conflicts that it produces. 
This conceptualisation takes neo-Marxist understandings of financialisation beyond its 
structural impasses without abandoning the notion of the economy as inevitably 
generating deep inequities and struggle. Moreover, it pushes the research agenda on 
financialisation to consider cases beyond the Anglo-American economies, to which 
research so far has been restricted. Indeed, it could be claimed that this is precisely 
what research on financialisation should be doing at this juncture where the struggle 
over pension reform continues unabated. I will return to this shortly below. 
 
The fourth chapter then applies this critical SSIP-Regulationist approach to the 
Swedish pension reform. As such, it analyses the significance of the regulatory role of 
pension provision in the Swedish economy. I here demonstrate the centrality of 
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 pensions to subject-formation from the formation of social democratic capitalist 
modernity to present-day finance-oriented neoliberal restructuring. This analysis 
conceives of the Swedish post-war ATP pension system as crucial for generating 
institutional complementarity and as at the top of the institutional hierarchy. It 
identifies and discusses three crises of Swedish social democratic ‘regularisation’ 
starting in the late 1960s and continuing with the recent pension reform. The emphasis 
on pensions is here shown to be crucial as it allows for the study of the shifts in the 
meanings and practices in daily life from the 1930s to present day. The analysis 
demonstrates that the significance of the ATP pension system for regularising mass 
consumption in the 1950s and 1960 cannot be underestimated. I argued that 
consumption, in the heydays of the ‘Swedish Model’, was reified to entail the quest for 
truth in daily life. This quest was challenged from within the labour movement in the 
late 1960s to produce the first crisis of Swedish social democracy. The second crisis of 
Swedish social democracy came to the surface with the neoliberalisation of the SAP in 
the 1980s and the early 1990s. Social democratic elites formulated the Swedish ‘third 
way’, which opened the economy up to the discipline of financial markets. This was 
consolidated through the accession to the European Union in the first half of the 1990s 
and the retaining of a strong ‘compensatory’ commitment (“compensatory 
neoliberalism”, Ryner 2002). 
 
The sixth chapter finally turns to the assessment of the success of the project of 
‘Subversive Neoliberalism’ through the introduction of the Swedish ‘third way’ 
pension system. Although the historical extension of the previous research on the 
neoliberal restructuring of the Swedish economy (e.g. Svensson 2001; Ryner 2002; 
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 Blyth 2002) hence is modest, it is significant because it tests the capacity of neoliberal 
policy-makers to transform the paradigmatically social democratic Swedish economy 
in its microfoundations, when the rest of the economy already is far down the path 
towards financialisation. By addressing this project of financialisation, key to subject-
formation in daily life, in the light of the internationally celebrated Swedish ‘Third 
Way’ reform, I have emphasised existing resistant logics and institutions to 
financialisation. It thus assesses the most recent iteration of the neoliberal project in 
Sweden to deepen financial market discipline from a historical perspective. As such, 
this project is aimed at subjecting Swedish daily life to financial market dynamics, 
forcing the pension saver to consider the performance of her or his financial assets 
before consuming. Given the inbuilt sensitivity of the ‘Income Pension’ to economic 
and demographic shifts, consumption levels may be seriously challenged under 
negative conditions. This threat is of course reinforced by the introduction of the 
funded Premium Reserve System and the reform of the employers’ pension systems. 
This potentially constitutes a third crisis of Swedish social democracy. However, as I 
have argued above, in moments of crisis there are opportunities for change and this 
may work in the favour of a more traditional social democracy.  
 
The argument presented suggests that, despite neoliberal restructuring and a finance-
oriented accumulation strategy formed in the late 1970s, there is still a breeding 
ground for social democracy in Sweden in 2007. This is founded on evidence of 
tendencies to resist financialisation in daily life. Despite that the new pension system 
has produced a ‘mass investment society’, there is no ‘mass investment culture’. The 
active management of financial risk has not become a mass phenomenon, as evidenced 
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 by ‘active’ participation rates in the PRS system. Still, decommodifying welfare 
provision is very popular and values of solidarity and equality of outcome are held in 
high esteem in Sweden. Hence, a lifeline for a more traditional social democracy 
exists, but it is thin.  
 
The contribution of this thesis is therefore significant in its findings because it shows 
the limits of the Swedish neoliberal project at this historical conjuncture. Indeed, as 
PPM chief economist Daniel Barr recently admitted: the active involvement of 
Swedish daily life into circuits of financial capital is limited to around twenty percent 
of the Swedish population. The large majority of pension savers are instead remaining 
‘passive’, index-tracking investors (Barr 2008). This may, nevertheless, be the more 
sensible investment strategy with the result that the risk exposure of most pension 
savers is reduced.  
 
However, this ‘popular sensibility’ in relation to meanings and practices of financial 
investment may be challenged by a new phase in the development of a finance-
oriented neoliberal accumulation strategy, which seems to be crystallising. The 
financial lobby has grown extremely strong in Sweden with financial liberalisation, 
particularly since the labour movement has retreated from its positions of veto power 
in the economy. The recently expelled SAP government took a very serious interest in 
the financial sector’s most recent grand vision: ‘Financial Centre Stockholm’ 
(Finansplats Stockholm). This project, now also officially supported by the newly 
elected centre-right government, aims at creating a financial centre in Stockholm for 
the Baltic region. Under the regulatory auspices of the European project, seeking to 
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 construct an internal market for financial services, the Swedish financial sector is 
aiming to carve out a Baltic market with itself at its core. I believe that this may very 
well be a project to provide a new source of impetus for the financialisation of Swedish 
daily life with the pension system so far failing to generate a mass investment culture. 
Whether the remaining thin lifeline for Swedish social democracy will be strong 
enough to respond politically to such a development, only the future can tell. With the 
radical elements of the Swedish labour movement silenced in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Ryner 2004), the intellectual leadership for such a revival might be lacking. Yet, this 
must be considered in the light of recent developments in Swedish politics.  
 
The fall of SAP leader Göran Persson in the 2006 elections and the moderation of the 
neoliberalism of the victorious Centre-Right alliance have implied new potential 
political contingencies. As Persson’s successor Mona Sahlin has taken a considerable 
right-turn, the silenced radical elements of the labour movement may be regaining its 
voice. At the same time, the Centre-Right Reinfeldt government is scoring very low on 
opinion polls. With over two years left before the next elections, the electoral future is, 
however, uncertain. Popular responses to financialisation may, particularly in the 
context of great instability on financial markets worldwide, however strongly 
contribute to the outcome of these elections.  
 
Beyond Sweden, the French case promises to be of great importance to studies of 
welfare State restructuring in the light of financialisation. While the dominant Swedish 
ATP pension system was a rather distinctly State-administered system in the post-war 
period, French post-war pensions were largely the realm of the trade unions. As such, 
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 French trade unions had a particular stake in the provision of pensions. Now, with 
French labour unions on the defensive ever since the Mitterand administration’s 
famous ‘U-turn’ in 1982, the struggle over the direction of pension reform is fierce 
with the Sarkoszy government pushing for risk-privatisation to accompany the 
impressive rate of disintermediation, financialisation and transnationalisation of the 
French corporate economy (Morin 2000; Clift 2004). In France, this struggle has taken 
on a politico-symbolical dimension that has been largely absent so far in Sweden. 
Resistance to subversively neoliberal attempts to reform pensions and the constitution 
of French investor subjects has brought the general direction of economic 
transformation to the surface. In this context, the role of the European project has also 
become part of the conflict (van Apeldoorn 2006). The legitimacy of the increasingly 
‘unsocial’ European project is fading quickly (Mathers 2007). Again, the outcome is 
uncertain and contingent upon politics, both more traditionally perceived and in the 
meanings and practices of daily life. 
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